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The ‘holy grail’ of both AI and cognitive science is human-level intelligence. Whereas AI relies
on computer algorithms to simulate human abilities, cognitive scientists investigate the brain to
understand the underlying mechanisms. For most of human history, emotions were thought to
be nothing more than disturbances for cognition. Therefore, they were usually ostracized from
research on intelligence. As a result, cognitive architectures only partially include emotions in
their design, if at all. Recently, though, it was discovered that emotions and cognition are in
fact inter-dependent systems. Consequently, before being able to fully replicate human-level
intelligence, it is necessary to understand the concept of emotions and its many roles within the
brain. In this thesis, working around the lack of definition for emotion, I show that emotions
inform the brain as to the nature of a given situation and guide the decision-making process,
to increase the survival potential of virtual agents. In particular ProtoEmo, an architecture
replicating the circuits found at the base of the forebrain, is shown to have the ability to detect
stimuli relevant to the survival of virtual agents. Hence, it outperforms other emotional agents
in terms of survival capabilities, which are measured by the size of the remaining population
at the end of a resource foraging task. PrimEmo, the architecture born from the integration
of ProtoEmo with standard models of the reward and decision-making systems in the brain,
displays survival capabilities similar to the advantage actor-critic algorithm. PrimEmo also
shows promises for supporting primitive emotions characterized by their level of ‘arousal’
and ‘valence’. After further refinement, PrimEmo could replace the core decision-making
module of a cognitive architecture, such as ACT-R or SOAR. Not only would it confer
survival capabilities to the architecture, it would also allow for the possibility of investigating
full-fledged emotions, and even emotional expression.
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turn, PF ValṠwitch encodes both the emotional signal and mental focus and
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Along with the development of service robots (like Softbank Robotics’ pepper robot), smart
personal assistants (such as the Google Home or the Amazon Echo) and video games, the need
for improving Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) is becoming increasingly important. Within the
field of affective science, this new interest for social robots has revitalized two related topics:
emotions recognition and emotional expression. Looking at the advances brought by the service
and entertainment industries, as well as their products currently on the market, one could easily
believe that science already solved the mystery behind human emotions. However, it could not
be further from the truth. The reason is that most of the computational models resulting from
this endeavor are shallow (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Scherer et al., 2010; Sloman, 2001).
Shallow here, is taken to mean that the machine executing the program does not have emotions
of its own, and neither does it have any understanding of the concept of affect be it for human
or virtual agents (a similar argument was made by Searle (1980) concerning the ‘mind’ and the
machine in his well-known thought experiment called the ‘Chinese Room’). Their shallowness,
therefore, comes from the fact that agents in the context of human interaction have no need
for emotions of their own. Even without understanding the concept of affect, they are more
than capable of categorizing emotions (based on facial expressions for example), then use this
labeled information to decide which action to perform next. Therefore, through the clever use
of machine learning and other techniques from the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI), it is
possible to give the illusion of personality. Consequently, this thesis stems from a desire to go
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beyond those shallow models and explore the origin and the many roles of emotions within the
brain.
1.1 Motivation
For most of human history, the concept of emotion was thought to be opposite to that of cogni-
tion. While cognition was believed to be the ‘cold’ rational part of the mind, emotions were the
‘hot’ instinctual or unbridled part. As a result, scientists thought that optimal decision-making
should rely solely on cognition. For humans, this meant that emotions had to be restrained
or even removed from any mechanism of action selection. In the quest for ‘true’ intelligence,
many have tried to get rid of any emotion, but to no avail. Recent advances in the fields of
neuroscience, cognitive science, as well as affective science, have led to the discovery that
emotions and cognition are in fact interdependent systems (Adams et al., 2012; Damasio, 2008;
J.-M. Fellous & Arbib, 2005a; Franklin, Madl, D’Mello, & Snaider, 2014; Freitas, Gudwin, &
Queiroz, 2005; Goleman, 1995; Ivanovic et al., 2015; Laird, Newell, & Rosenbloom, 1987;
LeDoux, 1998; Martinez-Miranda & Aldea, 2005; Oatley & Johnson-laird, 1987; Picard, 2000;
Rohrer, 2010; Scherer et al., 2010; Scheutz, 2012; Snaider, McCall, & Franklin, 2011). To put
it simply, emotions are required for intelligence to bloom. Thus, trying to get rid of them is
futile at best and detrimental at worst. Indeed, for the brain to be able to process the massive
flow of sensory information using limited resources, it needs reliable mechanisms to quickly
yet accurately assess the situation and trigger an appropriate reaction to maintain the body’s
homeostasis. Emotions evolved to be one of those mechanisms (Darwin, 1872; J.-M. Fellous &
Arbib, 2005a; LeDoux, 2012; MacLean, 1970; Panksepp, 1998, 2005; Rolls, 2007).
Originally, AI and cognitive science had a very similar goal, namely modeling human-
level intelligence. While cognitive neuroscientists strive to understand and model the brain
mechanisms underlying intelligence, AI researchers use machines to replicate the brain’s
capabilities. With the rise in computational power, AI systems have become as good as or even
better than humans on specific tasks. However, the field nowadays faces yet another challenge.
Machines are indeed performing better than humans ever could, but they are limited to a very
specific set of tasks. Humans, on the other hand, pursue and maintain many different goals on
a daily basis. A small community of researchers with the desire to address this fundamental
issue, therefore, split off from the main path adopted by AI. This new branch is nowadays
referred to as Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). Using discoveries from related fields, such
as cognitive science and machine learning, their goal is to build a computational architecture
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capable of human-level intelligence (Adams et al., 2012; Goertzel, 2014, 2015). However, for
the reasons mentioned above, emotions have notoriously been absent from most projects rooted
in either cognitive science or AGI. Resulting in architectures devoid of any emotions. Since it
has been established that intelligence requires emotions, it means that neither fields will ever
realize its goal. Consequently, before being able to fully understand and model intelligence, it
is necessary to investigate the concept of affect and the role of emotions in intelligence.
1.2 Problem definition
Recent, so called, cognitive architectures are indeed making an effort to include affect as part
of their core design. Even though, researchers have begun to accept the necessity for emotions
in order to build intelligent systems, there still lies one more obstacle. Although emotions are
ubiquitous and anyone could provide a seemingly endless list of examples, affective science
still struggles to define the concept. Throughout affective science’s long history, many theories
and models have been suggested, but none have been accepted as standard yet. As a result,
cognitive architectures usually use the most accepted theory at the time of their creation or a
theory reflecting the authors believes (well-known examples can be found in the SOAR (Laird
et al., 1987), LIDA (Snaider et al., 2011) and more recently DAC (Verschure & Eds, 2014)
architectures). Some even decided against including emotions at all. The most famous in this
latter category is ACT-R (J. R. Anderson et al., 2004). It should be noted though, that later
research projects have tried to incorporate concepts related to affect within ACT-R, with varying
degrees of success. J.-M. Fellous and Arbib (2005b) discuss possible reasons behind this lack
of accepted definition, as well as the consequences on the different scientific fields related to
emotion. Despite the fact that both cognitive and affective sciences are trying to answer the
questions ‘what are emotions?’ and ‘what role do they play in the context of intelligence?’,
the solutions implemented so far do not provide a satisfactory account for the different roles
attributed to emotions in intelligence.
For all the reasons expressed so far, this thesis seeks an answer to the question what is
‘the role of emotions in autonomous social agents’? However, before even beginning to tackle
this subject, it is necessary to first extract the features differentiating emotions from other
sensory and cognitive signals in the brain. This thesis purposefully avoids fully defining ‘what
emotions are’ (for reasons that will become clearer in Chapter 2), instead relying on its neural
underpinnings to understand its role in animals and as a facilitator of intelligence.
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1.3 Aims and objectives
Although, it was mentioned above that the goal of this thesis was to investigate the role of
emotions in autonomous social agents, it is impossible to tackle every aspects of the interaction
between emotion and cognition, in a reasonable amount of time. Given that emotions have
been said to have evolved to improve an animal’s chances in furthering its species (Darwin,
1872; LeDoux, 2012), a more pertinent endeavor would be to analyze ‘the role of emotions
in increasing the survival potential of social agents’. Considering, that for living organisms
survival is achieved through the detection of relevant opportunities and by acting upon them, it
seems only appropriate for this thesis’ main topic to focus on the relation between emotion and
the decision-making process. Henceforth, the central hypothesis explored is: “Emotions inform
the brain as to the nature of a given situation, interrupt any ongoing action, and guide the
decision-making process to increase the chances of survival of virtual agents”. To substantiate
this hypothesis, though, the following steps have been identified as necessary:
1. Investigate the current state-of-the-art in terms of theories and models of emotions. The
aim is to extract the recurring features for differentiating emotions. As a result, we will
be able to discriminate between affective and cognitive systems within the brain, while
avoiding the pitfalls associated with having to define the concept of emotion.
2. Among the previously surveyed theories and models, some rely on findings made in
neuroscience to explore the origin of emotions in the brain. Adopting a similar approach,
the objective is to determine the mechanisms and brain areas supporting emotions. This
is facilitated by the characteristics extracted in the previous step.
3. Through the design of a computational model of emotions, the next objective is to show
that the mechanisms responsible for emotions also provide increased survival capabilities
to virtual agents.
4. Almost as important as emotion, is the topic of decision-making in the animal’s brain.
As before, the goal is to establish what are the mechanisms at play, as well as the neural
underpinnings in charge of deciding the optimal action to perform in any given situation.
Fortunately, though it is a more mature field of research that has already provided a
standard mathematical model, known as “reinforcement learning”, along with neural
circuits suspected to be involved in this process.
5. A further integration of the architecture from the third step with established models
of the reward and punishment systems aims at providing a robust system supporting a
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primitive form of emotions. The architecture resulting from this integration is the ideal
platform to investigate the role of primitive emotions in the decision-making process. A
decision-making mechanism is described as a system managing the access to either a
cognitive or a motor resource.
1.4 Organization of the thesis
Before exploring the role of emotion in the decision-making process, it is necessary to first un-
derstand what exactly is an emotion, or rather in what way is it different from any other mental
state? Answering this seemingly simple question, however, is no trivial task. Consequently,
this thesis begins by retracing the history of the field of affective science in Chapter 2, and
takes a look at the different state-of-the-art models of emotions that have been designed over
the last decades. At this point, having developed a better understanding of the different facets
of emotions, as well as their neural underpinnings in the animal’s brain, we should be able
to compile a set of features that will help us distinguish emotion from cognition. Switching
to a different topic entirely, Chapter 3 analyzes the neurological mechanisms suspected to be
in charge of making decisions in animals. Alongside the biological approach, Chapter 3 also
describes the mathematical framework developed to model the decision-making process, which
is better known as reinforcement learning.
Next, an anatomically constrained model of fear conditioning, bridging the gap between
neuroscience and computer science, is explored in details in Chapter 4. The model of the
‘dual pathways’ from the thalamus to the amygdala implemented by Armony et al. (1995)
was intended as an early attempt at demonstrating the usefulness of computational models in
accelerating discoveries in neuroscience. To validate this model and cement its place in history,
the experiment designed by Armony et al. (1995) has been reproduced and the results analyzed
in Chapter 4.
Building on the knowledge gathered so far, Chapter 5 introduces ProtoEmo a neural ar-
chitecture inspired by the “Survival Circuit” theory (LeDoux, 2012) and hypothesized to be
capable of increasing the survival capabilities of virtual agents. In a similar manner, Chapter 6
expands on the information gathered through the ProtoEmo architecture, to build PrimEmo.
This second architecture investigates the role of emotions in the decision-making process. De-
tails of the exact implementation for both ProtoEmo and PrimEmo architectures are discussed
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in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively.
Both architectures designed for this thesis are far from modeling full-fledged emotions.
In addition, this thesis only investigates the influence emotions have over a restricted set of
cognitive functions, namely decision-making and its associated learning mechanisms. Even
though, action selection is a core component of intelligence, it is not the only one. Therefore,
the last chapter describes how the current results could be extended and how the PrimEmo
model could be integrated in a complete cognitive architecture. It also highlights some of the
more pressing questions that should be answered before human-level AGI can become a reality.
1.5 Contributions
Insofar as I know, the work presented here is one of the first computational modeling projects
to explore the dynamic existing between the sub-cortical areas known as: the amygdala, the
hypothalamus and the thalamus. While the amygdala is often the center of attention of any
study related to emotions, its function is here interpreted in a new context. The resulting system
described could be likened to the appraisal mechanism at the core of most cognitive theories
of emotions. As is explored in Chapter 2, there are a number of reasons for sub-cortical areas
to usually be left to the side when investigating affect. Most research projects that explore
the mechanisms underlying emotions focus on higher-level areas, where cognition is more
prominent and emotional influence more pronounced as well. Then, there is the fact that for the
last few years the field of affective science has been dominated by the cognitive or appraisal
approach. As explained in more details in Chapter 2, this is both a blessing and a curse. On
the one hand, it has revived people’s interest for emotions bringing along new ideas to explore.
On the other hand, those new ideas are usually rooted in cognitive science, thus, transforming
affect into yet another cognitive system rather than an inter-dependent entity. Finally, due to
our current technological limitations the only way to measure human emotions are still through
introspection and physiological changes (e.g.: increase in heart rate or skin conductivity). All
methods that have been heavily criticized for lacking precision or being biased (LeDoux, 2012;
Scherer, 2005). Even functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging techniques are far from ideal
to measure and study this phenomenon. Moreover, those methods only measure the outward
expression brought forth by emotions, but not emotions themselves.
As a consequence of our inability to clearly define the concept of affect, this project had
to work around this problem and instead adopts a perspective that focuses on the functions
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emotions evolved to fulfill. Even though, the underlying survival circuits introduced in Sub-
Section 2.6.2 and modeled in Section 5.1 (but see Appendix A for more details on the exact
implementation) ultimately perform cognitive tasks (specifically stimuli classification and
decision-making in this case), emotions and emotional behaviors still manage to emerge. For
the myriads of theories concentrating on the different aspects of emotions, this project offers an
alternative point of view or possible path to a standard definition. As Alexandrov and Sams
(2005) best describe it, in this perspective emotion and cognition could be construed as two
ends of a continuum. There is no clear delineation between the two concepts. This could be
due to the inter-dependence between the two systems, or to the simple fact that emotions really
are only a by-product of cognitive activity.
As a matter of fact, a possible interpretation of this thesis’ content could be that emotions
emerge from the activity of different cognitive systems. This is similar to what was suggested
by a movement called ‘social constructivism’ (mentioned in Chapter 2). The idea behind social
constructivism is that the concept of emotion does not exist in nature and is a product of the
mind (Damasio, 2008; LeDoux, 1998; Scherer, 2009). In this thesis, however, far from denying
the biological nature of emotions, the idea would be akin to that of Baars’ (2005) Global
Workspace Theory, in which the spontaneous and synchronous activity of some brain areas give
rise to working memory or even consciousness (this view is discussed in more details in Sub-
Section 2.7.2). Indeed, LeDoux (2012) indirectly references a similar concept when he places
‘global organismic’ states as the raw material from which feelings, and by extension full-fledged
emotions, are constructed. As is explained in greater details in Sub-Section 2.6.2, LeDoux
(2012) defines a global organismic state as the mental state which results from the detection of a
survival relevant stimulus, the activation of the memory, learning, motivational and modulatory
systems, the bodily feedbacks, the recruitment of relevant homeostatic and allostatic behaviors,
and the subsequent state of generalized arousal. Consequently, the fact that emotions and
emotional behaviors did emerge from the computational model developed in this thesis, could
be seen as additional evidence toward the idea that emotions labels attributed to recurrent
patterns of brain activity.
On a smaller scale, but may be even more important is the fact that ProtoEmo is, in
my opinion, the missing piece for the Pre-frontal cortex Basal ganglia Working Memory
architecture (PBWM), designed by Frank, Loughry, and O’Reilly (2001). The PBWM is a
computational model simulating the mechanisms responsible for decision-making in the brain.
The architecture can be split into three components, the pre-frontal cortex (PFC), the basal
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ganglia, and the Primary Value Learned Value (PVLV). Frank et al. (2001) define the PFC as
the area where information, or memories, necessary for the completion of the ongoing goal
is stored (this is usually referred to as ‘working memory’). The basal ganglia, based on the
dopamine signal provided by the PVLV model, decides on which action to perform next (but
see Sub-Section 3.3.2 for more details about the gating mechanism implemented by the basal
ganglia). In the case of the PBWM architecture, the only available action is whether to update
the information stored in the PFC or not, and if so which part of the memory should be updated.
The PVLV is a computational model designed by Hazy, Frank, and O’Reilly (2010); O’Reilly et
al. (2007) whose purpose is to investigate the processes at play during a classical conditioning
experiment. The PVLV model is made of two components: the Primary Value (PV) and the
Learned Value (LV) systems. While it is the responsibility of the PV component to learn to
activate the dopaminergic system upon receiving a reward, the LV system learns to expect
a reward through conditioning (the specificities of the PVLV model are further explored in
Sub-Section 3.3.2). According to Hazy et al. (2010); O’Reilly et al. (2007), within the PVLV
model the central nucleus of the amygdala is hypothesized to be the excitatory component of the
Learned Value (LV) system, whose role is to learn to activate in the presence of a conditioned
stimulus reliably associated with an unconditioned stimulus. However, given the scale of the
PBWM architecture, the exact mechanisms by which the amygdala is supposed to achieve this
function were not fully described. This question is what the ProtoEmo architecture strives
to answer. Consequently, by extending the PBWM’s explanatory power with ProtoEmo, the
PrimEmo architecture (introduced in Chapter 6 and further detailed in Appendix B) forms a
complete processing link. From a relevant stimulus entering the brain to the resulting decision,
PrimEmo is able to explain every step of the process.
To some extent the results and ideas presented in this thesis, also contribute to the field of
neuroscience. The amygdala was already known to be an important brain area when it comes
to emotions. Whether it be simply processing them or originating them, the amygdala has been
the center of attention for quite some time. Most findings, however, come from conditioning
experiments. The experimental results of such projects are usually interpreted within the
reinforcement learning paradigm. As detailed in Chapter 3, though, reinforcement learning
is not directly interested in emotions. There still is the concept of reward or punishment, and
more recent research projects have tried to introduce intrinsic features in the computation of the
reward signal. This thesis establishes a direct link between reinforcement learning and emotions.
Allowing for an alternative interpretation of the empirical data gathered through conditioning
experiments. Furthermore, the hope is that including the thalamus and hypothalamus in the
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design of ProtoEmo will spark more interest in these brain areas. Indeed, at the moment the
literature concerning those two regions is quite sparse and does not define any underlying
mechanisms.
Finally, the results presented in this thesis should also be of interest for the field of Artificial
General Intelligence (AGI). Even if, neither ProtoEmo nor PrimEmo have demonstrated
any capabilities in transferring knowledge acquired through one task to solve another (also
known as “transfer learning”), they are still both examples of control architectures, whose core
design relies on emotions. Something that current cognitive and AGI architectures are lacking,
as pointed out above. The development of other cognitive component following this model
would lead to the establishment of a complete cognitive architecture capable of human-level
intelligence.
10 Introduction
The fundamental objective shared by both AI and cognitive science is human-level intelligence.
Whereas the former is focused on building artificial systems simulating intelligence, the latter
seeks to explain the underlying brain systems. For most of human history, emotions were though
to be nothing more than disturbances for cognition. Therefore, most studies on intelligence
deliberately avoided emotions. As a result, cognitive architectures only partially include
emotions in their design, if at all. However, it was recently discovered that emotions and
cognition are inter-dependent systems, which means that emotions are required for intelligence
to bloom. Furthermore, it was theorized that emotions are a mechanism that evolved to increase
an animal’s chances of survival. Consequently, this thesis investigates ‘the role of emotions
in increasing the survival potential of social agents’. Additionally since, for animals, survival
is achieved through the detection of relevant opportunities and by acting upon them, this
thesis focuses on the interaction between emotions and the decision-making process. When
considering action selection as a whole, it is hypothesized that ‘Emotions inform the brain as
to the nature of a given situation, interrupt any ongoing action, and guide the decision-making
process to increase the chances of survival of virtual agents’. While exploring the validity of this
hypothesis, the project described hereafter has made some significant contributions. To begin
with, insofar as I know this is one of the first computational modeling projects to investigate
the interaction between the amygdala, the thalamus, and the hypothalamus. The amygdala was
already included in the Pre-frontal cortex Basal ganlia Working Memory (PBWM) architecture
as part of the Learned Value component of the Primary Value Learned Value model. However,
by implementing representations of the thalamus, hypothalamus, and their connections to
the amygdala, in populations of artificial neurons, the ProtoEmo architecture completes the
PBWM structure. Therefore, the results from the aggregation of the PBWM with ProtoEmo,
which is referred to as PrimEmo, forms a complete processing link, from a relevant stimulus
entering the brain to selecting a reaction. Essentially, bridging the gap between emotion and
reinforcement learning. Last but not least, the architectures and results presented here should
also be of interest to the field of Artificial General Intelligence, since both ProtoEmo and to




On emotion: theories and models
Before discussing the feasibility of modeling any affective process, be it emotions, mood
or personality, in artificial agents, it is important to understand what emotions are for living
breathing animals (humans included) and any other creatures. Therefore, this chapter is
dedicated to exploring the concept of affect and the different theories concerning the origin of
emotions as seated in the brain.
2.1 Passions and the soul
Even though many a scientist considers affective science to be a field still in its infancy, and
to their credit it is true that affect as a concept has only recently received a more widespread
attention, emotions have puzzled philosophers and all manner of thinkers since at least ancient
Greece. Aristotle is usually regarded as one of the first people, building on the work of his
mentor Plato, to venture a detailed explanation for the purpose of human emotions and their
origin. In his essay entitled ‘The Nicomachean Ethics’, Aristotle (350 B.C/1926) explores the
concepts of ‘pathos’ (a word Aristotle uses to refer to emotion) and describes how the soul
when interacting with any object will ‘feel’ either pain or pleasure. In turn, those passions
influence the way in which the soul and, therefore, the body react to the object. According
to Aristotle, it is this very ‘feeling’ accompanied by either pain or pleasure, when coming
in contact with the external world, that constitutes an emotion. Consequently, for Aristotle
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emotions are characterized by their valence. Furthermore, similar to the definition adopted
by Descartes (1649) centuries later, it is interesting to note that Aristotle assumes a view in
which passions are almost indistinguishable from perception. Aristotle then continued his
exploration of the ‘pathe’ (the plural of pathos) in ‘Rhetoric’, where he puts forward two of his
most important ideas.
The first, has to do with his categorization of emotions. According to this idea, some of our
emotions are ‘slow’ enough that we can think about them and influence them before they lead
to any action. Those were the deliberate or voluntary emotions. The second category, contains
emotions that go by too quickly and are transformed directly into actions, or more precisely in
this case, reactions.
The second idea is that emotions and cognition can interact and influence each other. As
mentioned, in the case of deliberate emotions one can rationalize and influence the outcome.
Aristotle goes as far as saying that it is unethical to let the soul act on a deliberate emotion,
without rationalizing about it or influencing it. Indeed, since passions were seen as nothing
more than a hindrance for the rational mind, letting deliberate emotions dictate a person’s
actions would amount to acting without thinking or, more appropriately, acting like an animal.
Although not clearly part of his framework, Aristotle is responsible for setting passion and
mind apart from each other. Emotions, in his point of view, are not part of the rational mind
they are only a disturbance that should be kept in check, if one is to act morally.
Moving forward in time leads to what is arguably the first ever written theory on emotions.
One has to remember that although, Aristotle’s treatises touched upon many influential ideas
regarding emotions, the primary concerns were on how to behave morally and how to use
discourse in the pursuit of enlightenment. On the other hand, Descartes (1649) dedicated his
correspondences with Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia to discussing the concept of passions and
their relations to the soul.
To better understand Descartes’ ideas, it is imperative to first mention the context from
which they stem. At the time, the human body was thought to be similar to a machine
(centuries later the cognitivists would employ a similar analogy when comparing the brain
to a computer, as detailed in Section 2.4). Limbs would move through a system of ropes
and pulleys, and sensations were nothing more than pulls and pushes exerted upon the pineal
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gland. Furthermore, those sensations were transmitted through the veins using the blood and
spirits. It is then without surprise that Descartes would theorize about passions using vocabulary
borrowed from physics. Given these conditions, Descartes described passion as a vegetative
power, a property of something being moved, while action is a moving force, “like volition in
the mind” (Descartes, 1649). As a matter of fact, the soul was separated from the body and
made of the individual’s thoughts. Those thoughts, according to Descartes (1649) were of two
kinds: ‘action’ and ‘passion’. On the one hand, the rational soul via the pineal gland ‘acts’
upon the body to move it according to our will. Reciprocally, the body sends spirits through the
pineal gland to influence the soul so that the individual can sense the world. It should be noted
that although the soul is attached to the body in many locations, Descartes (1649) describes
the pineal gland as the main interface through which the soul and the body most efficiently
influence each other. Consequently, actions come from and fully depend on the soul. Passions,
though, are more complex. In the most general sense passion can be interpreted as perception,
since it is made of anything new that arrives to the soul from the body (or more specifically
from the external world via the sensory devices of the body). A stricter definition sees the
passion described as feelings or emotions which result from the agitation of the spirits and that
move the soul. Furthermore, Descartes (1649) defines the functions of the passions as follow:
“. . . l’usage de toutes les passions consiste en cela seul qu’elles disposent
l’âme à vouloir les choses que la nature dicte nous être utiles et à persister en
cette volonté;comme aussi la même agitation des esprits, qui a coutume de les
causer, dispose le corps aux mouvements qui servent à l’exécution de ces choses.”
— Descartes (1649, p. 343)
[The principal effect of all the human passions is that they move and dispose
the soul to want the things for which they prepare the body. Thus the feeling of fear
move the soul to want to flee, that of courage to want to fight.]
In modern terms this definition would equate the passions with motivators as described
by Rolls (2013). In his discussion, Descartes clearly specifies that the ‘things’ for which the
soul and body are being prepared is “that which nature deems useful for us”. Thus, suggesting,
that emotions (or in this case passions) are an innate mechanism that evolved to help humans
evaluate the objects with which they interact in terms of their usefulness for survival. Two
centuries later, this idea would be substantiated and expanded to the whole animal kingdom,
by Darwin (1872). Furthermore, on the one hand, since passions can only influence the soul
and the soul acts mostly through the pineal gland, this marks the first time that emotions were
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located in the brain, as opposed to the guts, heart or an ethereal entity (Damasio, 1997, 2008).
On the other hand, on the contrary to what Aristotle thought, Descartes (1649) considers that
truthfully action and passions are two names given to the same concept. The only reason he
sees for those labels to exist is a difference in point of view. The same event is referred to as
action from the perspective of the person originating said event, while it is described as passion
in the context of the person on the receiving end. Finally, it is also interesting to note that
Descartes, defines the existence of six ‘primary passions’. All other emotions result from the
combination of those primary six or are sub-species. Another idea reminiscent of Aristotle’s
‘slow’ and ‘fast’ emotions.
2.2 The birth of affective science
The year 1872, marks the most important turning point in the history of affective science. After
34 years of research on emotions, Charles Darwin (1872) published his now famous book
entitled ‘The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals’, in which he introduced some of
the most revolutionizing ideas. Analyzing the many portraits he accumulated, Darwin (1872)
noticed that there were some peculiar similarities in the ways people and animals expressed
certain emotions. Building on his principle of ‘survival of the fittest’, which he introduced
to the world a few years prior (Darwin, 1859), Darwin theorized that at some point in the
past one of our animal ancestors evolved a primitive form of emotions. Using ‘fear’, for
example, this common ancestor would have been able to predict the dangerous nature of a
given situation, rather than react to the appearance of a predator. Given that this new ‘trait’
increased its chances of survival, according to the theory of evolution it should have been
passed down from this common ancestor to the next generation, mutating until it became what
humans refer to as emotions. The important consequence of this theory is that emotions are
not a property unique to humans anymore. Indeed, it implies that humans share some of their
emotions with other animals, and that there is a set of ‘basic’ emotions common to all humans.
Thus, upholding the tradition of categorizing emotions as did both Aristotle and Descartes
before. Furthermore, if emotions really evolved from a common ancestor, it follows that the
fundamental brain structures originating emotions should be preserved between species as
well (Ekman, 1973). Therefore, Darwin’s (1872) discovery entails that any empirical results
from animal experiments could be used to draw conclusions about human emotions. In addition
to defining emotions as a mechanism to improve survival, Darwin (1872) characterizes their
effect on the brain and the individual in general as being either exciting or depressing. Darwin
(1872) cite as examples of exciting emotions, anger and joy. Indeed, in both emotions lead to
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energetic movements and a higher heart rate. On the contrary, sorrow and grief are depressing
emotions, since they bring about almost lethargic movements, lack of motivation, and slower
cognitive processing. As it will become clear in the remainder of this chapter and the next one,
Darwin’s ideas will be a source of inspiration for many theories and models of emotions, even
to this day.
Ten years after Darwin’s discoveries, William James (1884) published his seminal paper
in which he set out to answer once and for all the question ‘What is an Emotion?’ and how
they are produced in the brain. Following James’ theory, and similar ideas that would be put to
writings by Lange (1885) a year later, emotions are a result of the bodily changes, occurring
in reaction to an event, being fed back to and interpreted by the brain. A more palatable way
to put it is to say that, people do not weep because they are sad and scream because they are
fearful. In fact, according to the James-Lange theory, it is the contrary: we are sad because
we weep and are fearful because we scream. If someone was to meet a bear while walking
through the forest, this encounter would trigger a host of reactions inside his body, such as
increasing heart rate, release of adrenaline and increase of skin conductance, as well as outside,
like running away for example. The experience of these internal and external bodily changes
is what constitute the emotion of fear. It stems from this definition that if one is to have
emotions, then one needs to have a fully functioning body to trigger them. Furthermore, even
though James (1884) recognizes that their are feelings of pleasure and pain, or excitement
and depression, associated with certain ‘nerve-actions’, because those mental states are not as-
sociated with any distinct bodily expressions, he does not consider them as ‘standard’ emotions.
It is also interesting to note that to the question of how does the body knows how to react
in each situation, James explains that part of the human brain (if not its entirety) is made of a
hard-wired structure which maps sets of sensory stimuli to bodily reactions, or as he elegantly
describes it:
“To begin with, readers of this Journal do not need to be reminded that the
nervous system of every living thing is but a bundle of predispositions to react
in particular ways upon the contact of particular features of the environment.”
— James (1884, p. 190)
As history and the rest of this chapter shows, James’ controversial ideas were the sparks
that would later give birth to the field of affective science as it is known today. Even though,
his ideas would remain unchallenged for a long time.
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2.3 A modern history
Through a series of experiments involving animals whose cortical connections had been severed,
Cannon and Bard (Cannon, 1927, 1929) were able to show that emotions could exist without
a body proper, thus ending the fifty years reign of the James-Lange theory of emotions in
psychology and, at the same time, being the first to make practical use of Darwin’s discovery:
that of animal emotions as homologues to human ones.
More specifically, Cannon challenged the James-Lange theory on five points:
• First in 1904, Woodworth and Sherrington (1904) experimented on dogs, whose spinal
cord and vagus nerve were transected, so as to remove any connection between the
brain and the organs that were believed to originate the sensory feedback required for
the creation of emotions. Then twenty years later, Cannon, Lewis, and Britton (1927),
were also able to keep alive cats whose sympathetic division of the autonomic nervous
system was removed, effectively making them unable to both react to particular events,
as well as feel any of the bodily changes that could have occurred. In both experiments,
no changes in emotional behaviors were observed, therefore refuting the concept of
embodied emotions present in the James-Lange theory.
• In another set of experiments conducted by Marañon (Cannon, 1927), patients were
injected with a dose of adrenalin, which in the body produces changes similar to that of
intense emotions, such as constriction of the blood vessels, liberation of sugar by the
liver and interruption of gastrointestinal functions. The experiment thus designed was
supposed to show that by artificially re-creating the symptoms of an intense emotion,
the injected patients would react accordingly and express their emotions. Instead, when
interviewed about their current emotional state, by Marañon, most of the patients would
say that they felt, and indeed expressed, no particular change in emotions. Interestingly,
in some cases subjects would describe their emotional state as: “I feel as if afraid” or
“as if awaiting a great joy”. The results of Marañon’s study again opposed what the
James-Lange theory predicted.
• Central to the James-Lange theory are the viscera and vasomotor system. According
to James’ ideas, feedback from changes in the viscera are the main information used to
discriminate between different emotions. However, in Cannon’s point of view, relying on
the knowledge available at the time, the sympathetic division of the autonomic nervous
system projects too diffusely to the different glands and smooth muscles throughout
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the body, to produce a specific pattern of activation, that one could use to discriminate
between emotions. As a result bodily changes that are observable for a feverish per-
son (a non-emotional state), are also present for a person experiencing happiness and
fear (Cannon, 1927, 1929).
• Furthermore, Cannon argues that smooth muscles and glands, on the contrary to striate
muscles used to move limbs, respond to signals coming down from the brain with a
certain sluggishness. For example, in animals like cats, dogs, and horses, the latent period
of smooth muscles, which is the amount of time between the brain sending a signal and
the muscle beginning to move in reaction to that signal, is in the range 0.25 seconds up
to 0.85 seconds. And for salivary glands in dogs, Pavlov (Cannon, 1927) measured a
latent period of six minutes. In the realm of humans, Wells, Forbes, and Whitley (1912)
measured a latent period of about three seconds for the psychogalvanic reflex. In another
study conducted by Wells (1925), affective reactions to pictures of men and women had a
latent period of 0.8 seconds on average. If the James-Lange theory is to be believed and
emotions are really born “from reverberations from the viscera” (James, 1884), it would
take seconds for an emotion to emerge out of a particular situation, the world would go
by too quickly for us to react to it.
• Finally, contrary to popular beliefs dictating that the deeper you travel inside the body,
the more sensitive organs are, surgeons discovered, around the time of Cannon’s writing,
that the alimentary tract of unanesthetized patients could be cut, torn, crushed or even
burnt without any feeling of discomfort. Arguing that the same can apply to both the rest
of the viscera and blood vessels, Cannon concludes that those organs are not sensitive
enough to provide the basis for the creation of emotions (Cannon, 1927, 1929). If only
damage of an extreme nature to the viscera triggers a sensation, how can they originate
subtle changes in our emotional state?
Even though the weaknesses highlighted by Cannon and Bard were well founded and had
ample support from other studies, they would in turn receive their fare share of criticisms, lead-
ing to Cannon suggesting his own theory on emotions and their associated brain mechanisms.
In an experiment conducted in 1925, Cannon et al. (1927) observed that a slight stimulation
would trigger fits of intense rage in cats whose cortical connections had been severed. Cannon
would later call this phenomenon “sham rage” since the animals involved in the study had
neither a physical target toward which they could direct their anger, nor any concrete reason to
be angry in the first place. He deduced that if the brain had an emotion center then it must be
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confined to the sub-cortical structures. Furthermore, removal of the thalamus in the same cats
would render the animal incapable of expressing any emotion. Hence, Cannon concluded that
the main center for the brain’s emotional system was the thalamus. Moreover, he described
the interaction between the cortex and the thalamus as being inhibiting. The reason why
the cats were displaying intense emotions while their thalamus remained, and the cortex was
removed, is because the thalamus is the center of a whirlpool of emotions. The role of the cortex
according to Cannon is to modulate the emotional activity that is constantly happening within
the thalamus. Therefore, by removing the cat’s cortex, Cannon was effectively removing any
emotional restraint the animal had. Lesioning the thalamus prevented the animal from having
any emotion in the first place. From those observations, Cannon et al. (1927) theorized that
“the peculiar quality of the emotion is added to simple sensation when the thalamic processes
are roused” (Cannon et al., 1927, p. 120). Both theory and observations clearly point in the
direction of emotions having an exciting or depressing effect on the brain, and, therefore, any
of its ongoing cognitive activities.
In a later paper, Cannon (1931) contributes more details to the mechanisms underlying
his theory of emotions. On the contrary to what one might think, given Cannon’s previous
complaints, he acknowledges the fact that James’ ideas were heading in the right direction,
however due to either a lack of knowledge or technological limitations, the James-Lange theory
completely overlooked the fundamental role of the thalamus in the communication between
brain and body. Based on the evidence that any signal going in or out of the cortex had to
pass through the thalamic region, Cannon described it as the “coordination center for the so-
called ‘emotional’ reactions”, hence grounding its position as the main component in his theory.
The similarities between the James-Lange and Cannon-Bard theories become clear when
illustrated by the diagrams of figure 2.1. It should also be noted that the Cannon-Bard theory
does not separate the body from emotions, since sensory data is still required to first trigger
both the bodily reactions and the exchange between thalamus and cortex, that will lead to the
creation of the emotion.
In 1962, influenced by the James-Lange theory, but very well aware of the criticisms made
by Cannon et al. (1927), Schachter and Singer (1962) suggested the ‘Two-Factors’ theory
according to which emotion is a function of the state of physiological arousal accompanied
by an appropriate cognition. Thus, the physiological arousal is the driving force, while cog-
nition has more of a steering function. To give a similar example as the one employed for
2.3 A modern history 19
Figure 2.1 This figure depicts the circuits responsible for emotions and emotional expression,
as theorized by James (1884) (on the left) and Cannon (1931) (on the right). Already the
differences, in opinion are clearly visible, as the Cannon-Bard model places the thalamus at the
center of the circuit. The James-Lange theory, on the other hand, heavily rely on the cortex to
process sensory and feedback information, as well as emotionally react. Following the numbers,
in order, depicts the sequence triggered by incoming sensory stimuli and leading to emotion
and its expression.
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the James-Lange theory of a person walking around in the woods suddenly coming across a
bear. The perceived situation of ‘proximity of a bear’ would initiate a state of physiological
arousal. This new physiological state would then be interpreted or contextualized using the
person’s knowledge of bears and how ferocious one can be when startled. Finally, leading to
the physiological state of arousal being labeled as ‘fear’.
To substantiate their hypothesis, Schachter and Singer designed a clever experiment, in
which participants would be either injected with epinephrine or a simple saline solution.
Epinephrine would induce in the subject an artificial state of arousal, while the saline solution
was considered to be the control case in which physiological arousal was absent, or negligible.
During the injection procedure, half of the participants receiving a dose of epinephrine, were
given a detailed explanation of the effects of the substance on the human body. The other half
did not get any explanation, leaving them in a state of arousal with no appropriate cognition.
After injection, irrelevant of the substance, the participants were left in a room with an actor.
The actor could play one of two roles, either that of another happy participant, or that of
another angry subject. The actor was introduced to steer the emotions of the participants that
were injected with epinephrine, but given no explanation about its effects. By providing an
adequate framework, the subject would finally be able to label his state of arousal. Following
Schachter and Singer’s hypothesis it was expected that subjects injected with a saline solution
(no physiological arousal) or injected with epinephrine and knew of its effects (physiological
arousal and appropriate cognition), should not feel any particular changes in their emotional
state. While subjects injected with epinephrine (physiological arousal), but that did not have
any clues as to its effects (no appropriate cognition), would label their new arousal state as
either ‘happiness’ or ‘anger’ depending on which actor they had been paired with.
The experimental results proving Schachter and Singer right, the two-factor theory was
published, hence marking the first point in history where cognition and emotions, or passions
and reason, were brought together. However, the theory’s impact on the history of affective
science is much greater. Introducing cognition as a main component in the emotion machine
meant that cognitive scientists, who until then had kept their distances, could join and apply
their knowledge to the problem, breathing new life into the research on emotions.
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Figure 2.2 Starting from the same triggering event, of a person suddenly encountering a bear,
this picture highlights the main steps of an emotional episode, as depicted by different theories.
From top to bottom, common sense would have us think that running away (autonomic arousal)
is a consequence of being afraid (emotion). The James-Lange theory, on the contrary argues
that emotion is a consequence of our reaction. Cannon and Bard in the meantime, place an
emphasis on sub-cortical activity (especially the thalamus), as the main system responsible for
both autonomic arousal and emotion. Finally, Schachter and Singer introduce the concept of
appraisal. Given a situation and a state of arousal, the appraisal process produces an emotion
(a simple label for the state of arousal).
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2.4 Appraisal theories
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the field of psychology was dominated by the
behaviorists (LeDoux, 1998). Breaking the tradition instigated by Descartes’ (1637) ‘Cogito,
ergo sum’, the researchers part of this new movement thought that psychology should be the
study of objective and observable facts. Since consciousness and emotions are notoriously
subjective and unmeasurable, they could not possibly be studied scientifically. Thus, conscious-
ness and the mind in general, which came to be known as ‘ghost in the machine’ ( LeDoux
(1998), but see also Ryle (1949) for the original philosophical definition of this concept), were
ostracized from the field of psychology. The behaviorists went as far as ridiculing anyone who
dared to mention those mental states.
Ironically, it is from within this oppressive environment that one of the most important
and for the time the broadest theory of emotions was written. After spending almost ten
years studying emotions in relation to personality and mood, Arnold wrote, what is nowadays
considered her magnum opus, a two volumes book entitled ‘Emotion and Personality’ (Arnold,
1961). In it, realizing that the prominent theories concerning the emotional system all had a
fundamental flaw, she fleshed out the concept of ‘cognitive appraisal’ (Reisenzein, 2006).
The theories described so far focus on the experience and expression of emotions, while
assuming the following general definition for an emotional episode:
• First, a stimulus reaches the brain.
• This stimulus triggers a reaction or some sort of bodily changes.
• The sensations related to those bodily changes are fed back to the brain.
• Finally, some mechanism based on the information available give rise to an emotional
experience and/or expression (depending on the theory adopted this process can involve
more than one step).
However, none of the theories give an exact account of the brain’s mechanisms to differentiate
between a stimulus that is cause for a reaction and other stimuli that do not engender any bodily
changes. As an answer to this problem, Arnold introduced the concept of cognitive appraisal
as:
“What is perceived does not lead to emotion unless it is first appraised as good
or bad for us here and now, requiring this or that action. The object itself may
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be present or absent, remembered or imagined: as soon as we appraise it, it has
affected us personally in some way, it leads to emotion. This appraisal is not a
rational judgment, it is immediate, intuitive and as inevitable as sense perception
itself. . . . This appraisal can be called a sense judgment, to distinguish it from
reflective judgment. It immediately follows and completes perception, hence can
be known as a separate process only when we come to reflect upon it.
Usually, the sequence perception-appraisal-action is so closely knit that our every-
day experience’s never the strictly objective knowledge of a thing, it is always a
knowing-and-liking, or a knowing-and-not-caring. There is hardly anything we
simply note without appraising it at the same time. Whether a thing is pleasing to
the eye, delectable to the palate, useful as a tool, a treasure to possess, it is never
simply there, apart from us, it is always seen in some relationship to ourselves.
In fact, strictly objective observation has to be carefully taught and meticulously
acquired to make so-called scientific method possible at all.” — Arnold (1959,
p. 407)
From this broad definition of appraisal some important properties concerning the sequence
from perception to emotion, as well as the different concepts involved, can be extracted. First
and foremost is the fact that appraisal, similar to the Schachter-Singer theory, does not directly
bring about any behavioral reaction unless the emotion experienced is of great intensity. Instead,
the appraisal of a given situation leads to the potentiation of appropriate action tendencies to
prepare the body for dealing with said situation. The output of the appraisal process as defined
by Arnold is simply an ‘action tendency’, which will engender an emotional experience and
influence the decision-making process, once it reaches consciousness. Second, the sequence of
events that form the beginning of the emotional episode (the first step in the previous global
definition), is clearly established as perception, then appraisal and finally action. Meaning that
for an individual to experience emotion, he will have to first make sense of his surroundings,
extracting the different objects. Only then can the appraisal process match the situation to
the person’s beliefs, desires and coping potential, and influence his actions. Similarly to the
Cannon-Bard theory this sequence implies that emotional experience is not bound to any bodily
changes. It only relies on the output of the appraisal mechanism. Finally, appraisal is defined as
an automatic and unconscious process indistinguishable from sense perception until it reaches
consciousness. Where from a person will have access to the object target of the appraisal sys-
tem, hence, lending support for introspection as a legitimate method for scientifically studying
human emotions in psychology.
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Although, Arnold has received a lot of attention from the cognitive science community, for
her contribution and ideas, most of her work has remained in the shadow, unappreciated. Her
books, not only introduced the concept of appraisal, they reached further and described the
brain circuits supporting the appraisal mechanism and the whole emotion system. Furthermore,
she also drew conclusions as to the repercussion her theory would have on psychology and the
study of personality. Arnold justifies this quest for a general theory of emotion by saying that:
“If we analyze this process from perception to emotion and action, we shall
find that we have to complete our analysis by recourse to neurological research.
Emotional expression, autonomic changes and overt action imply functioning
circuits in the brain; hence no explanation can be complete unless we can show
what is happening in the brain during emotion.” — Arnold (1959, p.407)
Even thought Arnold is recognized as the author of the appraisal theory, the scientist usually
credited for making it popular as well as scientifically acceptable for researchers in the 1960s
(keep in mind that the behaviorists, even if weakening, still had a strong grip over psychology)
is Richard Lazarus (LeDoux, 1998). Borrowing Arnold’s ideas (Reisenzein, 2006), Lazarus
(1966) set out to prove that a person’s reaction to (or coping with) a stressful situation can be
influenced by manipulating his perception of said situation. According to the appraisal theory,
depending on how the situation is perceived the person should experience different emotions.
With this very goal in mind, Lazarus designed an experiment in which subjects had to watch
a short, but rather gory film of a circumcision ritual involving teenage males from an aboriginal
tribe in Australia. For a third of the participants, the soundtrack accompanying the film was
left intact and contained all the gruesome details. For the other two thirds, the soundtrack was
either minimized (lower volume) or intellectualized. The experimental results showed that the
participants who were watching the film and had the soundtrack with the gruesome details at
full intensity, had higher activations of the autonomic nervous system (ANS) and felt worse
after the experiment, when compared to the other two groups. In line with the appraisal theory,
Lazarus concluded that the soundtrack accounts for a difference in the appraisal pattern, thus,
giving rise to distinct emotional experiences among the three groups of participants.
Lazarus’ theory on stress emotions and his extensive experimental work providing empirical
evidence for the predictions made by Arnold’s appraisal theory is the main reason for him to be
considered a pioneer in this subfield of affective science and in psychology in general.
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By 1980, appraisal theory had grown in popularity within the field of psychology attracting
the interest of many cognitive scientists. However, this began to change after Zajonc (1980)
published his paper entitled ‘Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences’. There he
described a series of cleverly designed experiments based on the mere exposure effect (Zajonc,
1968). During one such experiment, participants were exposed to a particular Japanese ideogram
for a short period of time. They were then asked to choose among a set of ideograms which
one they preferred. The results showed that the subjects reliably chose the ideogram that
they had been pre-exposed to. The clever part was to present the stimuli subliminally, long
enough to form a preference but short enough for the subject to be incapable of recognizing the
ideogram. From the results of this and many other experiments that Zajonc and his colleagues
performed, he concluded that emotional reaction was not preceded by perception. Zajonc (1980)
complemented this conclusion by arguing that:
“Before we evolved language and our cognitive capacities, which are deeply
dependent on language, it was the affective system alone upon which the organism
relied for its adaptation. . . . Thus, if the most recent version of homo sapiens
specifies that affective reactions are mediated by prior cognitive processes — as
contemporary cognitive views would have it — then at some point in the course
of evolution, affect must have lost its autonomy and acquired an intermediary in
the form of cold cognition. This scenario seems most unlikely. When nature has a
direct and autonomous mechanism that functions efficiently . . . it does not make it
indirect and entirely dependent on a newly evolved function.” — Zajonc (1980,
p. 170)
Even though, Zajonc (1980) describes cognition as “deeply dependent on language”, which
is not the case and could be argued limits the impact of his experiment, this argument still sup-
ports the idea that cognition does not necessarily precede emotions. In fact Zajonc (1980) goes
even further and states that emotions and cognition are two separate systems. It is interesting
to note that Zajonc (1980) uses a reasoning similar to Darwin’s (1872) to illustrate his point.
Invoking the principles on which evolution is theorized to operate, to emphasize the incongruity
of the (at the time) standard information-processing model of emotion, which emphasizes the
reliance of emotion on cognition and, therefore, diminishes the distinction between the two
concepts. Zajonc’s discoveries, however, did not spell the downfall of the appraisal theory, but
it served as a reminder for later researchers that emotion is not a simple cognition.
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The middle of the twentieth century saw the development of the computer and with it the
emergence of artificial intelligence (AI), as a field seeking to reproduce the capabilities of the
human mind through computer simulations. Scientists quickly realized the similarities in the
way a computer processes information and the inner workings of the brain, a point of view
reminiscent of Descartes (1649) own approach to the human body as a machine. Inspired by
this new perspective and the recent findings in cognitive science, psychology saw the birth of a
new movement, that would later replace the behaviorists, called ‘functionalism’. In the point of
view of functionalism, a computer processing the expression 2+5 is using the same underlying
strategy than a human brain, to determine that the answer is 7. As a result of this decoupling
between a process’ implementation and its underlying hardware, it was no longer necessary to
understand the intricacies of the brain to describe its functioning. If it was possible to build a
computer simulation mimicking the output of a human brain, then the algorithm used by the
simulation was considered a viable explanation for how the brain processed information to
reach the same conclusion. In short, according to the functionalism doctrine: “the mind is to
the brain as a computer program is to the computer hardware” (LeDoux, 1998). Contrasting
with the behaviorists, functionalism finally saw the return of the mind in the brain. However,
the mind was still not present in its complete form, since the functionalists focused on only
the unconscious processes of the brain. Therefore, consciousness was once again left out and
with it the possibility of expressing emotions. Thanks to Arnold’s appraisal theory, though,
emotion was not completely absent from the brain anymore, since appraisal had been described
as “immediate, intuitive and as inevitable as sense perception itself ” (Arnold, 1959, p. 407).
Even after Zajonc’s discoveries and partly due to AI and the functionalists, appraisal theory
continued to flourish from the 1960s to this day. As a matter of fact, by the 1980s within the
field of psychology appraisal theories were about the only approach to emotion (LeDoux, 1998,
p. 53). LeDoux (1998) even considers this approach as the one that almost got it right. The
only complaint he puts forth is related to the over-reliance of appraisal theories on cognitive
processes to explain emotion, hence, making it hard to distinguish emotion from cognition.
Additionally, Marsella, Gratch, and Petta (2010, p. 27) describe appraisal theories as “currently
a predominant force among psychological perspectives on emotion and arguably the most
fruitful source for those interested in the design of symbolic AI systems, . . . ”, therefore, echo-
ing LeDoux’s (1998) claim, as well as extending it to the field of AI and affective computing.
As a result of its close relationship with computer science, as well as psychology and cognitive
science, it seems like appraisal is the ideal theory for implementing cognitive architectures
endowed with emotions and other models of emotions used in the entertainment and service
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industry. At the same time its attractiveness for experts in the field of cognitive science has not
diminished, which also explains its influence as a sub-field of affective science.
Before analyzing the concept of affect through the lens of statistics, as well as exploring the
possible neural substrates originating emotions and feelings in the brain of animals, however,
the next Sub-Section presents the component process model which expands the appraisal
theory introduced by Arnold (1959, 1961). The advent of computer science, and later robotics,
has allowed researchers to apply their knowledge to real world problems, as well as test the
theories produced by the different approaches to emotions in a safe and controlled environment.
In contrast to the theories described so far, which provide abstract mechanisms to explain
emotions and might neglect some aspects or leave some questions open for others to answer,
computational models are a realization of those theories. As such, computational models need
to specify every detail before an implementation is possible, and then justify the values assigned
to its many parameters once embodied or implemented. Since they force a single interpretation
of their supporting theories, computational models of emotions stand as an expression of the
author’s point of view. In addition, the many design decisions made during the building process
emphasize the theory’s fundamental components, and provide an indication of the direction
towards which the whole field is heading.
2.4.1 The Component Process Model
Introduced by Scherer (1984), the Component Process Model (CPM) is a framework detailing
the appraisal process and its interaction with other cognitive subsystems. The CPM has been
under development ever since its inception (Sander et al., 2005; Scherer, 2009; Scherer et al.,
2010; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001), but has never been fully implemented. The reasons
for this lack of implementation will become clear later in the description.
As a general concept, Scherer considers emotions to be a mechanism that evolved to replace
instincts, usually conceptualized as rigid stimulus-response chains. In this perspective, emotions
are a flexible mechanism, which by decoupling stimulus and response, allows adaptation to
dynamic and complex environments. Hence, enhancing the survival capabilities of an agent
endowed with such a structure. In the context of the CPM, however, Scherer defines emotions
as:
“An episode of interrelated, synchronized changes in the states of all or most
of the five organismic subsystems. It is a response to the evaluation of an external
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Figure 2.3 General architecture of the component process model of emotion.
Source: Scherer et al. (2010, p.50), used with permission from Oxford Publishing Limited.
or internal stimulus event relevant to major concerns of the organism.” — Scherer
et al. (2010, p. )
The five ‘organismic subsystems’ mentioned in the previous definition, each fulfill a specific
function among: 1) evaluation of objects and events; 2) regulation of internal subsystems;
3) preparation for action; 4) signaling of behavioral intention; 5) monitoring of internal state
and external environment. It is important to note that Scherer adopts the idea of emotion as
a multi-componential construct, which is reminiscent of previous theories (Cannon, 1927;
MacLean, 1952; Papez, 1937). Indeed, although not the focus of his theory, MacLean (1949)
also suggested the existence of ‘cerebral analyzers’ receiving a wide variety of internal and
external stimuli. Emotions then were the results of patterns of activity in those analyzers.
However, this is not a view that every scientist shares even today (Dalgleish, 2004; Damasio,
2008).
The overall architecture of the CPM framework, as suggested by Scherer, can be split into
three principal modules (shown in Figure 2.3): 1) the appraisal module; 2) the component
patterning module; 3) and the categorization module.
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Figure 2.4 A comprehensive illustration of the component process model of emotion.
Source: Sander et al. (2005, p.321), reproduced with permission from Elsevier.
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Appraisal module
The appraisal module, is the most important part of the CPM framework, as its outcome
indicates if a stimulus is to trigger an emotional episode. As such, the results of its processing
components, drive the agent’s reaction to a particular stimulus event, and are major components
of the integrated representation that characterizes the subjective emotional experience, better
known as ‘conscious feeling’. According to Scherer, to ensure that an agent’s reactions are
adaptive and favor its survival, four global appraisal objectives need to be reached. Each
of them can be further broken down into sets of ‘stimulus evaluation checks’ (SEC), each
evaluating a distinct property of the stimulus event.
In order to successfully survive in a dynamic and complex environment, every living crea-
ture needs to remain aware of the different threats surrounding it, as well as any potential
opportunity that might improve its situation. However, to perform this constant monitoring task
animals have only access to very limited resources, in terms of energy supplies and also mental
capabilities. Therefore, Scherer argues that the first of the appraisal objectives, is a low-level
process sorting incoming stimulus events according to their relevance for the agent’s needs and
goals. On the one hand, depending on its relevance, a stimulus could be completely ignored,
thus saving precious resources from being wasted. On the other hand, relevant stimuli will be
attended to in order of their importance. Extreme cases, such as threats to an agent’s survival,
will interrupt any ongoing processing and enlist the agent’s full attention and mental capabilities
(the main reason for scientists to consider emotion to be an alarm system). To perform this
low-level filtering, a stimulus event is evaluated against three criteria: 1) ‘novelty’, which is
a measure of how abruptly a change in the environment occurred (a fast moving object or a
sudden burst of noise) and of how familiar or predictable a given event is, based on previous
experience; 2) ‘intrinsic pleasantness’, judges the likelihood of an event resulting in a state of
pain (to be avoided) or pleasure; 3) finally, the agent’s goals and needs are taken into account
to grade the pertinence of the stimulus event (abbreviated in the CPM as ‘relevance to goals
and needs’). For Scherer, the agent’s goals and needs are fundamental components both in the
context of the CPM and for animals in general. Arguing that “without needs or goals, no real
emotions”. As a consequence, if virtual agents are to be given emotions, the concepts of needs
and goals have to be implemented first. Two requirements that Scherer considers to be fairly
easy to fulfill (Scherer et al., 2010).
Once a stimulus event is deemed relevant for the agent, a plan has to be formulated to either
approach or avoid it, depending on its intrinsic pleasantness. In Scherer’s opinion, five checks
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are minimally required for the animal to learn more about the stimulus itself, its cause and prob-
able consequences. The checks suggested, to extract the required information, are: 1) ‘cause’,
one of the most important check (and also difficult to implement for virtual agents), since it
attributes agency and intention; 2) ‘probable outcome’, for which an individual has to consider
every possible outcome and compute its likelihood of happening given the sequence of events
leading to the current stimulus, as well as past experience; 3) in an effort to preserve resources
and to increase the speed with which an animal takes decision, its brain usually learns repeatedly
occurring sequences of events, thus a stimulus “failing to meet such expectations”, might be
cause for concerns; 4) ‘conduciveness’, is an assessment of the degree to which a given event
hinders or facilitates the realization of active goals and needs; 5) and ‘urgency” provides an
estimate for the importance of an event and for the speed at which a reaction has to be produced.
However, animals are capable of more than monitoring changes in the environment. Rather
than being swayed around, they can act upon the world. Modifying the environment until it
meets their needs. In the context of the CPM framework, this possibility is expressed through
the third appraisal objective: coping potential. If an animal sees an opportunity to gather more
food, it stands to reason to pay attention to stimuli predicting it and even expend some energy
to reach said food resource. On the contrary, if an event, like a natural disaster, cannot be
influenced, an animal might try to adapt its current strategy to accommodate the consequences.
In the worst case, it will simply be overcome with a feeling of helplessness. To estimate
the potential an agent has to cope with a given stimulus, the CPM relies on three checks:
1) ‘control’ and 2) ‘power’, are usually used interchangeably by authors, however Scherer
makes the distinction here between control, as a property describing how susceptible to external
influence an event is, and power, as a property of the agent defining its capabilities, in terms
of money, strength or knowledge, to control a situation; 3) in case an agent has no mean of
impacting an event’s outcome, its ‘potential for adjustment’ indicates the extent to which its
current plan can be adjusted to deal with the effects of the event.
For animals and agents living in social environments, an additional appraisal objective
considers the implications of an event or the consequences of ones actions, in the context of
social norms and moral standards. Although this objective involves many complex concepts,
it only contains two global checks: 1) ‘external standards’, which assesses the significance
of a stimulus regarding laws, norms and moral standards common to all individuals in the
same social group; 2) while ‘internal standards’ estimates the extent to which an action meets
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personal standards, such as self-ideals and internalized moral code.
Although the brain is notorious for its massively multi-processing prowesses, in the context
of the CPM, Scherer still assumes that the appraisal objectives are processed in sequence.
Arguing that:
“This sequence assumption is justified in terms of systems economy and logical
dependencies — the results of earlier SECs need to be processed before later SECs
can operate successfully, that is, yield a conclusive result.” — Scherer et al. (2010,
p. )
In the case of humans, and possibly other animals capable of emotions, the sequence is
thus repeated endlessly. Hence, continually updating the appraisal results and giving rise to
new emotional experiences. This recursive mechanism, in Scherer’s opinion, accounts for the
fleeting nature of emotions and is what enables animals to quickly react to unforeseen events in
the environment.
Response patterning module
In the component process model, Scherer describes the response patterning module as including,
for animals and humans at least, the Autonomic Nervous System (ANS) and the somatic system.
It is, therefore, mainly involved in preparing the body for actions, motivation, reacting to events
and communicating the individual’s current emotional state (usually through facial expressions
or changes in the voice). Compared to the appraisal module, its structure is much simpler,
since every results from the SECs will simply drive the activation of a particular set of sub-
components. As a result of his extensive work, Scherer was able to compile a list predicting
the effects, in terms of motor and ANS activations, of the SEC results. For example, a positive
result from the Novelty check, will produce an orienting response, a deceleration of the heart
rate, vasomotor contraction, increased skin conductance responses, pupillary dilation, local
muscle tonus changes, brows and lids up, frown, jaw drop, gaze directed, interruption of speech
and action, and raising head (but see (Scherer, 2009; Scherer et al., 2010) for the complete list
of predictions). The list in its current form is only intended to be used to faithfully reproduce
the emotional expression of humans. Therefore, an implementation of the CPM in a virtual
agent would require to adjust the different reactions to the agent’s capabilities.
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Categorization module
In the CPM, a lot of importance has been given to subjective experiences, usually known as
‘feelings’. According to Scherer, as part of the categorization module, they serve a monitoring
and regulation function. To fulfill its monitoring duty, the feeling component is required to
integrate and synchronize patterns of changes in all other components. Scherer believes that it
is this very process of integration, which gives rise to conscious feelings, stating that:
“If subjective experience is to serve a monitoring function, it needs to integrate
and centrally represent all information about the continuous patterns of change
and their coherence in all other components. Thus, feeling is an extraordinarily
complex conglomerate of information from different systems. . . . The CPM suggests
it is the very process of synchronization between components that elicits and
organizes this process of multicomponent integration, largely outside of awareness.”
— Scherer et al. (2010, p.59)
However, in the context of the CPM, feelings are responsible for more than simply moni-
toring and reflecting changes in the different components. They have proactive roles as well,
eliciting processes of cognitive reevaluation and of physiological and expressive regulation.
Conclusion
Given the definition adopted for the concept of emotions in the CPM, a typical emotional
episode can be described as beginning with a relevant stimulus entering the appraisal module.
Recurring sequences of appraisal and response patterning allow the agent to react to the event
and communicate its emotional states. Once all appraisal checks have reached a stable state, or
conclusive results, the emotional episode ends.
Although the CPM has never been completely implemented, its appraisal module has been
adopted by other research projects as part of their own models or to drive the behaviors of
social robots (see Sub-Section 2.6.4 for an example of such a model, as well as Scherer et al.
(2010)). Furthermore, the principles underlying the CPM are a good representation of recurrent
ideas found in appraisal theories.
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2.5 Dimensional theories
Another approach to emotion that has been considered over the years, is that of dimensional
theory. Dimensional theories of emotions argue that affective phenomenon, such as emotion,
mood and personality, are not discrete entities, but points in a continuous multi-dimensional
space. An idea not unlike the appraisal theories describe in the previous section. Indeed,
both approaches define a number of dimensions against which an object, an event, or more
broadly a situation is evaluated, which leads to an emotional reaction and ultimately a change
in affect. Rejecting the idea of discrete emotions, on the ground that there is little evidence for
the existence of basic brain areas or circuits supporting each emotional category, dimensional
theories tend to rather focus on the concept of affect. Emotions in this perspective are regarded
as no more than virtual labels retrospectively attributed to particular mental or perceived body
states. Therefore, the main goal implied by the adopted representation of affect is to deter-
mine the optimal number of dimensions, along with their nature, that completely describe the
concept without redundancy. However, simply characterizing the position of affect at a given
moment in time would be ignoring its dynamic nature. As a consequence, another line of
investigation for dimensional theories involves developing a mechanism to account for changes
in affect in reaction to shifts in the state of the external environment or the body. An example
of such mechanism is explored introduced by J. a. Russell (2003) is explored later in this section.
Back to 1872, when Darwin noticed a similarity in the expression of emotions across species
and cultures, upon closer inspection of his many portraits, at the time he drew the conclusion
that there had to be a set of basic emotions that are common to all animals, and by inheritance to
all humans. His discovery would later lead to the infamous theory of ‘basic’ versus ‘Complex’
emotions. Two years later a researcher by the name of Wundt (1874), inspired by Darwin’s
work on emotional expression, decided to take the mathematical route and develop a structural
description of subjective feelings. Where Darwin saw evidences for a set of basic emotions,
Wundt saw a potential for hidden factors that could describe emotional expressions. Through
statistical analysis of introspective reports on feelings, Wundt suggested that affect could be
conceptualized as a point in a three dimensional space of valence (positive versus negative
feelings), arousal (calm versus exited) and tension (relaxed versus attentive). Furthermore,
he believed that a mental phenomenon, described in such a space co-varies with measurable
physiological changes, such as heart rate, skin conductance or visceral activity.
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A century later, Mehrabian (1980, 1996) observed that, on the contrary to natural or inte-
grated sciences like physics and chemistry, social sciences were lacking a proper set of scales
(such as length, time or mass). He argued that the reason studies of affect or emotion had been
handicapped for the past decades was this absence of basic dimensions, which would provide
a common ground for describing and measuring emotion. Without shared values researchers
could not compare their theories (a concern later shared by Scherer (2005) as well).
Mehrabian grounded his search for a set of dimensions in the expanse of evidences that
other investigators had already produced. He was especially interested in the work of Osgood
(1957) and noticed that the semantic differential (a method of investigation used to measure
the connotative meaning of objects, events and concepts) factors of evaluation, potency and
activation, suggested as a result of his experiments, were repeated consistently in studies of
judgments of highly diverse stimuli. Mehrabian (1996) hypothesized that this consistency was
a direct consequence of the involvement of affective reactions. Stating that “. . . such reactions
were operative in any situation.” (Mehrabian, 1996). Mirroring the semantic differential factors
introduced by Osgood, Mehrabian conceived the now famous Pleasure, Arousal and Dom-
inance (PAD) Emotion State model, where pleasure, corresponding to Osgood’s evaluation
factor, denotes a positive versus negative affective state. Arousal similar to activity reflects the
individual’s level of mental alertness and physical activity. Finally, dominance akin to potency
measures the level of control a person feels she has over her own actions and environment.
Thus, a positive value for dominance is a sign that one feels in control of his surroundings and
makes his own decisions without any external influence, while a negative value is synonymous
with submissiveness and is characterized by a feeling of being controlled by others and/or a
situation. The PAD Emotional State model was tested in relationship with 42 verbal-report
scales of emotional response developed by other investigators. From the results, Mehrabian
(1996, p. 263) concluded that the PAD Emotion State model “provided a reasonably general
characterization and measurements of ” a person’s emotional state, since it was able to explain
all the reliable variance. However, Mehrabian (1996) did not stop there and extended his Emo-
tional State model into an Emotional Trait model. The distinction being that a trait, according
to him can be computed as an average over a long period of time (months, years or even a
lifetime) of a wide and representative sample of everyday affective situations. He equated an
emotional trait to temperament, hence, making his scale able to measure not only the current
emotional state of a person, but also her mood and on the long term one’s personality. In a later
paper Mehrabian (1996) described a series of experiments supporting the claim that the PAD
Emotional Trait model could be used as a general framework for describing and measuring
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personality. It is worth noting that to this day, many scientists from all manner of fields are still
using Mehrabian’s distinction and definitions of emotional state and trait.
Figure 2.5 A depiction of Mehrabian’s theory of emotions. It has become somewhat of a
standard model in the field of dimensional theory. In this school of thought, an emotion is
represented as a point in space (exemplified here by agreeableness and defense in red). In
the case of Mehrabian’s model, this space is defined by three dimensions, that of pleasure,
dominance and arousal. It should be noted that this three dimensional space is also used for
describing personality and temperament.
Even though, Mehrabian’s Emotion State model is nowadays widely popular as a model
of emotions, it bears mentioning that neither him nor Wundt (1874) gave any suggestion as
to how a person’s emotional state is updated as a result of her interactions with the world
or changes within the body. Many researchers have since dedicated their career to fleshing
out a mechanism that would account for changes in emotional state, based on alterations of
the surroundings and presence of certain objects in the environment. A general consensus,
which has emerged from the wealth of research performed, is that objects, events and other
stimuli in a person’s surroundings all have a special property called ‘affective quality’. When
an object is perceived by the brain, its affective quality is interpreted and triggers a change in
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the person’s emotional state. Effectively pushing it around, as one would a hockey puck. A
concrete example of this general mechanism can be found in the core affect model developed
by J. a. Russell (2003).
The framework first suggested by J. A. Russell and Barrett (1999) and further detailed
by J. a. Russell (2003), is a direct result of the observation that psychological theories related
to emotions rarely define the concept and usually rely on emotion words such as fear, anger
or joy. In Russell’s point of view, those emotion words are nothing more than folk concepts,
used long ago by our hunter-gatherer ancestors. Since these concepts are not supported by any
scientific theory, they have no place in psychology, or any other field for that matter. Therefore,
Russell sought to establish a framework describing the structure underlying emotion.
To create such a framework J. a. Russell (2003) needed to define the primitive building
blocks, which through different combinations account for all the observations and manifes-
tations of emotions. In this endeavor, Russell followed in Oatley and Johnson-laird’s (1987)
footsteps. They argue that emotions supported by cognitive processes, are always directed at an
object, whether real or imaginary. Therefore, those emotions are not primitive elements, but
complex events. Instead they suggest that affect should be based on emotional processes that
can exist free of any external objects. That is not to say that external objects or events do not
influence emotions in any way, but rather that the core structure of emotion should not rely on
external stimuli for its definition.
As discussed in Section 2.5, dimensional theories of emotions provide an empirically
established solution to this problem. Experiments conducted within this field have gathered
much evidences pointing to the dimensions of pleasure — displeasure (valence) and activation
— deactivation (arousal) as being primitive and ubiquitous. As a consequence, Russell adopted
a combination of these two dimensions, which he refers to as ‘core affect’, as the first primitive
of his framework. The perception of the pleasant and arousing qualities of external stimuli, he
defined as the second primitive, and labeled it ‘perception of affective quality’. The term per-
ception is intentionally used in this context, since the perception of a stimulus’ affective quality
is described as being indistinguishable from the cognitive perception of its other properties.
Core affect then exists within the individual and can be conceptualized as a free floating
point in the two dimensional space of pleasure and arousal. Whereas, affective quality, which
can be redefined as the propensity to alter core affect, is external and characteristic of each
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stimulus. Considering that core affect is an object-less representation of the individual’s current
emotional state, a mechanism is required to link a change in core affect to a perceived cause.
To fulfill this role, Russell introduces the ‘attributed affect’, which is defined by three necessary
and sufficient features: 1) a change in core affect; 2) an external object perceived as the cause
for the change; 3) and the process of attribution of the core affect to the object. Even though,
attributed affect is a cognitive process, it is not perfect and has been proved to give rise to
misattribution (J. a. Russell, 2003). In misattribution, a change in core affect, caused by one
source, is attributed to another target, which leads the individual to perceive the target as more
pleasant, or less so, than it really is.
Russell argues that combined with information processing and behavioral planning, the
adopted primitives account for the myriad manifestations and influences called emotional. For
one, in the same way other dimensional theories do, core affect qualifies in some particular cases
as an emotion. For example, a simple core affect of pleasure, could be labeled as happiness,
and core affect of displeasure and high arousal may qualify as anxiety. Nevertheless, pleasure
and arousal alone are not enough to account for most emotional episodes. Russell advocates
for a perspective integrating the dimensional approach with the categorization process found in
most appraisal theories.
Over the course of its existence dimensional theories have received a lot of criticisms.
Chief among them is the fact that, similarly to early theories of emotions, the emotional
episode considered has no clear beginning. In other words, dimensional theories usually lack
a mechanism to discriminate between objects that should trigger a reaction, and any other
object that can safely be ignored. Furthermore, since the main focus of the field is to find
a suitable multi-dimensional space to describe and measure an individual’s emotional state
and personality (emotional trait), very little attention has been given to the relations that exist
between emotions, and even less so to the many interactions the affective and cognitive systems
benefit from, in the brain.
One famous exception can be found in the work of Plutchik (1958, 1962); Plutchik and
Conte (1997), which culminated in the well-known ‘wheel of emotions’. Inspired by the parallel
between emotions and colors, which McDougall (1921) depicted as follow:
“The color sensations present, like the emotions, an indefinitely great variety
of qualities shading into one another by imperceptible gradations; but this fact
does not prevent us regarding all these many delicate varieties as reducible by
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analysis to a few simple primary qualities from which they are formed by fusion,
or blending, in all proportions . . . the same is true of the emotions.” — McDougall
(1921, p. 114)
Plutchik (1958) sought to decipher and model the relations between emotions. In 1958, he
introduced a cone-shaped model based on the dimensions of pleasantness — unpleasantness,
attention — rejection and intensity (Plutchik, 1958). At the same time he also suggested that
there are eight bipolar basic emotions: joy versus sorrow, anger versus fear, acceptance versus
disgust and surprise versus expectancy.
Figure 2.6 A well-known representation of Plutchik’s mechanism for creating higher-level
emotions, in which they are compared to colors. As is the case with colors, a select few are
defined as primary. Blending two primary colors together, results in a new color. In the same
way mixing two primary emotions, gives birth to what Plutchik refers to as a dyad. A first level
dyad is a blend between two adjacent emotions. The level of dyad increase the further apart
the primary compounds are.
Source: commons.wikimedia.org.
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In a later study Plutchik (1962) revised his model from a cone to a circle (see Figure 2.6).
For this experiment he used a modified pair-comparison method, in which a set of three
non-synonymous emotions were chosen. Participants then had to rate, on a bipolar scale, the
similarity of 146 emotion words to each of the three reference words. The scale used for rating
was comprised of 11 points ranging from opposite (−5), through no relation (0), to the same
(5). The mean similarity ratings were then converted to angular position on a circle. Emotion
words with opposite meaning sitting diametrically, while emotion words with no relation were
separated from each others by a 90 degrees angle. After, factor analyzing the results of the
experiments, Plutchik concluded that two factors accounted for most of the variance, hence
giving birth to the aforementioned wheel of emotions. To further prove the validity of this
emotion circle, a second experiment was conducted using the independent semantic differential
method, introduced earlier by Osgood (1957). A factor analysis of the results revealed that the
circles from both experiments had a product-moment correlation of 0.90, indicating that they
were almost identical. Hence, lending further credit to Plutchik’s (1962; 1997) ‘Circumplex
model of emotions and personality’.
Recently, with the advent of service robots and the development of the game industry,
dimensional theories are experiencing a resurgence in popularity. Considering that these
theories allow for the reduction of complex concepts, such as affect, mood or personality, to
simple vectors, as well as providing a mechanism to account for the influence of external
object or event on the emotional state of any given person, it is easy to understand why people
outside the field of affective science would be attracted to dimensional theories. They provide
a mathematical representation convenient for further processing or interpretation whether by
a computer program or a human. Furthermore, recent studies have shown that when used in
artificial agents, they performed better in emotion expression and recognition tasks (Marsella et
al., 2010, p. 29), then when using appraisal theories. Although, only semantic models have been
presented in this section other theories and models subscribing to the dimensional approach to
emotions can be found in Davidson (2003); Davidson, Scherer, and Goldsmith (2003), as well
as Fontaine, Scherer, and Soriano (2013) to name but a few examples.
2.6 Anatomic theories
The dawn of the nineteenth century, brought with it a peculiar movement later known as
‘phrenology’ (Damasio, 2008; LeDoux, 1998). Phrenologists were scientists, or rather pseudo-
scientists by current standards, who studied personality traits and mental disorders by feeling
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Figure 2.7 An example of a map used by phrenologists to locate human faculties on the skull.
Source: commons.wikimedia.org. Author: Mirokado.
the topography of a person’s skull. In 1796, Franz Joseph Gall, a reputed scientist at the
time, began to give lecture on ‘organology’, which can be best described as a mix of early
neuroscience, psychology and applied philosophy. Through organology, Gall introduced radical
concepts from which phrenology would stem, some of which are now widely accepted, while
other had to be abandoned. Contrary to the dualist belief spread by psychology so far, Gall
suggested that the brain as an organ is the seat of the mind. He went on in his reflection and
introduced the controversial idea that the brain was not in fact one unique organ that produced
the mind and its different faculties, but rather an aggregate of many organs each with its own
psychological faculty, and each working independently from one another. The many organs that
made up the brain, in Gall’s theory, were called ‘centers’. Thus, there was a center for sensation,
one for feeling, another for memory and language, and some more exotic ones for veneration,
benevolence, friendship, sublimity, suavity and philoprocentivness (what ever that might be) to
name but a few. Where Gall’s doctrine took a turn for the worse, was with his belief that the
‘power’ or mental faculties of each center was proportional to its size. Furthermore, he argued
that a person’s skull would have small bumps over those areas which were well developed,
while smaller centers would result in dips in the shape of one’s head. Therefore, it was possible
to derive someone’s personality by simply ‘reading’ the surface topography of his head (an
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example of a map drawn by phrenologists and depicting the location of the different personality
traits can be seen in Figure 2.7).
Being born in the middle of the Age of Enlightenment, an era where science was fashion-
able, phrenology grew in popularity and quickly spread throughout Europe. Soon phrenologists
everywhere were publishing maps describing the locations of the different faculties on the
human skull. By 1832 it even reached the United States, where an accident of great importance
for affective neuroscience was about to happen.
The year is 1848, Phineas Gage is a construction foreman working for the Rutland &
Burlington Railroad company. At the head of a large group of men, also called a ‘gang’,
their job is to lay down new tracks for the railroad’s extension across Vermont. Rather than
twist and turn around each outcrop of hard rock, the strategy is to blast a straighter and level
path through them. A process that requires to drill holes in the rock and pour in explosive
powder. Sand is then placed on top of the powder and ‘tamped in’ to contain the explosion
and direct it inside the rock. Phineas was usually in charge of pounding the sand with his
iron rode. However, this time acting while distracted Gage pounds directly on the explosive
powder, igniting it. The explosion, unrestrained by the sand, projects the iron rode through
Gage’s skull with enough force for it to land some twenty meters away (Damasio, 2008). In the
hands of Harlow (Damasio, 2008; J. Harlow, 1848; J. M. Harlow, 1868), Phineas Gage would
make a miraculous recovery in less than two months. However, as his friends, coworkers and
family would soon discover: “Gage was no longer Gage” (J. Harlow, 1848). For the duration
of Gage’s recovery and the next twenty years of his life, Harlow recorded in great details the
ways in which Gage’s personality had changed. Although, Phineas had regained his full range
of motion, his dexterity and could see as well as speak without any difficulty, his temperament
was different. Before his accident Phineas had been a respectable person with a bright future
ahead of him. Whereas after, J. M. Harlow (1868) would describe him as:
“. . . fitful, irreverent, indulging at times in the grossest profanity which was not
previously his custom, manifesting but little deference for his fellows, impatient
of restrain or advice when it conflicts with his desires, at times pertinaciously
obstinate, yet capricious and vacillating, devising many plans of future operation,
which are no sooner arranged than they are abandoned in turn for others appearing
more feasible. A child in his intellectual capacity and manifestations, he has the
animal passions of a strong man.” — J. M. Harlow (1868, p. 13–14)
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While Phineas Gage died on the 21st of May 1868 in San Fransisco, his case through
the thorough report of Harlow, would provide irrevocable proof for one of phrenology’s
tenets (Damasio, 2008). Since only a small portion of the brain was lesioned, triggering
a change in personality, while all other aspects of Gage’s capabilities remained intact, the
conclusion drawn by early 1920s neuroscientists was that the brain is indeed an aggregate.
However, instead of being called centers the brain’s components are nowadays called systems
each fulfilling a precise function, while influencing each others. Furthermore, Gage’s change in
temperament hinted at the fact that within the brain the mind shares its seat with emotions.
Figure 2.8 On the left: A picture of Phineas gage holding his tamping iron. On the right: A
virtual simulation of the trajectory the iron rod followed through gage’s skull.
Source: commons.wikimedia.org
This idea of a brain made of systems and being a container for both the mind and emotions,
along with theories that Darwin (1872) would put in writing only half a decade later marks
the most important turning point in the history of affective science. As a matter of fact, in
Section 2.2 this point in time has been defined as the birth of affective science. This nascent
field saw the quick rise in popularity of the James-Lange theory (see Section 2.2 and James
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(1884) for more details) followed by a long period of ‘stagnation’. Until Cannon et al. (1927)
armed with a better understanding of the different areas that make up the brain, as well as the
connections between them, broke through the silence to suggest an model centered around the
interaction between the thalamus and the cortex (a described in Section 2.3).
Exactly ten years later, upon learning that an American benefactor had provided a generous
financial support to a British laboratory, whose project consisted in figuring out how emotions
work, Papez (1937) his national pride hurt published his famous theory in a few days, or so the
story goes. Even though, the goal at the time was to show that Americans had some ideas about
emotions too, Papez (1937) had just introduced one of the most influential model of emotions
in the brain. Based on the work of Cannon et al. (1927), Papez (1937) used the following
definition of emotion as a basis for his reflection:
“The term “emotion” as commonly used implies two conditions: a way of
acting and a way of feeling. The former is designated as emotional expression;
the latter, as emotional experience or subjective feeling. The experiments of Bard
(1929) have demonstrated that emotional expression depends on the integrative
action of the hypothalamus rather than on that of the dorsal thalamus or cortex,
. . . For subjective emotional experience, however, the participation of the cortex
is essential. Emotional expression and emotional experience may in the human
subject be dissociated phenomena.” — Papez (1937, p.726)
Consequently, Papez’s theory describes the emotion system as a circuit, hence, its later
labeling as the ‘Papez circuit’, in which sensory inputs into the brain are split, at the level of the
way stations in the thalamus, into the ‘stream of though’ and the ‘stream of feeling’ (Dalgleish,
2004; LeDoux, 1998; Papez, 1937). The stream of thought depicts a path between the thalamus
and the lateral areas of the neocortex, where sensations are turned into perceptions, thoughts
and memories. The stream of feeling channels sensory data, coming into the brain via the
thalamus, directly to the hypothalamus, or more precisely the hypothalamic mammillary bodies,
which generates emotions. The outcome of hypothalamic processing is transfered to the anterior
thalamic nucleus and is relayed to the cingulate. The cingulate cortex receives activations
from both the stream of thought and stream of feeling. It was described by Papez as the place
where “environmental events are endowed with an emotional consciousness”. Finally, the
cingulate cortex projects to the hippocampus, which in turn completes the circuits by way
of connections with the hypothalamus, regulating the brain’s emotional response. Through
this circuit, Papez suggested that emotional experience could be generated in two different
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ways: by simple activation of the stream of feeling by sensory objects; or as a consequence
of information flowing through the stream of thought, where the stimuli would be perceived
and memories activated. Reaching the cingulate cortex, perceptions and memories would be
interpreted and give rise to feelings.
Around the time Papez wrote his theory, the connections described were poorly understood
or even unknown, because the methods for tracing such synaptic projections were crude. There-
fore, based on the known clinical effects of brain damage to the different regions involved in
the circuit, Papez speculated their existence and function within his circuit. Especially for the
hippocampus and the cingulate cortex, were lesions results in intense emotional, convulsive
and paralytic symptoms: delirium, depression, loss of emotional spontaneity and sometimes
coma, respectively.
Although, all of the connections hypothesized by Papez (1937) have since been found to
exist, there is not has much evidence showing that the different areas suggested to be part of
the circuit are indeed central to the production of emotions in the brain (Dalgleish, 2004).
The same year that saw the publication of the Papez circuit, witnessed the report of an
accidental discovery, by Kluver and Bucy (1937), of the effects of damage to the temporal lobe
in monkeys. In their study, they consistently observed that when the temporal cortex is lesioned,
animals (monkeys in this case) as well as humans experience ‘psychic blindness’. Meaning
that the visual acuity of the subject is not degraded in any way, but the animal is incapable of
grasping the psychological significance of a stimulus. For example, monkeys presented with
different objects, such as a comb, a sunflower seed, a screw or a live snake, will inevitably
bring each object to their mouth before deciding which is edible. Other characteristics of the
‘Klüver-Bucy syndrome’ include hyper-sexual activity, where animal will try to copulate with
other members of the same sex or with members of other species and a certain tameness in the
presence of previously feared objects.
Building on the work of Papez (1937), Klüver and Bucy (1937), and extending it with
Freudian psychology, MacLean (1949) sought to establish an all-encompassing theory of the
emotional brain, similar to what Arnold would do for the field of appraisal theory more than
a decade later. MacLean was also the first, since Darwin (1872), to really consider the brain
along its fourth dimension: time. As is detailed bellow, his theories not only describe the
different brain structures and their involvement in emotions, but also examine the brain’s
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evolution and its implication for emotions. Aware of the attention received by both the cortex
and hypothalamus, in the work of his predecessors, for their role in emotional experience and
emotional expression respectively, Maclean focused on uncovering the ways these two brain
areas communicate. Believing this to be the key to understanding how the affective quality
of an experience could influence the autonomic nervous system and generate an emotional
reaction, as well as lead in the most extreme cases to psychosomatic diseases like hypertension.
MacLean, like Papez before him, was convinced that for an animal to be capable of experi-
encing and discriminating between emotions, it needed a cerebral cortex. At the time, though,
no significant connections between the newly evolved neocortex and the hypothalamus were
known, making it impossible for the former to exert any kind of influence over the emotional
reaction process. The solution was to be found in Papez’s circuit, which established that
the evolutionarily older medial cortex, called the ‘rhinencephalon’, has strong ties with the
hypothalamus. Further, noting that stimulation of the rhinencephalon, but not areas of the
neocortex, produced autonomic responses, MacLean renamed the medial cortex into the ‘vis-
ceral brain’. He also concluded that the visceral brain had to be the seat of emotions in the brain.
According to MacLean, because the neocortex had not evolved yet, primitive animals were
limited to the visceral brain as the highest center for coordinating behavior. In these creatures,
the visceral brain was in charge of all the instinctual behaviors and basic drives underlying
the survival of the individual and to a greater extent of the specie. However, the advent of the
neocortex in mammals opened the door for higher forms of psychological functions. Therefore,
the neocortex incrementally took hold of the body’s musculature, all the while fulfilling the
higher functions of intellect. Yet even in humans, considered to be at the pinnacle of brain
evolution, the visceral brain remains essentially unchanged and fulfills its survival duty.
Drawing from his previous observations, MacLean hypothesized that emotional expression
resulted from the integration of sensations arising from the external environment with visceral
sensations. He suggested this integration to take place inside the visceral brain, where stimuli
from within and without the body were transmitted as nervous impulses to ‘cerebral analyzers’.
Similar to Papez, MacLean designated the hippocampus as the brain area containing the cere-
bral analyzers. As a consequence the hippocampus became the main component underlying
emotions. Moreover, acknowledging the limitations of the hippocampus as a more primitive
structure, compared to the neocortex, he argued in a fashion reminiscent of the Cannon-Bard
theory, that the hippocampus needs the top-down control of the neocortex to keep emotional
reactions in check. Without inhibition from the neocortex, according to MacLean, the hip-
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pocampus would run wild, leading to phobias or obsessive-compulsive disorders.
After refining his hypothesis for three years, MacLean (1952) introduced the concept of
the ‘limbic system’ as a replacement to the visceral brain. In addition to the brain areas already
present in the Papez circuit, the limbic system included such regions as the amygdala, the
septum and the pre-frontal cortex. Extending the visceral brain hypothesis, the structures of the
limbic system are primitive components working together to ensure the survival of the individ-
ual and the specie. This system evolved to mediate visceral functions and affective behaviors,
such as feeding, defense, fighting and reproduction. It is therefore, an extension of the visceral
brain as it not only maintains homeostasis, but also underlies the emotional life of the individual.
Finally, almost twenty years later, MacLean (1970) published the ‘triune brain’ theory,
according to which the forebrain has gone through three stages of evolutions, namely: reptilian,
paleomammalian and neomammalian. The paleomammalian stage roughly corresponding to
the aforementioned limbic system. As a result, the human brain can be conceived as a three
layered hierarchy. Where each layer has its own intelligence, memory, sense of space and time,
motor control and other specialized functions. In MacLean’s perspective, the brains of humans,
primates and advanced mammals, all have three layers. Lower mammals have the reptilian and
paleomammalian layers, while other vertebrate creatures, such as birds, reptiles, amphibians
and fishes, are left with only the reptilian layer. The triune brain is MacLean’s most global
theory and offers a broad view of the brain, and the limbic system’s place within this ensemble,
through the scope of evolution. At the same time it provides a flexible architecture to explain
the differences in levels of complexity between the capabilities, mental as well as behavioral,
of advanced mammals in comparison to lower mammals and vertebrates.
In consequence of the depth and richness of MacLean’s work, the surface of which has
only been scratched in this chapter, it is easy to see why by 1952 most affective neuroscientists
believed the search for the seat of emotions in the brain to be over. It also serves to explain
why the concept of the limbic system has survived through history and is still a theory taught
to young neuroscientists today. Be that as it may, the survival of the limbic system was not
without problems, as it has received its fare share of criticisms. Some scientists went as
far as arguing that the concept should be abandoned all together. The reason behind this
argument being that in the context of our current understanding of the brain, the limbic system
does not have well defined borders anymore. When MacLean first introduced the concept,
he used the phylogenetic properties of its component to identify its borders, as mentioned
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above. Shortly after the publication of MacLean’s theory, researchers sought to confirm his
reasoning and found that indeed vertebrates seem to be lacking a structure resembling the
neocortex, while still having a medial cortex. Hence, lending more support to the limbic
system concept and MacLean’s triune brain theory. Yet in the early 1970s, anatomists like
Karten and Northcutt (Karten & Shimizu, 1991; Northcutt & Kaas, 1995) were able to show
that, even though primitive animals did not have a neocortex proper, other regions of their
brain meet the structural and functional criteria of the neocortex. As a result, it was no longer
possible to distinguish brain areas based on their emergence in evolution, rendering the whole
rhinencephalon, visceral brain and limbic system suspect. Many of MacLean’s followers have
since tried to revive the concept by providing other criterion to find the regions included, but to
no avail. Even though the concept of the limbic system might soon be abandoned, it does not
mean that all of MacLean’s ideas were misguided. His approach to emotions through the lens
of evolution and his focus on the capabilities the emotion system affords animals, still serves as
guide in current research projects.
2.6.1 The rise and fall of the ‘basic emotions’ theory
Since Darwin speculated the existence of innate emotions, which are shared not only across
cultures, but probably with most mammals and even close related vertebrates as well, many
have tried to identify those so called ‘basic emotions’ and the neural circuitry underlying them.
In Darwin’s mind the universality of a particular emotion was characterized by the similarity
of its expression across different civilizations. Further, in his perspective basic emotions
represented innate, patterned responses that are controlled by ‘hardwired’ brain circuits. His
claims relied on simple portraits that he had drawn himself, while traveling around the world.
To lend more credibility to Darwin’s presumptions, modern researchers have gone into remote
areas of the world to establish through rigorous scientific methods that at least a subset of the
emotional range humans are capable of, have a universal mode of expression. As a result, the
first list of basic emotions proposed (LeDoux, 1998; Scherer et al., 2010), included: surprise,
interest, joy, rage, fear, disgust, shame and anguish. On the one hand, relying on facial expres-
sion alone Ekman (1973, 1992) was able to produce an overlapping list including: surprise,
happiness, anger, fear, disgust and sadness, which is still regarded as a standard in most current
research projects on emotions recognition and synthesis in virtual agents or robots. On the other
hand, scientists like Plutchik (1958, 1962) and Frijda (1986) argue for a different approach.
Considering that, the further down the evolutionary scale one goes, the less the creatures are
capable of facial expression. Yet the wealth of emotional expressions, observed in mammals, is
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still available through body language. From his observations, Plutchik deduced yet another list
of basic emotions that largely overlaps with Ekman’s one, with the addition of acceptance and
anticipation. The last approach, considered has been suggested by Panksepp, Mir, Delgado, and
Edwards (1982), who used the behavioral consequences of electrical stimulation of areas of the
rat brain to reveal four basic emotional response patterns: panic, rage, expectancy and fear.
Figure 2.9 This figure presents a graphical depiction of Plutchik’s circumplex model of emotions
and personality. To establish the validity of his model, he performed a survey in which
participants had to rate the similarity of 146 emotions. To visually represent the results of his
experiment, he chose to use a circle, on which emotions with opposite meanings sit diametrically
opposite from each other. On the other hand, two emotions separated by a 90 degrees angle
have no relation at all. Therefore, the dissimilarity between two emotions increase with the
angle between them. As was the case for Mehrabian before him, Plutchik’s model also describes
both emotions and personality.
Far from denying the existence of any other non-basic emotions, most theorists conceive
of them as the results of blending or mixing of two or more basic emotions together. Among
the mechanisms suggested to account for this blending process, Plutchik’s theory of the cir-
cumplex (Plutchik, 1962; Plutchik & Conte, 1997) contains the most sophisticated one. As
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mentioned in Section 2.5, in the circumplex theory, emotions are placed on a circle with
the angular position of one emotion relative to another being indicative of their relation (as
illustrated by Figure 2.9). Thus, 180 degrees implies opposite emotions, while 90 degrees
means that the two emotions have no particular relation. Finally, emotions separated by only a
few degrees have a very close meaning. However, Plutchik’s theory goes beyond this model
and gives a mechanism to account for non-basic emotions. A complex emotion, similar to how
colors work, is a blend between two basic emotions on the circle, hence the name ‘dyad’. A
blend of two adjacent basic emotions is called a ‘first order dyad’. Blends between two basic
emotions, which are separated by one other emotion, are referred to as second order dyads,
and so on for higher order dyads. A blend between two nearly opposite emotions (high order
dyad) can result in conflict, which in itself can be the cause for a new emotion. For example,
joy and fear are separated by acceptance and their fusion is imperfect. The resulting conflict is
the source of the emotion called guilt.
In Plutchik’s perspective the blending mechanism is typically a cognitive operation. Hence,
basic emotions are shared across species, but non-basic emotions, being the result of cognition,
can only be shared by animals with the same cognitive capabilities. As a result, most if not all
non-basic emotions are uniquely human.
Although the basic emotion theory has enjoyed an era of popularity, it has not been without
a cost. Throughout history, it has also received its fair share of criticisms. Some appraisal
theorists considering emotions to be the internal representation and interpretation (appraisal)
of situations, argue that emotions are social constructions, and not the result of mindless pro-
cessing of biological hardware. Therefore, in this so called ‘social constructivist’ perspective,
emotions are purely inventions of the human society, resulting from our need to categorize or
interpret the world around us, as opposed to biological phenomenon. As a consequence, the
concept of innate basic emotions cannot exist in such framework.
Ortony and Turner (1990) published a paper, in which they questioned the foundations
upon which all basic emotion theories are built. A recurrent complaint in the field of affective
science, even to this day, is the lack of agreed upon definition for the very concept of emotion.
While, this is true for the whole field, the problem is compounded when it comes to basic
emotion theories. Not only does the concept of emotion change according to the author’s
point of view, there is also no consensus as to what characteristics a given mental state should
possess to be considered a basic emotion, a fact that Ortony and Turner target with three of
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their complaints. First, as is made clear by the different lists of basic emotions detailed before,
there usually is some overlap from one list to another, but from author to author the size of
the list will change, and so do the label attributed to each basic emotional state (the lists given
above being standardized to make the overlap clearer). The shorter lists counting only two
emotions (pleasure and pain for example), while the longest ones can contain up to 18 emotions.
Further, some of the lists contain mental states, that Ortony and Turner (1990) argue are not
emotions. The prevalent examples are interest or surprise. Assuming that a given state should
at the very least require a non-neutral valence to constitute an emotion. In such a case interest
does not meet the requirement for being an emotion, since the state of interest in itself does
not have any valence. The valence is attributed to the object target of the attention mechanism.
Interest can be a cause for the appearance of an emotion, but is not one. The same holds
true for surprise. The third complaint expressed by Ortony and Turner (1990) concerns the
wealth of methods used in studies related to basic emotions. A direct consequence of the lack
of established characterization, is that each research project employs its own experimental
methods to determine a set of basic emotions, ranging from introspection, analysis of the words
describing emotions, to brain stimulation. This again results in non-overlapping, sometimes
very different, lists of basic emotions.
The final criticism is directed toward a smaller group of basic emotion theorists. The
point of view adopted by the different members of this group, is the result of an alternative
interpretation of Darwin (1872)’s theory. As mentioned earlier, using the principle of the
‘survival of the fittest’ Darwin (1872) was able to deduce that emotions were a mechanism
that evolved from a common ancestor. As a result, some emotions are shared not only by all
humans, but also throughout the animal kingdom. Furthermore, it can be deduced that the
fundamental brain structures involved in those emotions are also conserved across species. The
role of those conserved circuits, however, is rather vague. The adopted consensus among basic
emotion theorists, thought, is that a hardwired neural structure underlies each basic emotion.
These neural populations are thought to be in charge of producing the emotion, as well as
the accompanying innate reaction (Ekman, 1973). Yet so far there has been little evidence to
support this idea. Rather the different clues seem to indicate the existence of a global emotion
or ‘response’ system. Indeed, evidences for the existence of hardwired structures supporting
reaction patterns associated with emotions have been discovered. However, the link between
these response patterns and the different emotions observed is one of correlation, but not one of
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causation, as the basic emotions theorists interpreted it (Ortony & Turner, 1990).
The consequences of Ortony and Turner’s publication was a decrease in popularity for the
theory of basic emotions. However, the idea has managed to survive and still strives to this
day, where it inspires the work of some scientists (Damasio, 2008; Frijda & Parrott, 2011) or
sometimes only appears implicitly (Wager et al., 2015). While others do not hold it in high
regards anymore or even outright reject it. Part of its continuing success can also be attributed
to its use in machine learning especially deep-learning projects where lists of basic emotions
provide a convenient foundation for categorization.
2.6.2 The ‘Survival Circuit’ theory
In spite of its declining reputation and many detractors, the principles underlying the basic
emotions theory are worth reinterpreting in different directions. The core idea of circuits that
evolved to fulfill specific tasks and are inherited from our animal ancestors has recently been
revisited. Instead of looking for mechanisms producing specific emotions, LeDoux (2012)
suggests to focus on the functions fulfilled by emotions and identify the underlying brain
circuits. This idea is by no means original, since it echoes a similar perspective adopted
by Sloman (2001) a decade earlier. On the contrary to Sloman, however, LeDoux introduces a
concrete implementation of this idea in the shape of the ‘survival circuits’ theory:
“By focusing on survival functions instantiated in conserved circuits, key phe-
nomena relevant to emotions and feelings are discussed with the natural direction
of brain evolution in mind (by asking to what extent are functions and circuits
that are present in other mammals also present in humans) rather than by looking
backward, and anthropomorphically, into evolutionary history (by asking whether
human emotions/feelings have counterparts in other animals).” — LeDoux (2012,
p. 2)
Furthermore, by focusing on these preserved circuits, the theory goes beyond simply explaining
the mechanisms underlying emotions. It offers a unified framework in which related phenom-
ena, such as motivation, reinforcement and arousal, are considered basic components.
At its core, the survival circuit theory exploits the relationship between innate survival
functions and emotions, which was first proposed by Darwin (1859, 1872), to explain the
emergence of emotions from the interaction of multiple brain systems. It is worth mentioning
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that, the idea of innate survival functions, inherited from our animal ancestors, originated the
consensus which many neuroscientists take for granted, that the neural circuits at the base of
the brain are innately hard wired by evolution and maintain the well-being of the organism (an
idea explored in Section 2.6 and again in Sub-Section 2.6.3). In turn, this idea led to the theory
of basic (hard-wired/innate) emotions, which is nowadays a major controversy in the field of
affective science.
The survival circuits, as described in LeDoux’s theory, are responsible for maintaining
the organism’s homeostasis: maintenance of energy and food supplies, thermoregulation, de-
fense and reproduction. Through their life-sustaining and adaptive functions, therefore, they
increase an animal’s chances of survival and reproduction, in complex, dynamic and sometimes
hazardous environments. Further, LeDoux argues that, although the adaptive responses to a
given threatening event is species-specific, much of the organization for the structures which
make up the survival circuits have been conserved. According to him, this is evidenced by the
fact that even single cell organisms are capable of detecting and avoiding harmful chemicals,
while moving toward substances rich in nutrients. Through evolution and pressured by the
environment, animals have grown in complexity and, therefore, in capacities to implement
elaborate adaptive strategies. However throughout the animal kingdom, and even in humans,
the mechanisms underlying each survival function have been conserved.
On the one hand, the survival circuits are quite similar to the innate circuits, that basic
emotions theories hypothesize account for those shared and universally recognized emotions.
Indeed, both approaches rely on the existence of inherited neural populations nested at the base
of the brain. On the other hand, while basic emotion theories use those brain systems to explain
the origin of emotional experiences, LeDoux’s (2012) theory focuses on the survival functions
fulfilled, but do not make any claim about these systems originating any feelings. As described
later, the survival circuits do play a part in the emergence of emotional phenomena, however
they are not considered to be the origin, only the trigger. As a consequence, within the survival
circuit theory, there are no circuits dedicated to anger or happiness, for example, however
there are systems accounting for defense, thermoregulation, maintenance of energy and food
supplies, fluid balance, and reproduction. Each system, in turn, interacts with basic control
components to fulfill its role, depending on the organism’s motor and sensory capabilities. This
last step being where species-specific adaptive responses are finally implemented.
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Finally, each survival circuit is characterized by a set of detectors, implemented in neural
populations, which monitor the stream of input sensory data in search for stimuli relevant to
the circuit’s function. Similarly to what neuroscientists usually assume, LeDoux argues that the
configuration of the neural population, underlying each detector and survival circuit as a whole,
has been inherited from our animal ancestors. This allows the circuits to detect, and react
to, specific stimulus patterns using tried and true strategies refined through natural selection.
Additionally, survival circuits can also learn to respond to novel stimuli, through its association
with an innately triggering event, a process usually referred to as ‘classical conditioning’ (see
Sub-Section 3.2.1 for a detailed definition).
In summary:
“survival circuits are sensory-motor integrative devices that serve specific
adaptive purposes. They are tuned to detect information relevant to particular
kinds of environmental challenges and opportunities, and they use this information
to control behavioral responses and internal physiological adjustment that help
bring closure to the situation. All complex animals (invertebrates and vertebrates)
have survival circuits. Core components of these circuits are highly conserved in
vertebrates.” — LeDoux (2012, p. 5)
The brain is an integrated system made of multiple sub-systems that interact to meet the
challenges and opportunities afforded by the environment. This holds true for the survival
circuits, which interact with each other via inhibitory connections, so that only one response
is enacted. For example, in the presence of a threat, any reproductive or eating behavior is
inhibited, in favor of fleeing or fighting, depending on the context. The inhibition or activation
of a given circuit depends on its overall activation value relative to the values of the other
circuits. Hence, in the previous example, even if at first an animal might flee in the presence
of danger at some point it will be compelled to face the threat to gather food supplies, since
fleeing uses precious metabolic resources needed for any of the survival functions.
Innate and learned emotional stimuli within the survival circuit theory are equivalent to
conditioned and unconditioned circuit triggers. LeDoux argues that in addition, they can also
be described as incentives and reinforcers. Where an incentive is taken to be a stimulus that
motivates instrumental behavior, and a reinforcer is a stimulus that increases the probability
of its associated instrumental behavior to be learned and later performed in response to a
given context. The multiple roles assumed by the same stimulus are made most apparent
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in an experimental paradigm called instrumental conditioning (explored in more details in
Sub-Section 3.2.1). A standard instrumental conditioning experiment usually involves an
animal, that has to perform a certain action, such as pressing a button or pulling a lever, for
example. Upon completion of the instrumental behavior, the animal receives a reward in the
form of food pellets, orange juice or any other culinary delicacy. The stimulus of interest in
this case is the reward, which is designed to trigger one of the innate circuits. In addition
to triggering a survival circuit, this stimulus also serves to inform the animal that perform-
ing this last action was a correct reaction, given the context. Therefore, it is a reinforcing
signal as well, increasing the probability of said action to be executed should the situation
present itself again. Finally, once learning is achieved, a stimulus signaling a deficiency in
energy or food supplies, will trigger the associated survival circuit. Furthermore, in the case of
instrumental conditioning, since no source of energy is immediately available, the same stim-
ulus also acts as an incentive for the animal to press the button or pull the lever to get the reward.
A major consequence of innate and learned stimuli assuming those multiple roles is that
emotion related concepts, such as motivation and reinforcement, can be explained in terms
of survival circuit as well. This avoids having to resort to aspects of emotions to describe the
mechanisms underlying these concepts, and therefore prevents their definition from suffering
the same problems faced by the concept of emotions. Motivated behaviors usually fall under one
of two categories: approach toward a desired outcome or avoidance of an undesired outcome.
Furthermore, motivation can be conceptualized as a two stage process. Once a need arises,
and if the desired object is out of reach, the organism engages in an exploratory behavior in
search for said object. When the goal object is finally within reach, a consummatory action is
performed by the organism to fulfill its desire. It has recently been discovered, that the first
stage of any motivated behavior is guided by incentives (LeDoux, 2012). Which means that
within the survival circuit theory, any stimulus triggering a circuit also has the potential to drive
motivation.
Reinforcement learning was born from and is still used as a standard model to interpret
empirical results of classical conditioning experiment. This paradigm has known a rise in
popularity within both neuroscience and machine learning. While machine learning researchers
adopted variations of this algorithm to robustly solve complex tasks, neuroscientists are trying
to map its underlying principles to mechanisms within the brain. So far it has been accepted
that dopamine could be interpreted as the reward prediction error signal at the core of the
reinforcement learning framework. However, the mechanisms involved in the activation of
dopamine neurons are not fully understood yet (but see Sub-Sub-Section 3.3.2 for a possible
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model). Similarly, more research is needed on the influence dopamine exerts over associative
learning, at the basis of classical conditioning. Both problems are explored in more details in
Chapter 3. Nonetheless, LeDoux (2012) argues that the survival circuit theory can help shed
some light on the systems underlying reinforcement learning in the brain:
“The expression of reinforcement as a change in the probability that an in-
strumental response will be performed may well occur via a generic system in
which the reinforcer strengthens the response [. . . ]. But, in addition, survival
circuit-specific motivational information is likely to contribute at a fundamental
level, providing the stimulus with the motivational value that allows it to ultimately
engage the more generic mechanisms that strengthen instrumental responses and
that motivate their performance.” — LeDoux (2012, p. 14)
Activation of any survival circuit leads to adaptive motivated behaviors and learning through
association and reinforcement as described so far. However, an additional consequence of
the triggering of a survival circuit is the release of hormones in the brain and blood stream.
Through their widespread influence the released hormones modulate the neuronal excitability
of their target areas. Therefore, they modulate rather than initiate any processing taking place in
the receiving brain regions. As described in more details in Chapter 3, dopamine and serotonin
are two of the major hormones influencing the different brain systems. In addition to the role
they play for reinforcement learning, dopamine raises the sensitivity of neural populations to
any incoming stimuli, whereas serotonin inhibits neural activity. As a result, this hormonal
modulation implements a simple attention mechanism, whereby stimuli relevant to survival
circuits trigger the release of hormones, which in turn sensitize the sensory-motor system
further focusing its processing on possibly relevant stimuli. Hence, it creates a sort of positive
feedback loop between survival circuits and hormone releasing brain areas. According to
LeDoux, the release of hormones into widespread areas of the brain accounts for the global
arousal, which accompanies most emotions.
In conclusion, upon entering the brain a relevant stimulus is detected by the survival circuits.
This event marks the beginning of what is usually referred to as an ‘emotional episode’. The
corresponding survival circuit, once activated, simultaneously sends signals to the modulatory,
motivational, sensory-motor and other cognitive systems (of relevance in this case are learning
and memory components), as well as triggers the autonomic nervous system. The modulatory
system releases hormones into widespread areas, placing the brain in a state of generalized
arousal, and focusing the attention of the sensory system on similar incoming stimuli. Within
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the motivational and motor systems, innate and learned adaptive reactions are potentiated, while
memories relevant to the survival function are retrieved from both implicit and explicit memory
systems. Once the reaction has been performed, new memories are formed and learning occurs.
The overall result of survival circuit activity, along with the activation of the memory, learning,
motivational and modulatory systems, the bodily feedbacks and the generalized arousal is the
establishment of a mental state, which LeDoux calls ‘global organismic’ state.
Given the history of the concept of emotions, one might be tempted to equate this global
organismic state with an emotional experience, or ‘feeling’ as it is usually referred to in hu-
mans. However, LeDoux argues that feelings and global organismic states are two independent
concepts that can, and in fact do, exist separately from each other. Global organismic states
are only the raw material from which feelings, associated with survival circuits activation, are
constructed. Such feelings only occur when consciousness: 1) directly detects the activation of
a survival circuit, or becomes aware of the existence of a global organismic state, which itself
results from the activity of survival circuits; 2) appraises and labels this state with an emotion.
Other kinds of feelings, that may arise within sufficiently complex brain structures, include
those associated with higher-order or social emotions and sensory feelings. Finally, LeDoux
(2012) warns against applying introspectively based concepts to other animals. Considering
that all humans have the same basic brain, which contains the same basic structures, it is safe to
conclude that all humans are conscious creatures and experience emotions in similar fashions.
However, since the brain of other species differ from ours, it is impossible for us to know for
sure what is the subjective feeling associated with a particular emotion. Or as Nagel (1974)
argued, only a bat can experience the world like a bat.
After the failures of the limbic system and the basic emotions theory, neuroscience is
nowadays focused on determining the different brain areas that are involved in recognizable
emotions, such as fear and disgust, through studies on conditioning, Positron Emission Tomog-
raphy (PET) and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). The circuitry for fear is
nowadays very well described (Dalgleish, 2004; LeDoux, 1998) across a variety of species (rats,
monkeys and to a lesser degree humans), giving rise to some tentative biologically plausible
models of emotions, implemented in networks of artificial neurons. Examples of such models
are described in more details in the next two Sub-Sections.
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2.6.3 Proto-affect for effective functioning
Extending the fundamental ideas behind the OCC model (Ortony et al., 1988), Ortony, Norman,
and Revelle (2005) introduced a framework describing a structure around which all information
processing in the brain can be organized. They believe that for a system of any complexity,
be it an animal, a virtual agent, or a robot, effective functioning depends on the interplay of
four domains: 1) ‘affect’, what the organism feels; 2) ‘motivation’, what the organism wants
and needs; 3) ‘cognition’, what the organism knows, thinks and believes; 4) and ’behavior’,
what it does. Moreover each of these ‘domains of functioning’ need to be considered at three
levels of information processing. The first, ‘reactive’, level is assumed to be a hard-wired
structure, only capable of releasing fixed action patterns. It also plays the role of an interrupt
generator for higher levels of processing. The second level, aptly labeled ‘routine’ level, is
primarily concerned with the execution of automatic behaviors. Its higher mental capacities
allow it to form simple expectations about the future, and be the seat of awareness, but not
self-awareness. Consciousness and self-awareness are processes that require self-reflective
functions, only present at the highest level of processing, also called the ‘reflective’ level. Aside
from consciousness, the reflective level is the locus of many other complex cognitive processes,
such as decision making, assessment of causal relations, complex understanding or abstract
reasoning. Although the model is a functional one Ortony et al. (2005) argue that many of its
aspects are consistent with neuroanatomical accounts. Therefore, the three levels of information
fulfill functions roughly corresponding to: the spine/midbrain/basal ganglia, cortex/cerebellum,
and the pre-frontal cortex. This is in a way reminiscent of MacLean’s (1970) ‘triune brain’
explored above.
The term ‘affect’ in this context is used as a superordinate concept encompassing other
valenced conditions such as emotions, feelings and moods, but not personality. Emotions,
therefore, are simply affect that relates to something, whether this something is an object, an
individual, or an event matters not. Further, feelings are taken to be simple readouts of the
somatosensory systems, as well as altered states of awareness and attentiveness. According to
the authors, any stimulus that the brain encounters will automatically be assigned a value, thus
feelings can be considered the most basic form of affect. Full-fledged emotions, in turn, are
described as emerging from the cognitive perception of feelings, influenced by motivation and
the organism’s reactions:
“As already indicated, we consider affect to be a general construct that en-
compasses a wide range of psychological conditions relating to value. However,
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even though emotions are more highly specified than other affective states, they
do not comprise a discrete category with easily identifiable boundaries. Rather,
they vary in their typicality, with some cases being better examples than others.
Thus, we propose that the best examples of emotions, which we often refer to
as ‘full-fledged emotions’, are interpretations of lower-level feelings and occur
only at the reflective level, influenced by a combination of contributions from the
behavioral, motivational and cognitive domains.” — Ortony et al. (2005, p. 177)
On the contrary to affect that is concerned with value, cognition is defined as ‘cold’
processes interested in the stimulus’ meaning alone. Motivation, which is usually seen as a part
of emotion, in this framework, relates to the different tendencies guiding the organism’s actions
to accomplish a goal or fulfill its needs. Finally, behavior is simply that, any physical action,
whether externally observable or internal (change in heart rate, contraction of the viscera or any
other autonomic reaction).
The reactive level
Ortony et al. (2005) consider the reactive level of information processing as a hard wired struc-
ture, only capable of releasing biologically determined reactions to survival-relevant stimuli.
Most systems involved at this level can be reduced to simple pattern recognition mechanisms.
As a consequence it is rapid and relatively unsophisticated in both its detection capabilities and
its behavioral repertoire. Reasons that also make it prone to commit numerous errors, in the
form of false alarms (initiating a reaction to a stimulus that is irrelevant) and misses (on the
contrary, remaining unresponsive to an opportunity). Finally, due to its simplistic underlying
mechanisms and overall lack of mental capabilities, it is assumed that cognition is absent from
this level.
A further consequence of the elementary nature of the reactive level, is the fact that the
three remaining domains (behavior, motivation and affect) are so closely intertwined that they
are better thought of as different characterizations of the same phenomenon. Motivation is
reduced to simple drives, which can be viewed as guides to react to changes in the organism’s
homeostasis. Similarly, motor expressions range from primitive reflexes, to preparatory re-
sponses allowing higher levels of processing more time to initiate the next action. Behaviors
generated by the reactive level, can be sorted into two broad classes: 1) approach, resulting
from the activation of motor and autonomic systems; 2) and avoidance, which on the contrary
is a consequence of inhibiting the underlying behavioral mechanisms. Finally, the processes
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related to the domain of affect, are responsible for assigning a value, along the two dimensions
of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’, to every stimulus entering the reactive level. Lacking any of the
features attributed to full-fledged emotions, the concept of affect is referred to as ‘proto-affect’.
However, its role is not limited to the valuation of stimuli, it also serves the purpose of interrupt-
ing ongoing processes and directing the attention of higher levels, toward important events of
the environment. Moreover, it is possible for proto-affect to reach higher levels of processing,
where it will be interpreted and cognitively extended. Hence, originating full-fledged emotions.
Even though, it is deemed simple the reactive level has access to some crude representations of
the recent past, enough to allow for habituation and some form of classical conditioning.
The routine level
Moving up in the hierarchy, leads to the routine level, whose core is the execution of well-
learned routines. Having access to elaborate representations of the present and the future,
it is capable of a wide range of processing, which extends from conditioning to symbolic
processing. According to the authors, it is also the seat of awareness, but not self-awareness.
This level initiates and controls both human behaviors and cognition. Since most of its content
is unconscious and its processes automatic, they are usually acquired through learning and
experience. Even though, the routine level has more mental capabilities than the reactive level,
some particular situations still require the control of the reflective-level. For example, in the
routine level, cognitive processes can correct for small deviations in expectations. However,
if the discrepancy becomes too large, there is a need for the reflective level to evaluate the
situation, abandoning the current goal and formulating a new strategy to solve the problem at
hand. Through learning and experience the routine level is able to form implicit expectations.
Therefore, it is also capable of detecting any violation of those expectations, but not interpret it.
This is where the need for a higher level of processing arises.
Cognition finally appears at this level and can be found in the form of automatic unconscious
processes, such as perception, categorization, basic language recognition and synthesis to name
but a few. Its access to basic awareness combined with a more elaborate concept of affect,
allows the organism to have feelings, in the general sense of the term. Although affect has
been described as more elaborate, it still lacks a cognitive interpretation and only shares some
features with the full-fledged emotions, hence its labeling as ‘primitive emotions’. However,
by crossing the two dimensions of positive and negative values, available at the reactive level,
with the two levels of time, present and future, represented at this level, four broad categories
of emotions emerge:
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• a (positive) feeling about a ‘good thing’ (present), usually referred to as ‘happiness’.
• a (negative) feeling about a ‘bad thing’ (present), which can be translated to ‘distress’.
• a (positive) feeling about a ‘potential good thing’ (future), usually labeled ‘excitement’.
• a (negative) feeling about a ‘potential bad thing’ (future), often described as ‘fear’.
As a result of the increase in mental capabilities, motivations are not limited to basic drives
anymore and can take more varied shapes, such as inclinations, urges or restraints. Furthermore,
because information can be stored in memory, motivation can exist even when the cue, that
originated it, is not part of the environment anymore. At the routine level, a motivation will
persist until it is completely fulfilled. The availability of memory also enables the organism
to perform complex actions, since behavioral ‘chunks’ can be stored, or learned, and later
organized into ‘skills’. On the contrary to the reactive level, at the routine level, the four
domains of functioning are related to, but distinct from one another.
The reflective level
The reflective level is the peak of the information processing hierarchy, suggested by Ortony,
Norman and Revelle. It is the seat of advanced cognitive and meta-cognitive skills, as well
as consciousness. Any process operating at this level rely to a certain degree on ‘reflection’,
a special characteristic of higher animals, such as humans or primates. In humans it allows
the construction and use of mental models of people, animals, artifacts and of the possible
interactions one can have with the other models. More importantly it enables us to infer and
represent the thoughts other humans might entertain, about ourselves or other objects (real or
abstract). Additionally, humans, in particular, also have access to the notion of self, making
it possible to maintain an image of ourselves, have ideals and standards, and introspect. The
reflective level is where art is appreciated, abstract reasoning solves mathematical problems
and social collaboration, or deception, happen. To put it succinctly, the reflective level is where
cognition realizes its full potential.
However, cognition is not the only functioning domain reaching its apogee in the reflec-
tive level. Primitive emotions, rising from the routine level, are contextualized, cognitively
interpreted and elaborated into full-fledged emotions. Combined with the information present
in consciousness, the power of the reflective level enables the rich emotional experiences,
supposedly unique to humans. In turn, emotions influence the functioning of both cognition and
motivation. According to the authors and the processes supposedly giving birth to full-fledged
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emotions, the reflective level is where the focus of most appraisal theories lies. Motivation also
figures prominently, at the reflective level, and takes the form of long-term goals, plans and
strategies that guide behaviors.
On the contrary to all the other domains of functioning, behavior is absent from the
reflective level. Based on the fact that the pre-frontal cortex is the anatomical equivalent, in
the human brain, to the reflective level, Ortony et al. hypothesize that it has no direct access to
somatosensory information. Nor does it have direct control over the motor cortex, or behavior
in general. The reflective level is only able to communicate with the lower routine level.
As a consequence, cognitive models and representations in the reflective level are based on
information rising up from the routine level. All the while behavioral strategies are executed by
influencing or controlling the circuitry involved in the routine level.
Conclusion
The framework introduced by Ortony, Norman, and Revelle (2005) is part of a line of inves-
tigation (pioneered by MacLean (1952, 1970)) that is less preoccupied with the concept of
emotions and rather focuses on the different interactions between the brain’s sub-systems:
affect, cognition, motivation and behavior, in this case. It allows scientists, who adopted such
a framework, to organize their thoughts, observe the similarities between brain architectures
of different animals and easily transfer the knowledge or concepts acquired from one brain
structure to another. Other examples of such attempts at organizing the brain into independent
yet related systems can be found in the work of Izard (1993), Alexandrov and Sams (2005),
and Sloman (1999, 2001).
Although many acknowledge that conscious experience is an important part of emotions,
due to the complexity of defining both emotions and consciousness theories are usually confined
to the reactive or routine levels, while limited consideration has been given for the role of
emotions at the reflective level yet. Consequently, emotions are still restricted to the unconscious
part of the mind and interact with the limited cognitive systems that populates it. Certainly,
designing a model capable of achieving a level of emotional intelligence on par with the
limited form of emotions and cognition found in the routine level would already be quite
the accomplishment. However, full-fledged or ‘blue ribbon’ emotions as they are referred
to by Panksepp (1998) require consciousness and the access to the highest level of cognitive
capabilities it affords (Damasio, 1997; LeDoux, 2003; Thagard & Aubie, 2008).
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2.6.4 Emocon: A model for emotional consciousness
Aware of this issue, Thagard and Aubie (2008) introduced the ‘Emocon’ architecture, whose
underlying theory seeks to provide a detailed explanation of how conscious emotional experi-
ence emerges from the interaction between brain areas coordinated through working memory.
According to Thagard and Aubie (2008), a theory of emotional consciousness needs to be able
to explain phenomena, such as 1) emotions ‘differentiation’, or the ability to distinguish a wide
variety of emotions; 2) ‘integration’, describing the mechanisms by which the outcome of
emotional processing is combined, or influences, other cognitive and physiological processes;
3) the varying degrees of emotional ‘intensity’, defined as the degree of mental attentiveness
or physical arousal; 4) the ‘valence’, the pleasurable or unpleasurable character of emotions;
5) and ‘change’, the events by which emotional episodes begin and end. Further, the answer
should come in the form of hypotheses concerning mechanisms whose outcomes produce said
phenomena. Where a mechanism is defined as “a structure performing a function in virtue of
the operations, interactions and organization of its component parts” (Thagard & Aubie, 2008,
p.812). To this end, they identify the crucial components an architecture requires to construct
a theory of emotional consciousness as: 1) representation; 2) emotional decision-making;
3) cognitive appraisal; 4) inference; 5) and working memory. The main assumption, at the root
of Emocon’s theory, is that emotional experience is the result of the interactions among all the
components, that make up its structure. Furthermore, the concept of emotion is defined as “a
pattern of neural activity in the whole system, including inputs from bodily states and external
senses” (Thagard & Aubie, 2008, p. 817).
Even though, Thagard and Aubie (2008) both had the ambition to implement a neuro-
computationally realistic model of emotional consciousness, capable of integrating cognition
with physiological and emotional processes, they lacked the computational resources to do
so. Instead, they rely on four less complex models: ANDREA, GAGE, EACO and NECO,
to provide a ‘proof of concept’ of sort. Through the implementation of those models and the
experimental results each yielded, Thagard and Aubie are able to describe the mechanisms, and
brain regions, underlying the components required for a theory of emotional experience.
The GAGE model
The first model part of the Emocon architecture, has been published by Wagar and Thagard
(2004). It is named GAGE in honor of the late Phineas Gage (see Section 2.6 and (Damasio,
2008) for a detailed account of Phineas Gage’s case), whose disability it intends to model.
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According to Wagar, the overall goal is to present a neuro-computational account of the mecha-
nism underlying emotional reaction. On the contrary to Armony’s model (see Section 4.1) the
author intends to describe the system through a neuroanatomically realistic model. Therefore,
the basic processing units are represented by artificial spiking neurons. Using these neurons as
basic component of the network, also serves to highlight an important factor in the production
of emotional reactions: time. Wagar and Thagard, adopted the ‘somatic marker’ hypothesis
depicted by Damasio (2008) as foundation. GAGE expands on it to describe the gating mecha-
nism implemented by the nucleus accumbens (NAcc). The NAcc in this perspective is seen
as integrating cognitive information from the ventro-medial pre-frontal cortex (VMPFC) and
hippocampus, with emotional data produced by the amygdala.
The somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 2008; Wagar & Thagard, 2004) posits that, the
system made up by the VMPFC and amygdala interact through a set of inter-connections to
produce said somatic markers. The VMPFC provides feasible behavioral options for the current
situation. These options are then processed in the amygdala through ‘As if ’ mechanisms that
evaluate the expected outcome for each of them. This evaluation in turn is sent back to the
VMPFC, where it is stored. After that, if a set of stimuli elicit an already marked behavioral
option, the VMPFC sends both the option and its corresponding, retrieved, somatic marker to
higher level decision making processes and/or motor effectors. The somatic marker system, as
introduced by Damasio, allows the brain to quickly sort through the set of feasible reactions for
the current situation. Assuming that the brain always selects the most adaptive and beneficial
option, the somatic markers serve as an indicator of which options can be safely ignored (those
marked as having an unpleasant outcome), and which ones require more consideration (those
marked as having a pleasant outcome):
“In this perspective, somatic markers make the decision process more efficient
by narrowing down the number of feasible behavioral alternatives, while allowing
the organism to reason according to the long-term predicted outcomes of its
actions.” — Wagar and Thagard (2004, p. 68)
GAGE builds on this mechanism and seeks to show that the integration performed by the
NAcc, works as a gating mechanism, which lets through only those options that are consistent
with the current context. As a consequence, neurons are organized into five anatomically
recognized groups, corresponding to the brain areas of the VMPFC, amygdala, hippocampus,
NAcc and ventral tegmental area (VTA). The mechanism the NAcc is theorized to use for
gating information is described by Wagar and Thagard as follow:
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Figure 2.10 This figure shows the different brain areas included in the GAGE architecture.
Introduced by Wagar, this model focuses on the role of the nucleus accumbens, which is hypoth-
esized to implement a gating mechanism. Based on the ‘somatic marker’ hypothesis suggested
by Damasio, the ventro-medial pre-frontal cortex (VMPFC) sends plausible options to the
amygdala, which evaluates their expected outcomes, via ‘as if’ mechanisms. The value of
each option is then sent back to the VMPFC and stored as a somatic marker. In case such an
option presents itself again, in the future, its somatic marker will be retrieved and sent to the
nucleus accumbens alongside the option. According to Wagar, for an option to be allowed
through, it needs to be assessed as having a desirable outcome by the amygdala, as well as
make sense in the context provided by the hippocampus. Only in this situation, is it possible for
the activity within the nucleus accumbens to overcome the heavy inhibition maintained by the
ventral tegmental area.
Source: Wagar and Thagard (2004, p.69), used with permission from the American Psychologi-
cal Association, Inc.
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• The VMPFC, in line with the somatic marker hypothesis, provides potential responses to
and appraise the current situation.
• The amygdala, processes the somatosensory information associated with the current
situation, and produces valenced bodily states. Through interaction with the VMPFC,
the amygdala also evaluates the expected outcomes of the behavioral options.
• The hippocampus brings contextual information to the NAcc.
Further, whereas VMPFC and amygdala neurons are characterized by low-amplitude short
spike trains, hippocampal units fire high-amplitude long-lasting spikes. However, on its own,
neither the VMPFC, amygdala nor the hippocampus, is capable of causing the NAcc neurons
to fire, since they constantly receive heavy inhibitory projections from the VTA. Leaving the
NAcc in a perpetual hyperpolarized state. Therefore, for a behavioral option to be able to go
through the NAcc, it is required that all three areas (VMPFC, amygdala and hippocampus) fire
synchronously, and that the option is coherent with the context. This means that the pattern of
activation sent by the VMPFC, representing an option, has to overlap with a sub-population of
the NAcc neurons depolarized by hippocampal output.
To confirm the integration capabilities of the NAcc, GAGE has been implemented and used
in two simulations. The computational implementation of the GAGE model used a total of 700
spiking artificial neurons. Each individual unit was modeled after a single-compartment leaky
integrate-and-fire neuron.
The first experiment implemented by Wagar and Thagard, simulated the ‘Iowa Gambling
task’. In its original form, the Iowa gambling task, has been developed by Damasio (2008) to
detect damage to the VMPFC, the area through which Phineas Gage’s tamping iron is theorized
to have pierced. For the task proper, a subject is presented with four decks of cards. He is then
asked to draw a card from any of the decks, until he is told to stop. For each deck there is an
independent probability that drawing a card will result in a reward, rather than a punishment.
Therefore, by manipulating the probability for reward, it is possible to have ‘good’ decks
and ‘bad’ decks. The subject can switch decks as many time as he wants, and whenever it
pleases him. At the beginning of the experiment, the only unknown element for the subject is
the quality of each deck (as good or bad). While developing his somatic marker hypothesis,
Damasio established that individuals with intact pre-frontal cortex, were able to learn, through
experience, to draw cards from only the good decks, and avoid the bad ones. On the contrary,
individuals with damaged VMPFC, were unable to take advantage of the long-term expected
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outcome provided by the interaction of the VMPFC and amygdala. Therefore, they focused
more readily on the short-term rewards, and ended up constantly choosing the bad decks. For
the computational simulation, used to test the GAGE model, only two decks of cards were
used (one good, the other bad). The inputs presented to the VTA and hippocampus were fixed,
meaning that the current context was maintained throughout the simulation. Each turn, the
VMPFC had the choice between drawing a card from either decks. However, the good deck was
associated with a pleasant bodily state presented to the amygdala, whereas the bad deck was tied
to an unpleasant state. The results gathered over several iterations of the Iowa gambling task,
using GAGE, showed that the model was able to reproduce the emotional reactions observed
for both intact and damaged human subjects. Hence, proving that the NAcc is capable of
integrating cognitive information from the VMPFC with emotional data from the amygdala.
The second experiment simulated the study performed by Schachter and Singer (1962)
(see 2.3 for a brief description). While for the first experiment the context was maintained
by presenting the hippocampus with a fixed pattern of inputs, in this second simulation, the
amygdala had a static input. The hippocampus was presented with two types of input, one
corresponding to a pleasant context, the other to an unpleasant one. In this case the VMPFC
did not represent behavioral options for a given situation, but assumed its second role, that of
physiological arousal. Similar to the hippocampus, the VMPFC was presented with either a
pattern corresponding to anger or one symbolizing euphoria. Again, after several iterations, the
data gathered showed that GAGE, was able to label an emotion as either anger or euphoria,
based on the context. Thus, proving that the NAcc is also capable of integrating physiological
appraisal, with contextual data.
In Wagar and Thagard’s perspective, although GAGE has proved capable of integrating
cognitive information with emotional reactions, as well as account for the influence the current
context exerts on this process, the model remains limited in its predictive power. As it stands,
GAGE is able to faithfully reproduce results observed on the Iowa gambling task, for both
patients with and without damaged VMPFC. However, according to the current model, a lesion
to the NAcc would see the whole mechanism crumble. In reality, due to its plasticity, the brain
would instead be able to recover and relocate part of its abilities. Furthermore, because of
the restricted number of brain areas implemented, GAGE accurately models the mechanism
underlying the production of covert emotional reactions. Yet, it is still unable to explain the
processes through which high-level decisions, or cognitive appraisal, happens. In spite of
those limitations, Wagar and Thagard still consider GAGE to be a successful first step in using
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computational neuroscience to help further understanding of human decision making and the
impairments that accompany injuries to the pre-frontal cortex.
The ANDREA model
Figure 2.11 The ANDREA model is an attempt at describing the neural mechanisms underlying
motivation, cognition and affect. Within this architecture, both the amygdala and the orbito-
frontal cortex (OFC) receive external stimuli. The amygdala uses this information, as well as
signals coming from the dopamine (DA) and serotonin (5-HT) systems, to derive the current
state of affective arousal. According to Litt et al̇, the OFC is responsible for perceiving the
punishing or rewarding nature of external stimuli. Its output is modulated by the amygdala’s
activity. The OFC then projects to the DA and 5-HT systems, as well as to the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC). On the contrary to TD-learning, which focuses solely on the DA system,
ANDREA employs an opponent mechanism to determine the error in the prediction of rewards
and punishments. Of the last two areas, the dorso-lateral pre-frontal cortex is in charge of
representing and selecting goal-directed behavior, while the ACC, given its central position, is
tasked with detecting any conflict between the current behavior and the active goal.
Source: Thagard and Aubie (2008, p.815), reproduced with permission from Elsevier.
ANDREA is another neuroanatomically realistic model, introduced by Litt, Eliasmith, and
Thagard (2006, 2007, 2008). It was born as a result of Litt, Eliasmith and Thagard noticing
that, while imaging studies and neurophysiological experiments had greatly advanced our
understanding of the brain structures underlying the interactions between motivation, affect and
cognition, the description of the mechanisms by which these structures operates had lagged
behind. Further, apart from the reinforcement learning paradigm (detailed later in Chapter 3),
most existing models of the reward processing system, were limited to the task-specific level
of explanation. Litt et al. believe that a larger-scale synthesis is required to move beyond and
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produce a truly global model of motivated behavior. A growing wealth of evidences (Mc-
Clure, York, & Montague, 2004; Schultz, 2000), points toward the involvement of brain areas
such as the amygdala, orbito-frontal cortex (OFC), ventral striatum (VS), anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC) and dorso-lateral pre-frontal cortex (DLPFC) in reward processing and related
goal representation, for humans and higher-order primates. Therefore, by implementing a
neuroanatomically realistic model of these structures, as well as their diverse interactions,
ANDREA constitutes a first attempt at providing a broad mechanistic description of the human
reward processing system. Moreover, as a consequence of its integration of the current theories
about how the different reward processing tasks are performed, ANDREA also provides a novel
and detailed neural basis for ‘loss aversion’: the fact that animals usually prefer avoiding losses,
rather than expanding a lesser amount of energy to achieve equal gains.
As a computational model, ANDREA has been implemented with a total of 7600 spik-
ing leaky integrate-and-fire artificial neurons, split into seven neural populations, as shown
in Figure 2.11. The amygdala, OFC, VS, ACC and DLPFC were represented by artificial
networks with varying numbers of neurons (in the range [800,1200]), while the dopamine
(DA) and serotonin (5-HT) systems were each modeled by 1200 neurons spread across several
discrete sub-populations. ANDREA relies on the ‘Neural Engineeting Framework’ (Eliasmith
& Anderson, 2003) for the actual implementation of its basic processing units.
Recent theories of emotions, commonly attribute to the OFC, the role of perceiving the
punishing or rewarding nature of external stimuli. Further, according to the authors, its
processing is influenced by the current context (not represented in ANDREA), and more
importantly, by its interactions with structures involved in emotional processing (Damasio,
2008; Litt et al., 2006, 2008). One such brain area is the amygdala, which for a long time
has been considered as the processing center for negative emotions, such as fear or anger.
However, this perspective has recently been challenged by McClure, York, and Montague
(2004), who argues that amygdala output activity is rather related to a stimulus’ salience.
Additionally, findings from Adolphs et al. (2005) indicate that the amygdala might also play a
role in ‘attention’. Therefore, within the ANDREA model, the amygdala is used to represent the
individual’s state of affective arousal. Additionally, its interaction with the OFC, to modulate
the valuation process of a stimulus, is based on evidence from vision research, which points in
the direction of the amygdala having a multiplicative scaling effect of attention on the observed
saliency of visual inputs (Treue, 2001). As a consequence, if V denotes the orbito-frontal
valuation of a given stimulus, and A the emotional arousal, encoded by the amygdala, then the
70 On emotion: theories and models
modulated valuation, at time t, is given by the equation:
V ∗(t) =V (t)×A(t) (2.1)
Thus, for low levels of amygdala activity, the outcome of OFC processing will be attenuated.
On the contrary, high levels of activation, results in an amplification of stimuli valuations.
The dopaminergic neurons, of the ventral tegmental area and subtantia nigra pars compacta,
have for a long time been implicated in the processing of ‘reward prediction error’. Activity of
these brain regions have been the target of the reinforcement learning paradigm (see Chapter 3
for more details), from Rescorla and Wagner (R. Rescorla, 2008; R. A. Rescorla & Wagner,
1972), to its resurgence in the hands of Sutton and Barto (Sutton, 1984; Sutton & Barto, 1998).
The dominant approach developed within this framework, the ‘temporal difference’ (TD)
learning, computes the reward prediction error (E) based on the difference between the latest
reward valuation and a weighted sum of all previous rewards (P). By substituting the current
valuation, with the modulated signal of the OFC, expressed in Equation 2.1, the predicted error
in reward could be expressed as:
E(t) =V ∗(t)−P(t −1) (2.2)
With P(t) = P(t −1)−α ×E(t) (2.3)
Where α is a constant representing the learning rate. As a result, for each positive reward
prediction error, neurons in the DA population will fire for a short amount of time with an
amplitude proportional to the discrepancy between the predicted and the actual reward. On the
contrary, for each negative reward prediction error, activity will dip belove baseline level. Even
though, TD-learning, and by extension the reinforcement learning paradigm, is the most widely
accepted model to account for reward prediction error, it has been challenged by Daw, Kakade,
and Dayan (2002). They claim that due to the low baseline firing rate of the dopamine system,
a DA-only scheme is unsuitable for computing highly negative prediction errors. Furthermore,
Daw and colleagues, suggest the serotonin system to be interacting in opponency with the
dopamine system. It is this new perspective that Litt et al. chose to implement within ANDREA.
As a consequence, the DA neural population reacts to appetitive stimuli, whereas the serotonin
system is primarily triggered by aversive stimuli. Finally, encodings from both the dopamine
and serotonin systems are consolidated in the VS, which is also part of the reward prediction
error mechanism. Within ANDREA, the main target of the opponent system is hypothesized to
be the amygdala. With both the dopamine and serotonin systems feeding back to the amygdala,
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its output activity can thus be described by:
A(t) = Ae(t)+β ×DA(t)+ γ ×5−HT (t) (2.4)
Where Ae is the base arousal level determined by external stimuli unrelated to reward. It is
important to note that this expression allows for an asymmetry in the influences exerted by the
dopamine and serotonin systems (β ̸= γ).
The ANDREA model is completed by two of the most important brain areas: the DLPFC
and ACC. The DLPFC has been deemed crucial, by Litt and colleagues, for the planning,
representation and selection of goal-directed behavior. In the human brain it is theorized to
make use of the outcome of ACC processing, as a basis for its own reasoning mechanism.
However, to limit the scope of their theory and keep the model’s complexity to a manageable
level, the authors chose to leave this part aside. Instead, they propose a raphe-dorsolateral-
cingulate-amygdala pathway by which negative prediction errors can further influence arousal.
Due to its central position, receiving projections from the OFC, DLPFC and VS, the ACC plays
an important role in emotional consolidation and detecting conflicts between current behavior
and desired results. Adopting this perspective for its implementation inside ANDREA, Litt
et al. further suggest feedback connections to the amygdala that help explain psychological
and neuro-imaging results. The ACC is tasked with analyzing the results from orbito-frontal
processing (modulated stimulus valuation), to produce an appropriate behavioral response:
approach, if the stimulus has a positive value; withdrawal, otherwise. The behavioral valence
is further integrated with the reward prediction error, from the VS, before being fed back
to the amygdala and projected to the DLPFC. As a result, if a given behavior is concurrent
with a positive prediction error, the individual is rewarded for his action and that behavior is
strengthened. On the contrary, in the case of an action occurring simultaneously with a negative
prediction error, conflict and the potential for behavior modification arise. The individual is
punished and a weakening of the behavior is modeled via attenuation of the cingulate cortex’s
activity. Labeling C the cost for conflict and potential behavior modification, the global activity
of the amygdala population is described by:
A(t) = Ae(t)+β ×DA(t)+ γ ×5−HT (t)+C(t) (2.5)
Consequently, in ANDREA, the loss aversion phenomenon, is accounted for by the cali-
bration of the asymmetric contributions of the dopamine and serotonin systems to amygdala
output (γ > β in Equation 2.5). In turn, amygdalar activity modulates OFC processing outcome,
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through the multiplicative scaling realized in Equation 2.1. As a consequence, larger values of γ
result in a bias towards negative stimulus evaluation. Litt et al. justify this particular calibration
by saying that:
“Such disparity might have an evolutionary basis: negatively appraised events
may often jeopardize survival and further reproduction, while the same vital
saliency does not commonly accompany boons.” — Litt et al. (2006, p. 497)
Additionally, losses may further bias arousal via the cost for conflict and behavior modification
(denoted C in Equation 2.5), whose value results from the activity of the pathway originated by
the dorsal raphe nucleus (seat of the serotonin system). The amygdala playing an important
role in attention, in addition to processing state of affective arousal, means that any conflicting
stimulus, which may require a shift in the current strategy, will easily draw attention upon itself.
Therefore, through the different feedback loops to the amygdala and its interaction with OFC,
aversive external stimuli will be overvaluated. Litt et al. conclude their analysis of the loss
aversion mechanism modeled in ANDREA as follow:
“The nature of loss aversion is thus well replicated by our [the ANDREA]
model, which proposes the first detailed, biologically realistic neural basis for the
phenomenon.” — Litt et al. (2006, p. 498)
Finally, a lesion study has been simulated to investigate the consequences of ablating the
serotonin system, for the activity of the different mechanisms described so far. When the raphe
nucleus is lesioned, negatively appraised stimuli can no longer increase arousal. Since the
brain region originating the raphe-dorsolateral-cingulate-amygdala pathway is cut off from the
system, the cost for conflict C disappears from the output activity of the amygdala, leading to
the disappearance of the loss aversion. Further, the direct feedback from the serotonin system,
to the amygdala also wanes. As a result, stimuli negatively evaluated by the OFC, do not benefit
from either attenuation or amplification. The overall outcome for the whole model is that the
individual indulges in more risky behaviors, disregarding the dire consequences some actions
might have. Litt and colleagues, conclude that:
“The outcomes of this lesioning agree well with the findings of experimental
studies, . . . ” — Litt et al. (2006, p. 498)
Moreover, they urge other scientists to use the ANDREA model, or models of their own, to
investigate the effects of ablating the dopamine system, as a complementary study to the one
presented here. Such experiments would also provide with a concrete understanding of the
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behavioral consequences observed in animals.
In conclusion, by synthesizing wide ranging psychological experimental data, as well
as explaining the computation happening both between and within each brain region, the
ANDREA model proved to be useful in providing researchers with a detailed explanation of
the neural structure underlying behavior motivated by affective stimulus valuation. Yet, there
remains much to explore within smaller subsets of the reward system, the complex mechanisms
upon which the DLPFC relies to make concrete decision, and the different influences the former
system has on the latter.
The EACO model
Although dimensional theories usually differentiate emotions based on their valence and
arousal properties (Mehrabian, 1980, 1996; Scherer et al., 2010), Thagard and Aubie (2008), in
a fashion similar to J. a. Russell (2003), argue that those dimensions are not sufficient for an
individual to be able to make out the difference between, for example, sadness and anger (both
negatively valenced and with intensities ranging from moderate to extreme). Therefore, for fine
discrimination of the full range of emotions, cognitive appraisal is needed.
Since the definition of emotion, used within the context of the Emocon theory, is similar
to the one Scherer suggested in the Component Process Model (CPM, see Subsection 2.4.1
and (Sander et al., 2005; Scherer, 2009; Scherer et al., 2010; Scherer & Ekman, 1984; Scherer
et al., 2001) for details), and because the conceptual mechanisms, by which an individual
transition from one emotional state to the next, are also comparable, the CPM was chosen as
an inspiration for cognitive appraisal. However, rather than adopting the established sequence
between the Stimulus Evaluation Checks (SECs), Thagard and Aubie (2008) claim that a simi-
lar or better appraisal mechanism can be implemented using a parallel constraint satisfaction
model. As a consequence, the Emotional Appraisal as COherence (EACO) structure combines
the parallel satisfaction model of coherence introduced by Thagard (1989) with the theory
underlying the CPM to produce a computational model of emotional appraisal in the brain.
EACO has been implemented, as an artificial neural network, containing 67 units, spread
across three layers. For each time step, the activation value of unit j is updated with the
following equation:
a j(t +1) = a j(t)× (1−d)+ enet j × (max j −a j(t))+ inet j × (a j(t)−min j) (2.6)
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Where d = 0.05 is the decay factor, max j and min j are the maximum and minimum activation
level for unit j, respectively, and the net excitatory and inhibitory inputs are given by:
enet j = ∑
i
ωi j ×ai(t) for ωi j > 0 (2.7)
inet j = ∑
i
ωi j ×ai(t) for ωi j < 0 (2.8)
With ωi j the strength of the connection between sending unit i and the receiving unit j. The
first layer, is made of a single ‘special’ node, which maintains an activation level of 1 at all
time. The second layer, comprised of 52 nodes, represents the 16 SECs. The value of each
individual SEC is encoded across a different number of nodes depending on the values it can
assume. For example, the ‘low familiarity’ of a situation is represented by a node different from
the one encoding for a ‘high familiarity’. The third, and final layer, contains 14 nodes each
standing in for an emotion chosen among: happiness, joy, disgust, contempt, sadness, despair,
worry, fear, irritation, rage, boredom, shame, guilt and pride. Units are connected, between
layers through bidirectional excitatory projections, and to each other within the same layer
via inhibitory links. As a result, the strongest emotion, in the last layer, gains full activation,
while inhibiting all other emotions. However, for two emotions with similar SECs, for example
happiness and pride, even if happiness is the most activated unit and inhibits the other emotions
due to the similarity in SECs pride can still overcome the lateral inhibition and activate a small
amount. This way, EACO also accounts for instances of mixed emotions.
Even though EACO has been implemented in a neural network, to take advantage of the
natural parallel processing capabilities of such structures, as well as allow for partial, or mixed,
emotion recognition, it is still limited by its use of localist representation, where each emotion
is modeled by a single unit, a far cry from the encoding capabilities a fully distributed system
could achieve. Consequently, Thagard and Aubie next suggested the NECO model.
The NECO model
Thagard and Aubie employed the Neural Engineering Framework (NEF), of Eliasmith and
Anderson (2003), to develop a more realistic model of parallel constraint satisfaction, which
has been shown to be able to reproduce results realized by the explanatory coherence (Thagard,
1989), an equivalent localist model. Furthermore, they sought to explain how biologically real-
istic neural populations, organized in recognized brain regions, including the lateral pre-frontal
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cortex (LPFC) and amygdala, can compute a kind of emotional coherence through interactions.
As implemented by Thagard in 1989, explanatory coherence solves a parallel constraint
satisfaction problem, such as theory evaluation, by representing each proposition with a sin-
gle unit, whose activation level is a real number constrained between −1 and 1. Nodes are
connected via positively or negatively wighted links, indicating explanatory or contradictory
relations, respectively. Building on the example of theory evaluation, we have two pieces
of evidence E1 and E2, as well as two incompatible hypotheses H1 and H2. With H1 able to
explain both E1 and E2, while H2 can only account for E1. The resulting network is depicted in
Figure 2.12. With the nodes representing both evidences connected to a ‘special’ unit, whose
activation level is maintained at 1. To know which of the hypotheses is stronger for our theory,
we simply let the network update the activation values of the node representing H1 and H2, at
each time step. Once the values of the hypotheses have stabilized, it is expected in this case for
the node corresponding to H1 to have a high positive value (close to 1, the maximum allowed),
whereas the second node, tied to H2 should have a rather low value, close to 0 or less depending
on the strength of its connection with the first evidence unit. In 1989, Thagard implemented
ECHO, a localist model, which has been shown to be able to corroborate the coherence of the
‘Theory of Evolution’, using hypotheses and evidences similar to the ones Darwin had at his
disposition, in his time. Using the NEF, Thagard and Aubie extended the ECHO model, into a
parallel distributed and biologically realistic model, which they called NECO.
Whereas ECHO used a single unit to represent a proposition, NECO uses 1000 spiking
neurons to encode the acceptability levels of all propositions. In its first iteration, NECO em-
ployed overlapping neural populations to represent the acceptabilities of multiple propositions.
Hence, combined the populations stand for a real number vector space of n dimensions, where
n propositions are being considered. As a consequence, each dimension is representative of
the acceptability of one proposition. To be able to store multiple real numbers in a single
population, NECO randomly tunes each neuron, such that its spiking rate correlates with a
direction, at the beginning of every experiment. Consequently, some neurons can be tuned
in between multiple dimensions, and therefore are excited by multiple propositions. The fact
that a single neuron can contributes to the acceptability of two different proposition, is what
makes NECO’s first iteration, a truly distributed system. Coherence and incoherence between
propositions, in NECO, are represented by recurrent excitatory and inhibitory connections,
respectively, between the neurons encoding for the corresponding dimensions. Thus, if one
of two coherent propositions is acceptable, its neural representation will also excite, to some
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extent (controlled by synaptic weights), the neural population encoding for the acceptability of
the second proposition. The reverse being true for contradictory propositions. Similar to localist
models, such as ECHO, parallel constraint satisfaction is achieved by externally stimulating the
accepted evidences, and letting the firing patterns of all populations settle into a stable state.
The resulting patterns, once decoded with the appropriate function, represent the acceptance or
rejection of each proposition, and have shown to maximize the constraint satisfaction (Thagard,
1989). NECO’s first implementation has been shown to be able to reproduce the behavior
of ECHO, through a series of simulated theory evaluations, albeit in a more neurologically
realistic manner.
Figure 2.12 Here is an example of a localist model of explanatory coherence, introduced by
Thagard. The goal of this kind of model is to discover the best hypothesis, given a set of
evidences for each of them. In this case, there are two hypothesis, labeled H1 and H2 at the
top. As indicated by the inhibitory connections in-between those hypothesis, they are mutually
exclusive. The first evidence (E1) can only be explained by the first hypothesis, whereas the
second one has relevance for both hypothesis. A fact that is clearly indicated by the excitatory
connections between the respective nodes. After the activity of all nodes within the network
have stabilized, H1 will be selected as the best hypothesis. More complex networks, can not
only select the best hypothesis, but also reject any evidence that do not fit.
Source: Thagard and Aubie (2008, p.823), reproduced with permission from Elsevier.
Through another model, called HOTCO, Thagard (2002) was able to show that if each unit
representing a proposition had a numerical valence, in addition to its standard acceptability
value, then the interactions between cognition and emotion could be understood in terms of
parallel constraint satisfactions. Due to Thagard and Aubie’s willingness to make NECO
neurologically plausible, valence was modeled through interactions between multiple brain
areas, rather than as a function of a single neural population, which also had to encode for
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acceptability. Following the somatic marker hypothesis introduced by Damasio (2008), as well
as some of the ideas suggested by the GAGE model (Wagar & Thagard, 2004), in NECO it
is assumed that each proposition carries an emotional memory. This memory is later used to
elicit emotional responses, when and if the proposition reaches working memory.
Figure 2.13 NECO is a neurologically realistic model illustrating how emotions could be
construed as the solution to a parallel constraint satisfaction problem. The lateral pre-frontal
cortex (lateral PFC) computes the acceptability levels of all propositions, within a single
neural population. The PF ValṀemȧrea is a long-term storage for the emotional value of
each proposition. It sends the emotional markers of all propositions to the ventromedial PFC,
where they are consolidated and summed together. The output is projected to the amygdala,
which transforms it into an emotional signal. PF ValṀemȧlso connects to the PF ValṠwitch
area, sending it the current mental focus. In turn, PF ValṠwitch encodes both the emotional
signal and mental focus and forwards their product to PF Valİn, where the information will be
maintained via recurrent connections. Through its link to the lateral PFC, the PF Valİn area
‘pulls’ the acceptability levels of each propositions toward their respective emotional markers.
Source: Thagard and Aubie (2008, p.827), reproduced with permission from Elsevier.
The second iteration of the NECO model, developed to fill some of the gaps present in the
Emocon theory, organizes its neural populations into six interacting areas shown in Figure 2.13:
the lateral pre-frontal cortex (LPFC), the ventro-medial pre-frontal cortex (VMPFC), the amyg-
dala, and three synthetic pre-frontal cortical areas labeled ‘PF Val. Mem.’, ‘PF Val. Switch’
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and ‘PF Val. IN’, where ‘Val.’ stands for valence. Additionally, two external input stimuli are
provided to the model, namely the ‘Data Activation’, which projects directly to the LPFC and
represent the outcome of all cognitive processes. The ‘Mental Focus’, second external stimulus,
in this instance plays the role of working memory, and triggers the activation of the emotional
memory for a given proposition, stored in PF Val. Mem. To save on computational power and
complexity, rather than modeling each of the six regions with a combined neural population for
all propositions, this instance of NECO uses distinct sub-populations to encode the properties of
each individual proposition within an area. Consequently, the LPFC contains the acceptability
values of each propositions. The emotional memory, or somatic marker (Damasio, 2008),
characterizing a proposition is stored in the PF Val. Mem. area, which in turn projects to the
VMPFC. As described in the GAGE model, the role of the VMPFC is to consider all plausible
behavioral responses, sorting or rejecting them based on their expected valenced outcome (Wa-
gar & Thagard, 2004). In NECO, the VMPFC consolidates the emotional valence input for
all propositions and sends the total sum of these inputs to the amygdala. Next, the amygdala
integrates the emotional valences into a global emotional state, which it forwards to the PF
Val. Switch. In turn the PF Val. Switch, outputs the ‘product’ of the focus value, for a given
proposition, with the amygdalar emotional state. So that only the currently active proposition
is associated with the emotional state. Once the PF Val. IN population receives a value, this
information is maintained via recurrent connections, keeping it active in working memory as
well. Through its direct connections with the LPFC, the PF Val. IN component virtually ‘pulls’
and ‘pushes’ the acceptability of the currently active proposition, by an amount proportional to
its emotional marker. As a result, positively marked propositions are strengthened and more
likely to be chosen, whereas negatively marked ones gradually fade away.
Based on the results gathered through a series of simulations, Thagard and Aubie conclude
that, far from implementing the complete Emocon theory, the NECO model remains of impor-
tance as it provides plausible explanation for how emotional appraisal construed as parallel
constraint satisfaction can plausibly be implemented using distributed representations and
inter-connections with emotionally important brain regions, such as the VMPFC and amygdala.
Therefore, it partially fills some of the gaps that remain in this complete account of emotional
consciousness.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, by combining the many neural components and mechanisms, described so far,
we get an integrated system capable of accounting for the wide range of components and
phenomena crucial to the emergence of emotional consciousness:
• Representation and working memory: For the brain to be able to do more than simply
react to sensed aspects of the external environment or the internal state of the body,
encoding needs to be realized at different levels of complexity. At the lowest level, if an
external or internal stimulus manages to activate a sensory organ a signal is sent to the
brain or more specifically to a neural population. In turn, neurons within this population
excited by the incoming signal fire following a causally correlated pattern. This pattern
which is incrementally built by tuning the neural population via statistical dependency to
the neural signal coming from the senses, represents a feature of either the world or the
bodily state detected by one of our many sensory devices. For higher-levels, Eliasmith
and Anderson (2003), have been able to describe how neural populations can not only
build representations of the firing patterns of other neural populations directly projecting
to them, but also transform these encodings in complex ways. Hence, introducing
the possibility to form representations of representations, and allowing the brain to
develop higher-order thoughts and processes. One such high-order process is working
memory, which involves the integration and short-term storage of differently encoded
information, as well as the executive processes of attention and task selection. While
the representation component is ubiquitous in an architecture made of interconnected
populations of neurons, working memory mainly relies on the dorso-lateral pre-frontal
and anterior cingulate cortices, as has been described in the ANDREA model.
• Emotional decision making: The different mechanisms by which emotion is able to
influence the decision-making process have been successfully modeled by both the
GAGE and ANDREA architectures. However, at least two other brain regions, the
thalamus and insula, are thought to be of importance for emotional consciousness, due to
their extensive connectomes, especially their links to both internal and external sensors.
The thalamus, considered the gateway to the brain, receives projections from all external
sensors, save for the olfactory bulb which is directly connected to the amygdala, and
sends efferent connections to the amygdala and the cortex. The insula integrate somatic
information, which it passes along to other cortical areas.
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• Inference and appraisal: As it stands, the Emocon model is still missing a detailed
account of the mechanisms underlying appraisal and inference. However, the EACO and
NECO models both represent attempts at solving this problem, albeit at different levels
of complexity and details.
Moving on to the emotional phenomena:
• Valence: The concept of valence in this particular architecture, can be considered at
two levels. At the level of the stimulus, as explained by the ANDREA model, the
orbito-frontal cortex plays a major role in perceiving the pleasurable/unpleasurable
nature of any given stimulus. While, when applied to a mental state, valence is then
accounted for by the opponent system, comprised of the dopamine and serotonin neural
populations. Further, imaging studies have found that, in addition to the dopamine and
serotonin systems modeled by ANDREA, positively valenced states are correlated with
the activation of the left pre-frontal cortex, whereas negative mental states are associated
with increased activity of the right pre-frontal cortex.
• Intensity: The most natural explanation for a difference in intensity, for two similarly
valenced emotions, is in terms of firing rates in the relevant neural populations: dopamine
system and left pre-frontal cortex, for positive states; serotonin system and right pre-
frontal cortex, in the case of negatively valenced mental state. Furthermore, Anderson et
al. found that amygdala activation is related to emotional intensity, but not valence. On
the contrary, the orbito-frontal cortex react to the valence of an emotion, regardless of its
intensity (A. K. Anderson et al., 2003). Thus, corroborating the mechanism hypothesized
by the ANDREA model.
• Change: According to Thagard and Aubie, “the key to understanding the onset and
cessation of emotions is working memory, . . . ”. Here working memory is defined as
the part of long-term memory, that currently is most active. Working memory, at the
neural level is characterized by four crucial aspects: 1) ‘stimulation’, the mechanism
by which new information, from external stimuli or other processes, enter working
memory and, therefore, consciousness; 2) ‘recurrent activation’, which describes how
information, already present and active in working memory, is maintained; 3) ‘decay’,
which is the opposite of recurrent activation, and defines the process by which content,
that is not actively maintained, slowly fades away; 4) ‘inhibition’, specific to the context
of the Emocon model, it describes the process by which activation of some elements,
tend to suppress the activity of others. Therefore, within the Emocon model, emotional
2.6 Anatomic theories 81
experiences begin, when particular neural populations are stimulated, in working memory.
The experience continues, if recurrently maintained, until it is either inhibited by another
element or simply decays with time.
• Integration and differentiation: Integration, similarly to the representation component, is
an inherent feature of the Emocon architecture, which involves so many different brain
areas, whose very function is to combine low-level perceptions with high-level inferences.
As for differentiation, the authors believe that it can only be achieved through cognitive
appraisal. However, as already mentioned, this is the only missing component in the
Emocon architecture, although both the EACO and NECO models attempt to account for
it.
Even though, Thagard and Aubie (2008) could not implement the complete Emocon archi-
tecture, and corroborate its full capabilities, they still managed to provide solid explanations
for the different components and emotional phenomena, including somatic representation, emo-
tional decision-making, cognitive appraisal and working memory. Combined, these elements
serve to describe a unified theory of emotional consciousness. As a consequence, the authors
consider Emocon to have accomplished at least two major contributions: 1) it has gathered
under the same umbrella previously disjoint models and ideas; 2) and given an account of
the central aspects of any emotional experience, such as integration, differentiation, valence,
intensity and change.
Although Thagard and Aubie (2008) affirm that the theory related to the Emocon architec-
ture seeks to explain the emergence of emotional experience from the interaction of different
cortical areas, it also needs to explore a wide range of functions related to emotional expres-
sion. Though, it is interesting to note that to investigate the concept of subjective feelings and
their realization in the brain, Thagard and Aubie (2008) first need to find a suitable defini-
tion for consciousness. Consequently, it means that for any animal to feel anything it needs
some form of consciousness. A similar argument can then be made for robots and virtual agents.
Using the hierarchy introduced by Ortony et al. (2005) in Sub-Section 2.6.3, because the
Emocon model describes the emotional mechanisms responsible for subjective feelings and
their relationship to different cognitive processes, it is therefore constrained to the routine
and reflective levels. According to Ortony et al. (2005), the reflective level is indeed where
full-fledged emotions occur, but it is also where emotions have the least influence. The reflective
level is the domain of higher-level cognition. Emotions coming up from the routine level are
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Figure 2.14 The EMOCON model incorporates concepts from the ANDREA, GAGE and NECO
models. Hence, even if it has not been implemented yet, according to Thagard it holds the
key to emotional consciousness. It is conjectured that emotion, and therefore by extension
emotional consciousness, is not the result of a single brain area’s processing. Instead, emotions
are thought to emerge from the pattern of neural activity and the interactions of the different
systems making up EMOCON.
Source: Thagard and Aubie (2008, p.817), reproduced with permission from Elsevier.
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perceived, contextualized, and represented by a simple label. Even if for many this is where
subjective feelings give colors to our lives, since we are finally made aware of their existence,
those feelings are only a pale shadow of what emotions were at the reactive and routine levels.
Consequently, even though there is some overlap, the theory developed by Thagard and
Aubie (2008) is focused on the cortex and the interactions between it is made of. On the
contrary, this thesis stands at the opposite end of the spectrum (as defined by Ortony et al.
(2005), as well as Alexandrov and Sams (2005)) investigating the sub-cortical survival circuits
and their involvement in the decision-making process. Furthermore, by focusing on emotional
expression rather than subjective feeling this thesis avoids having to define consciousness.
However, the concept of emotion still needs to be specified.
2.7 What definition for emotion?
As made abundantly clear in this chapter answering the seemingly simple question of “what is
emotion?” is quite complex and a far reaching problem. Without any pretense of completely
defining emotion, this section explore the concept of full-fledged emotions and their relationship
with cognition. As alluded to in Section 1.5 it is argued that emotion could be construed as
an artificial construct emerging from the activation pattern of the cognitive systems engaged
to cope with a situation relevant to the individual’s survival. However, for the analysis and
interpretation of the results in Sections 5.3 and 6.4 to have any meaning a working definition is
required. The limitations of such this definition are identified at the end of this section.
2.7.1 Full-fledged emotion
Papez (1937) correctly pointed out that what is commonly referred to as ‘emotion’ or ‘full-
fledged emotion’ can be divided into two dissociable concepts: emotional expression and subjec-
tive feelings. With the exception of the Emocon architecture (presented in Sub-Section 2.6.4),
the theories and models introduced in this chapter all focus primarily on the unconscious
processes underlying emotional expression. Functionally, emotional expression is responsible
for improving the individual’s chances of survival, and, therefore, of furthering the species.
Within this context, the emotional system detects stimuli (whether internal or external) of major
concern for the organism, arouses, and influences the appropriate cognitive systems whose
task it is to ensure that the body is ready to cope with a given situation and/or to bring the
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individual’s internal state back to homeostasis. In addition to monitoring the state of both the
environment and the individual, as well as regulating the body’s homeostasis, emotions are also
used when communicating with conspecifics. If a person is unable to cope with a situation, for
example, expressing their helplessness allows them to recruit the help of others in facing the
threatening event or object (see Damasio (1997, 2008); Darwin (1872); J.-M. Fellous and Arbib
(2005a); LeDoux (1998); Scherer et al. (2010) for more examples of the use of emotions in
communication). From a more theoretical perspective, emotional expression is usually defined
as “arising from patterns of individual judgment concerning the relationship between events and
an individual’s beliefs, desires, and intentions, sometimes referred to as the person-environment
relationship.” (Marsella et al., 2010, p. 27). The description of subjective feeling, then, stems
from the definition of emotional expression and requires some form of consciousness. As
specified by LeDoux (2012), and to some extend by Thagard and Aubie (2008) as well, an
individual is only able to experience an emotion whenever their consciousness either detects
the activation of a survival related system or perceives the physiological changes and mental
states resulting from the emotional system triggering a coping reaction.
2.7.2 Emotion as emerging from cognitive activity
As briefly brought up in Section 1.5, a possible interpretation of this thesis’ content could be
that emotions are pure artificial constructs emerging from the pattern of activity of the cognitive
systems recruited to cope with a situation of major concern for the survival of the individual.
Similar to how working memory, and to a certain extent consciousness, are theorized to arise
from the spontaneous and synchronous activities of different brain systems (Baars, 2005),
emotions when considered in this new light would materialize from the activation pattern of the
cognitive systems currently engaged in maintaining the body’s homeostasis. This conjecture is
derived from two main line of thoughts.
Primarily, it can be inferred from the different definitions of emotion introduced in this
Chapter. To begin with both Aristotle (350 B.C/1926) and Descartes (1649) defined passion
in a fashion very similar to how perception is construed nowadays. Additionally, in his
correspondences with Hyperaspistes in August 1641 Descartes openly admitted that he believed
the passion and action of the soul to be one and the same. The only difference between the two
concepts is one of point of view. While the action of the soul is described from the viewpoint of
the individual triggering an event, the soul’s passion is an interpretation of the same event from
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the perspective of the person being passively influence by it. This piece of information could
be dismissed on the grounds that the knowledge on which the definition from Aristotle (350
B.C/1926) and Descartes (1649) are based has since been disproved. However, even Arnold
(1959) when writing about her theory described appraisal as “immediate, intuitive and as
inevitable as sense perception itself. . . . Usually, the sequence perception-appraisal-action is so
closely knit that our everyday experience’s never the strictly objective knowledge of a thing,
. . . ” (Arnold, 1959, p. 407). Later, Marsella et al. (2010, p. 27) and Scherer et al. (2010, p. 49)
would also describe emotion as either “arising from patterns of individual judgment . . . ” or “An
episode of interrelated, synchronized changes in the states of all or most of the five organismic
subsystems.”. Even J. a. Russell (2003) a dimensional theorist wrote in his paper:
“Objects and events all have affective qualities, the perception of which is
as much a part of contact with the external world as perception of nonaffective
qualities. Indeed, just as sensation, perception, and cognition cannot be cleanly
distinguished from on another, perception of affective quality is another part of
this processing of information.” — J. a. Russell (2003, p. 149)
All four authors definitely hinting at the fact that what is referred to as emotion depends on and
is hardly distinguishable from cognition.
Second, it is an idea indirectly brought up in LeDoux’s (2012) description of full-fledged
emotions as being labels attributed to global organismic states when perceived by consciousness
(see Sub-Section 2.6.2 for more details). Additionally, in the same article he clearly states
that “In this Perspective I, therefore, describe a way of conceiving phenomena important to
the study of emotion, but with minimal recourse to the terms emotion or feelings.” (LeDoux,
2012, p. 654). As a matter of fact, as will become apparent throughout this thesis, the functions
assigned to almost all the brain systems introduced could be construed as purely cognitive in
nature.
Consequently, recognizing that the evidences presented are rather weak, it is still possible
to conjecture that the distinction between emotion and cognition is an artificial one. Although,
it has just been argued that emotion could be considered as a by-product of the activity of the
cognitive systems recruited to cope with a survival relevant situation, the remainder of this
thesis still separates emotion from cognition (however artificial this differentiation is) for the
sake of clarity, and also because this idea has not found unanimous support yet (although it
has been discussed in J.-m. Fellous and LeDoux (2005)). Furthermore, in the context of this
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thesis and for the computational models described within it to be accountable it is necessary to
at least provide a working definition for the concept of emotion.
2.7.3 A working definition of emotion
Although LeDoux’s (2012) ‘survival circuit’ theory does not suggest any new concept, it
borrows ideas introduced throughout history and across affective science’s many sub-fields,
from Darwin (1872) to MacLean (1970) and from appraisal to anatomic theories, and rearranges
them into a coherent narrative that emphasizes the relationship between survival and emotions.
To a certain extent, in my opinion, LeDoux’s (2012) reinterpretation of those concepts appears
to be the closest in following in Darwin’s (1872) footsteps. Furthermore, the neural structure
he describes as being essential for the survival of animals has also been identified and analyzed
in details in other publications (Panksepp (1998), Damasio (2008), Whalen and Phelps (2009)
and Niv (2009), to name but a few). Thus, it could be considered as standard within the
neuroscience community. Consequently, it should come as no surprise that the remainder of
this thesis takes inspiration from the ‘survival circuit’ theory.
As a result, the definition of emotion adopted for the rest of this thesis is similar to the
description provided by Scherer et al. (2010) and LeDoux (2012). Emotion, therefore, is
construed as a mental state emerging from the activation of the cognitive systems recruited
by the brain to cope with a situation of major concern to the individual. If emotions are to be
considered as mental states, however, it means that we also need to define features specific
to emotions allowing us to differentiate them from other mental states. Across the different
theories and models introduced in this chapter, it seems that emotions are recurrently associated
with a ‘feeling’ of pleasure or pain. Moreover, their effect on the brain and the individual in
general is characterized as being either exciting or depressing. Consequently, in the context of
this thesis emotion is differentiated from other mental states by its level of arousal and valence.
Although, J. a. Russell (2003) mentions in his article that those two features are not enough to
account for full-fledged emotions, because the project described here is only interested in the
primitive form of emotion the definition presented here should suffice.
2.7.4 Limits of defining emotion
As illustrated by the fictional discussion between Russell and Edison (J.-M. Fellous & Arbib,
2005b), providing a complete definition of full-fledged emotion is a daunting task as it involves
a cascade of other definitions, such as consciousness or fear. Given that this exercise is already
2.7 What definition for emotion? 87
arduous for humans and animals, one can only imagine the difficulty of describing emotion
for artificial agents or robots, for which even the meaning of pain has to be reinvented. From
the debate between Russell and Edison, it can be concluded that any serious attempt at fully
defining emotion is either futile, since the number of concepts to on which emotion depends
grow exponentially, or ultimately results in a flawed definition influenced by the individual’s
perspective. Still, Russell argues that even an incomplete definition if specific enough can be of
use, since it allows “meaningful comparison between different approaches to humans, animals,
and machines” (J.-M. Fellous & Arbib, 2005b, p. 5).
Following Russell’s argument, the definition of emotion adopted for this thesis is appropriate,
however restrained it might seem. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 1 this thesis’ focus is on
emotional expression, or more specifically on the primitive form of emotion and its role in
survival. Consequently, using a characterization that accounts for full-fledged emotion would
unnecessarily complicate the issue and possibly overshadow some of the finer differences
between the computational models introduced and other similar architectures. Therefore, it is
my opinion that conceiving of emotions as a mental states emerging from the activity of the
cognitive systems in charge of maintaining the body’s homeostasis, and differentiated by their
level of arousal and valence is sufficient to deliberate about the overall hypothesis.
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Although the concept of emotion has attracted the attention of many philosophers and scientists,
from ancient Greece to today, it does not have an agreed upon definition yet. As a result of the
multi-faceted nature of emotions, especially in humans, many theories have been developed
over time to try and answer the question ‘What is Emotion?’ Thus, this chapter explores the
point of view adopted by three sub-fields of affective science. Within the dimensional theory,
‘affect’ is represented as a point in a dimensional space, ‘pushed’ around by the ‘affective
quality’ of the objects a person interacts with. Therefore, dimensional theories focus on defining
the dimensions required to fully describe affect. In the context of appraisal theory, emotions
are considered to be simple labels attributed to stimuli by different cognitive systems. Hence,
the goal of this sub-field is to detail the processes used by cognition to determine the relevance
of a given stimulus for an individual’s goals, beliefs and desires. The last sub-field resides at
the intersection between affective science and neuroscience, as such it seeks to understand the
neural underpinnings of emotions in the animals brain. Based on the principle of the ‘survival
of the fittest’, Darwin (1872) theorized that emotions evolved as a mechanism to increase
the survival potential of animals. Consequently, there is a set of emotions that is shared not
only across cultures, but also across species. Furthermore, the brain structures involved in
processing these emotions should be conserved between species. Following in Darwin’s (1872)
footstep, LeDoux (2012) introduces the ‘Survival Circuit’ theory, in which he describes emotions
as being labels assigned by the conscious mind to ‘global organismic’ states, whenever it detects
the triggering of innate circuits responsible for maintaining the body’s homeostasis. Given that
the neural structure identified by LeDoux (2012) are though to improve the survival potential
of animals, the remainder of this thesis will take inspiration from the ‘survival circuit’ theory.
As a result, and in spite of the fact that emotions have been suggested to be a by-product of the
activity of the cognitive systems in charge of the body’s homeostasis, a definition of emotion
similar to those suggested by LeDoux (2012) and Scherer et al. (2010) has been adopted for the
project described here after. Therefore, emotion is conceived as a mental state resulting from
the activation of the cognitive systems recruited by the brain to cope with a situation of major
concern for the individual. Finally, emotional states are differentiated from other patterns of





As established in Chapter 2 two properties used to characterize emotions seem to be
recurrent. They are best expressed using the terms ‘valence’ and ‘arousal’ borrowed from the
dimensional theory. Valence within the brain can take several appearances. However, when
considered in terms of the functionality emotions fulfill, it usually translates to ‘reward’ and
‘punishment’. This chapter goes further and explores how emotions, especially reward and
punishment, are used by the brain to manage its limited resources (both motor and cognitive).
It describes the path from classical conditioning to reinforcement learning, then moves on to
the dopamine and serotonin systems, identified by neuroscientists as the main areas signaling
reward and punishment in the brain. Finally, the actor-critic model is explored in more details,
from its mathematical roots to its computational model, then to its implementation inside the
brain. Along the journey we will strive to answer the question: how does the brain learn and
decide what to do in any given situation?
3.1 Reward and punishment in the brain
Although reinforcement learning is nowadays well-known as a flourishing machine learning
paradigm, it evolved from the need to model results from classical conditioning. First intro-
duced by R. A. Rescorla and Wagner (1972), as the delta-rule, it waxed and waned before
being brought back to life thanks to the work of Sutton and Barto (1998). Their ideas helped
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build the foundations for the models developed today. Furthermore, it spiked the interest of
neuroscientists who again used those same equations to interpret empirical data on classical
conditioning. Hence, lending more support to the theory and guiding the search for the brain
mechanisms underlying conditioning.
3.1.1 The dopaminergic system
Figure 3.1 A representation of the dopamine (DA) system’s influence over the human brain.
Dopamine signaling originates from two main areas, namely the ventral tegmental area (VTA)
and the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc).
Source: commons.wikimedia.org, Authors: Slashme, Patrick J. Lynch and Fvasconcellos.
For a long time the dopaminergic system has been split between two roles. On the one hand,
there are scientists who attributed an excitatory role to the dopamine neurons. And on the other
hand there were those, who thought that dopamine was some kind of a reward signal (Cools,
Nakamura, & Daw, 2011). It turns out that history and biology has proved both parties to be
right to some extent (Niv, Daw, Joel, & Dayan, 2007).
The dopaminergic system is made of two main areas (as shown in Figure 3.1) the ventral
tegmental area and the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) (Seamans, 2007). These two parts
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of the midbrain have two levels of functioning. The first one, called ‘tonic’, can be associated
with an average firing rate. It constitutes some sort of baseline and maintain a minimal amount
of dopamine in the brain at all time. The second one, called ‘phasic’, is defined by burst of
dopamine. That is a sudden increase in the firing rate followed by a rapid decrease to finally
match the tonic level again (Niv, 2009).
It is because of those two modes of functioning that researchers have had a hard time
agreeing on the exact role of the dopamine system. However, recently Niv, Daw, Joel, and
Dayan (2007) suggested a model to try and unify all the experimental results gathered so far.
Thus, in their model the tonic level of dopamine has been associated with an excitatory effect
on the motor area, leading to more vigorous movements or an increased ‘motivation’, while
the phasic bursts were defined, through the reinforcement learning framework (Arbib, 2003;
Sutton & Barto, 1998), as reward prediction error. It is worth mentioning that in reinforcement
learning, even if the focus is on phasic dopamine levels, the tonic level is also used as the
baseline or limit between reward and punishment (a burst over the tonic level being a reward
and a dip under defining a punishment).
3.1.2 The serotonergic system
Despite having an overall much greater influence on the brain than the dopaminergic system
(see Figures 3.1 and 3.2) and five times its number of receptor’s sub-types, hinting at a very
diversified role the serotonergic system does not have an explanatory framework comparable to
reinforcement learning (Cools et al., 2011).
Based on the experimental results obtained through animal instrumental conditioning,
but also from patients suffering from mental disorders, and on the fact that the serotonergic
and dopaminergic systems are supposed to have complementary roles, Cools and colleagues
hypothesized that the serotonergic system is involved in slow and careful movements, lack of
motivation to act and the perception of punishment (Cools et al., 2011). Lastly, as depicted
in Figure 3.2, the serotonergic system completely depends on the raphe nuclei, especially the
caudal and rostral part. More interesting, however, is the fact that activity from the serotonin
neurons are inhibiting the dopamine neurons, whereas the dopaminergic system has no direct
control over the serotonergic system (see Figure 3.1 and Cools, Nakamura, and Daw (2011);
Daw, Kakade, and Dayan (2002); Litt, Eliasmith, and Thagard (2006)).
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Figure 3.2 This is a depiction of the serotonin (5-HT) system. Signals mainly originate in the
raphe nuclei, especially the dorsal portion. Compared to the dopamine system, it has a wider
influence both within the cortex as well as in sub-cortical areas. More importantly, though, the
serotonin system has projections to the VTA and SNc. Projections that are not reciprocated by
the dopamine system.
Source: commons.wikimedia.org, Author: Sven Jähnichen.
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3.1.3 Synergistic interactions between dopamine and serotonin
As mentioned previously, the roles of the dopaminergic and serotonergic systems are thought
to be complementary (Cools et al., 2011). Thus, while dopamine has an excitatory effect on
neurons, serotonin would be inhibitory.
However, quite recently Di Pietro and Seamans (2011) have made quite a surprising dis-
covery. By subjecting pyramidal cells with dopamine alone, then serotonin alone and finally
different combinations of dopamine and serotonin, at different concentrations, they observed
that both dopamine and serotonin alone have an excitatory effect on the cells. Mixing dopamine
and serotonin, with a higher concentration of dopamine, resulted in an even higher excitability
in the pyramidal cells. On the contrary, a mix of dopamine and serotonin, with higher con-
centration of serotonin would inhibit pyramidal neurons’ activity. This fact would then give
another explanation for the existence of a tonic level of dopamine. Indeed, if serotonin is to
play the role of the inhibitor, then it will need to mix with some dopamine or else the desired
effect could never be achieved.
The study of the dopaminergic system has known a sudden increase in interest after the
introduction of the reinforcement learning framework (Arbib, 2003; Sutton & Barto, 1998),
as it is considered to be a mechanism for reward prediction error. However, as detailed in this
section and put forth by other authors, it is clear that the dopaminergic system alone cannot
account for every aspects of reward and punishment in the brain (A. K. Anderson et al., 2003;
Cools et al., 2011; den Ouden et al., 2013; Di Pietro & Seamans, 2011; Yates, Darna, Gipson,
Dwoskin, & Bardo, 2015). Hence, efforts should be made to reveal the remaining mysteries
surrounding the serotonergic system.
3.2 Reinforcement learning
Born from experiments using classical and instrumental conditioning (two procedures defined
in the first Sub-Section), the field of reinforcement learning has steadily developed to become
an inescapable part of today’s machine learning community. Before analyzing one of the
standard model of reinforcement learning that was developed in the early 1990s and known
as the actor-critic model, this section explores the general concepts that form the core of the
reinforcement learning framework. Finally, the link between reinforcement learning and the
animal’s brain (human included) is detailed.
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3.2.1 A word about conditioning
Figure 3.3 This figure depicts the two stages
of a typical classical conditioning experiment.
In the first stage, the mouse is presented with
both the conditioned (CS) and unconditioned
(US) stimuli simultaneously. During this stage,
it learns the association between the two stimuli.
For the second stage, only the CS is presented,




Most, if not all, the experiments aiming at
observing the effects of reward and pun-
ishment in the brain are based on some
form of conditioning. At the present
there exist two main classes of condition-
ing, namely classical conditioning, discov-
ered by Pavlov (1927) and later extended
by R. A. Rescorla and Wagner (1972),
and instrumental conditioning pioneered
by Thorndike (1911).
In the realm of classical conditioning ex-
periments, first described by (Pavlov, 1927),
animals are subjected to both a stimulus with
no particular rewarding or punishing value, called the ‘Conditioned Stimulus’ (CS), and an
innately rewarding or punishing stimulus, like a foot shock or food, called the ‘Unconditioned
Stimulus’ (US). After repeatedly presenting simultaneously the CS and US to the animal the
CS will become associated with the rewarding or punishing value of the US. So that in the end
the CS alone will trigger an innate response from the animal. In his well known experiment,
Pavlov subjected his dogs to a particular tone before feeding them. After some short period of
time, playing the tone alone was enough to make the dogs salivate (Pavlov, 1927).
In contrast, instrumental conditioning involves the subject learning how to perform a task,
the goal of which is signaled by the delivery of a reward or punishment (US). The standard
instrumental conditioning experiment would involve an animal sitting or placed in front of two
lights. Whenever a light is switched on the animal will then have, after a certain delay, to push
a button or pull a lever placed under each light. If the animal performs the right action a reward
will be delivered in the form of food pellets or fruit juice (US). However, if the animal chooses
the wrong button, nothing happens, which can be perceived as a punishment or lack of reward,
in this case.
In the point of view of the observer, instrumental conditioning has two main advantages over
classical conditioning. First, for classical conditioning to work properly the CS and US should
be presented simultaneously or with a delay no longer than one or two seconds. Otherwise, the
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stimuli will not become associated. Second, because in instrumental conditioning the animal
has to perform an action to get a reward, the animal’s reaction time can be used as a direct
measure of its motivation.
As will be detailed later in this section these two advantages are the reasons for scientists to
prefer instrumental conditioning to classical conditioning, when performing experiments on
reward and punishment.
3.2.2 Characteristic features
The earliest trace of reinforcement learning in history goes back to Thorndike (1911), already
mentioned for his contribution to instrumental conditioning. It is not surprising to see that
Thorndike’s work was the basis for both instrumental conditioning and reinforcement learning,
as reinforcement models were first developed to account for results from experiments on reward
perception in animals and humans (Dayan & Abbott, 2001; Sutton & Barto, 1998). As part of
his pioneering work Thorndike introduced the ‘law of effect’. Hence laying down the foundation
for what would become reinforcement learning as it is known today. At an abstract level, the
law of effect describes the learning process at the core of this paradigm:
“Of several responses made to the same situation, those which are accompanied
or closely followed by satisfaction to the animal will, other things being equal, be
more firmly connected with the situation, so that, when it recurs, they will be more
likely to recur; those which are accompanied or closely followed by discomfort to
the animal will, other things being equal, have their connections with that situation
weakened, so that, when it recurs, they will be less likely to occur. The greater the
satisfaction or discomfort, the greater the strengthening or weakening of the bond.”
— Thorndike (1911, p. 244)
Later pioneers such as Rescorla and Wagner would be responsible for bringing reinforce-
ment learning to the fore. However, researchers would quickly come to realize that the original
equations at the core of the framework were ultimately flawed. Furthermore, the rise to
prominence of supervised learning and artificial neural network spelled the downfall of the
field. In the literature this event is usually referred to as the ‘first fall’ of reinforcement learn-
ing (Sutton & Barto, 1998). Its revival was achieved through two different paths. The first one
pioneered by Bellman (1957) considered reinforcement learning as a way to achieve optimal
control and lead to the introduction of dynamic programming. The second path, which is
most commonly associated with the idea of reinforcement learning, is that of trial-and-error
96 Decision making
learning (Sutton & Barto, 1998). Because the main focus of reinforcement learning nowadays is
on trial-and-error, the remainder of this section will develop this second concept in more details.
Reinforcement learning, contrary to popular belief, is not a unique algorithm or model, but a
framework describing how an agent can learn to accomplish a task through interactions with its
environment. Consequently, any model or algorithm capable of answering the ‘reinforcement
learning problem’ is categorized as a reinforcement learning algorithm. The problem, at the
core of the framework, is to find the optimal policy for completing a given task. The optimality
parameter being measured by the total amount of reward an agent perceives over the total
amount of time it takes to complete the task. To solve this problem most of the standard
algorithms have at their disposal four elements (Sutton & Barto, 1998):
1. A value function: Depending on the algorithm, each state or state-action pair is associated
with a value representing the total amount of reward an agent perceived when reaching
the state s or when reaching the state s by executing action a. The value function is
usually denoted Vπ(s) or Vπ(s,a) (note that the value function depends on the chosen
policy π).
2. A policy: Denoted by the letter π . The policy describes the agent’s strategy for choosing
the next action to perform, when a decision is required.
3. A reward function: It maps each state of the environment with a reward r, that indicates
the desirability of the state. The reward function is also used to indicate to the agent the
goal of the task. Thus, in a maze task for example, the reward for all the states would
be 0 except for the state in which the agent has solved the maze, in this case the reward
would be set to 1.
4. And optionally a model of the environment: Depending on the type of algorithm a
simplified representation of the environment, a model, can be provided to the agent,
allowing it to make predictions as to the consequences of its actions. Thus, it might serve
as a way to optimize the search strategy. The presence of this element leads to a crude
categorization of reinforcement learning algorithms into two categories: model-based,
inherited from the control theory path, and model-free relying solely on the interactions
with the environment.
3.2 Reinforcement learning 97
3.2.3 The Rescorla-Wagner equation
In 1972, based on the results of animal classical conditioning experiments, Rescorla and
Wagner (R. Rescorla, 2008; R. A. Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) hypothesized that, animals would
update the expected reward associated with a compound conditioned stimulus (CS), based on the
discrepancy between the current expectation and the value of the unconditioned stimulus (US)
presented simultaneously. Consequently, assuming that the agent’s state, during a conditioning
trial, is described by a real-valued vector of stimuli: u(S) = (u1(S),u2(S), . . . ,un(S))⊤, where
ui(S) = 1 denotes the presence of CSi (ith component of the compound CS), and ui(S) = 0 its
absence, then the ‘value estimate’ of state S can be expressed as:
ν(S;ω) = ω⊤u(S) (3.1)
Furthermore, if t indexes each conditioning trial, then the vector of associative strengths (ωt)
learns between trials using the equation:
ωt+1 = ωt + ε ×δt ×u(St) (3.2)
Where ε is the learning rate and the ‘prediction error’ (δt) reflects the difference between the
magnitude of the unconditioned stimulus and the state’s estimated value:
δt = rt −ν(St ;ωt) (3.3)
Even though the Rescorla-Wagner model was at the basis of the revival of the reinforce-
ment learning framework, in spite of its power of prediction regarding results from classical
conditioning experiments, the model fell short when trying to explain the concept of second
order conditioning (Dayan & Abbott, 2001; Niv, 2009; Sutton & Barto, 1998).
Second order conditioning is based on the same concept than classical conditioning. It
can be described in two main steps. First, as for classical conditioning, the subject will be
simultaneously presented with a conditioned stimulus (CS1) and an unconditioned stimulus
(US). This stimulation will be repeated until CS1 is associated with the unconditioned response
(or innate response, UR). Then as a second step, the animal will be subjected to CS1 and to a
second CS2. In the same way as before, after repeated exposure CS2 will be associated with
the UR. Thus, presenting either CS1 or CS2 will have the animal react using the associated
UR (Schmajuk, 2008).
98 Decision making
Figure 3.4 This figure depicts the three stages of a typical second order conditioning experiment.
In the first stage, the animal is simultaneously presented with both unconditioned (US) and
conditioned (CS1) stimuli. Its brain learns to expect the association between the two stimuli.
For the second stage, the animal is subjected to a new conditioned stimulus (CS2), as well as
CS1. Since CS1 can already trigger an innate response, the animal learns to associate CS2
with CS1. Finally, in the last stage, presenting CS2 to the animal should trigger the innate
response associated with the US.
Source: commons.wikimedia.org, Author: Nicolas P. Rougier.
3.2.4 Temporal difference learning
To account for the introduction of the time parameter in the conditioning experiment, Sutton
and Barto (1998), developed the well-known Temporal Difference learning algorithm, usually
referred to as TD-learning. Borrowing ideas from the Monte Carlo methods as well as dynamic
programming, one could identify the TD-learning algorithm as the fresh new core of the
reinforcement learning framework.
Considering the Rescorla-Wagner model again (see Equation 3.2), it appears that the update
mechanism is too short sighted, since it accounts only for immediate reward (Niv, 2009; Sutton
& Barto, 1998). However, for second order conditioning and sequence learning in general (as
is the case for instrumental conditioning), the agent must be able to plan more than one step
ahead, sometimes without knowing the consequences of its actions until after reaching the goal.
The insight, therefore, was to introduce an ‘eligibility trace’, as well as a ‘discount factor’. The
eligibility trace, looking backward, allows previously visited states to influence to some degree
how the value of the current state is updated. On the contrary, the discount factor looks forward
and allows future outcomes to influence the updating process as well. It also accounts for the
fact that animals, in general, prefer immediate rewards to those in the distant future. If zt is
a vector of eligibility traces, then the update expression used in the Rescorla-Wagner model
becomes:
ωt+1 = ωt + ε ×δt × zt (3.4)
Hence, replacing the vector of features u(St), describing a given state St , with the vector of
eligibility traces. Furthermore, it should be noted that in the case of TD-learning, t instead of
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indexing complete conditioning trials, denotes a single time step.
Similarly, the prediction error δt introduced in the Rescorla-Wagner model is transformed
into the following TD error:
δt = rt+1 + γ ×ν(St+1;ωt)−ν(St ;ωt) (3.5)
Finally, the components of the vector of eligibility traces are incremented or decremented
according to the stimuli present in u(St) or are slowly decayed, at a rate λ (usually referred to
as the eligibility trace decay parameter), following the expression:
zt+1 = γ ×λ × zt +u(St) (3.6)
Since its revival in the 1970s, reinforcement learning has flourished and has found a plethora
of applications in the industry as well as the scientific community. In particular two algorithms,
namely the SARSA and the Q-learning (Watkins, 1989) algorithms, seem to have established
themselves at the fore of the field of reinforcement learning (Woergoetter & Porr, 2008).
3.3 The Actor-Critic
Figure 3.5 The Actor-Critic model, introduced by Sutton, is a reinforcement learning algorithm.
It is made of two components, namely the actor and the critic. The actor, as the name implies
is responsible for optimizing the agent’s policy. Hence, it takes a state or state-action pair as
input and outputs the next action to perform. The critic, on the other hand, is responsible for
learning the value of each state or state-action pair. As a result, based on the same input as the
actor in addition to the actual reward given by the environment, the critic computes the error
in reward prediction, also called the ‘TD-error’. The critic’s output serves as a learning signal
for both components of the model. On the contrary to other TD-learning algorithms, that only
focus on learning the value function using a fixed policy, the Actor-Critic model optimizes both
at the same time.
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Having described the main features of the reinforcement learning framework, this section
introduces the ‘Actor-Critic’ model. As a reinforcement learning method, this model has
recently grown in popularity, all the while being the precursor to the other reinforcement
learning algorithms mentioned above, such as SARSA and Q-learning (Barto, Sutton, &
Anderson, 1983; Sutton, 1984; Sutton & Barto, 1998). In addition to being a widely used
algorithm within the machine learning community the actor-critic has also gathered the interest
of many neuroscientists. As is the case for the temporal difference learning algorithm, which is
regarded as a model for dopamine signaling within the animal’s brain, so too have scientists
tried to use the actor-critic model to describe how the brain solves the problem of ‘action
selection’ or ‘decision-making’.
3.3.1 Mathematical model
The reinforcement learning framework described so far provides a useful model to interpret
data from classical conditioning experiments, but is limited in its ability to explain results
from studies on instrumental conditioning (Niv, 2009). In classical conditioning experiments,
regardless of how the subject reacts to the conditioned stimulus, he will always end up in the
same state and obtain the same reward. After hearing the telltale tone, whether the mouse tries
to flee or stays put or even cower in fear, in the end it will get a foot shock. Consequently, the
subject only learns to predict future reward or punishment associated with different stimuli. On
the contrary, in instrumental conditioning, the delivery of a reward is contingent on the subject
performing the correct action. There is therefore an incentive for the subject to optimize its
decision-making strategy to increase the total amount of reward it can get. The problem of
optimal action selection is compounded by the fact that in complex and dynamic environments,
the reward for accomplishing a given task is delayed until after its completion. Therefore,
one has to look back after the facts to determine which were the key actions that lead to the
realization of said task. This is known as the ‘credit assignment’ problem (Barto et al., 1983;
Niv, 2009; Sutton, 1984; Sutton & Barto, 1998). TD-learning methods solve this problem by
using the immediate outcome, as well as the expected reward for each state to decide what
action to perform next. A straight forward approach, employed in very simple cases, is to
greedily select the action which leads to the state with the highest expected outcome.
To provide an elegant answer to both credit assignment and optimal selection problems
in a purely model-free environment, Sutton (1984) devised a simple architecture based on
two neural populations: the actor-critic. His insight was to realize that, in the absence of
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any immediate outcome (as is the case for delayed reward), the nature of an action can still
be quantified via the discrepancy between the old and the new states (denoted ν(St ;ωt) and
ν(St+1;ωt), respectively). Therefore in Equation 3.5, if the reward is set to 0 (rt = 0) the
resulting TD error takes the shape:
δt = γ ×ν(St+1;ωt)−ν(St ;ωt) (3.7)
As a result, an action leading to a state with higher value (ν(St ;ωt) < ν(St+1;ωt)) will be
reinforced, whereas an agent tends to avoid actions, which bring it to a state of lower value
(ν(St ;ωt)> ν(St+1;ωt)). Consequently, it is possible for the agent to adapt and optimize its
policy.
True to its name, the role of the Critic is to critique the action chosen by the Actor. To
learn the value of each state, the Critic component uses a standard TD method. Therefore, if
u(St) is again the vector of features, completely describing the state St , and zωt is the vector of
eligibility traces associated with the Critic, then learning within this component is characterized
by the following equations:
δt = rt+1 + γ ×ν(St+1;ωt)−ν(St ;ωt) (3.8a)
zωt = λ
ω × zωt−1 +u(St) (3.8b)
ωt+1 = ωt + ε ×δt × zωt (3.8c)
It should be noted that δt the TD error is the same as in Equation 3.5. Moreover, the prediction
error is the Critic’s only output, which is used by both components to learn.
While the Critic tries to reduce the discrepancy between the current state’s value and the
immediate and expected outcome, the Actor adapts the policy to keep this same discrepancy
positive, since incorrect actions are those that lead to lower value states and therefore are
associated with negative TD error. Using the Critic’s output, the Actor component updates the
agent’s policy (denoted π(at |St ;θ), where θ is the vector of parameters associated with the
policy π) according to:
zθt = λ
θ × zθt−1 +∇ log(π(at |St ;θt)) (3.9a)
θt+1 = θt + ε ×δt × zθt (3.9b)
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The main output of the Actor component is θ the vector of parameters used to configure the
policy and choose the next action to perform. An example of a standard policy, if the action
space is discrete and small enough, is to attribute the highest probability of being selected to




defines the policy (3.10a)
h(S,a;θ) = θ⊤u(S,a) defines the preferences (3.10b)
3.3.2 Decision making in the human brain
In spite of its elegance and popularity, the TD-learning algorithm (and by extension the
actor-critic) cannot easily be mapped directly onto brain areas. Furthermore, its reliance on
temporal chaining requires that both the timing and sequence from conditioned stimulus (CS) to
unconditioned stimulus (US) be exact every time. Hence, making it unsuitable as an explanation
for animal learning in instrumental conditioning (Hazy et al., 2010; O’Reilly et al., 2007).
Consequently, in an effort to explain the empirical data from both classical and instrumental
conditioning, neuroscientists have sought to understand the mechanisms implemented by the
animal’s brain, that produce those behavioral results (Frank et al., 2001; Grillner, Robertson, &
Stephenson-Jones, 2013; Gurney, Prescott, & Redgrave, 2001a; Hazy et al., 2010; Houk, 2011;
O’Reilly et al., 2007; Prescott, Gurney, Montes-Gonzalez, Humphries, & Redgrave, 2002;
Redgrave, Prescott, & Gurney, 1999; Vitay & Hamker, 2010). Not only has this modeling
effort broadened our understanding of the role played by the different sub-cortical areas and
their interactions. It has also led to the introduction of both the Primary Value Learned Value
(PVLV) architecture and a dual-pathways gating mechanism as a standard model for the basal
ganglia.
Primary Value Learned Value: a critic within the brain
That dopamine activity is the primary signal for learning within both classical and instrumental
conditioning paradigms, is nowadays a widely accepted idea (Berke, 2018; Hazy et al., 2010;
Maia, 2009). In spite of this fact, the mechanisms responsible for the phasic dopamine bursts
signaling a reward, as well as the influence of dopamine over the learning process of these mech-
anisms, are not very well understood yet (Hazy et al., 2010; O’Reilly et al., 2007). O’Reilly
et al. (2007) attempted to provide an explanation embodied by the ‘Primary Value Learned
Value’ architecture. Adopting a top-down approach, they first developed a computational
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model to account for the behavioral data from conditioning experiments. Since a wealth of
empirical evidences seemed to indicate that the animal’s brain is using mechanisms similar
to those hypothesized by the PVLV, its components can easily be mapped to different brain
areas. Therefore, providing simultaneously a computational model and a biologically plausible
explanation for the brain’s mechanisms supporting dopamine activity. The PVLV system being
part of an ongoing research project, it has recently been extended, by Hazy et al. (2010), to
include a novelty detection component.
The PVLV architecture can be further divided into three systems, namely the PV and LV,
which were introduced in the original version, and finally the NV, the most recent addition.
The PV and LV systems both have excitatory and inhibitory components. The neural activ-
ity of the excitatory component of the PV system (PVe) represents the primary reward. Its
inhibitory component (PVi) learns to expect the occurrence of a given US. Once training is
complete, it is able to inhibit PVe’s activity. Hence, avoiding any further phasic dopamine burst
at US-onset. The excitatory (LVe) and inhibitory (LVi) components of the LV system have
a similar interaction, the only difference being that they learn to drive dopamine activity for
any CS reliably paired with a US. According to O’Reilly et al. (2007) the LVe component is
capable of associating a CS with a US, because it can only learn to trigger the dopamine system
at CS-onset, if a reward is received or highly expected at US-onset. This either requires for
the CS and US to co-occur, or the brain to keep the CS in memory until US-onset. Having
LVe’s learning be contingent on the delivery of a reward, avoids any positive reinforcement
from self-generated dopamine activity (Hazy et al., 2010; O’Reilly et al., 2007). LVi follows
the exact same learning process albeit with a slower learning rate. Consequently, it slowly
learns to inhibit LVe’s excitatory effects and implement a habituation mechanism. Finally,
the NV component, later added by Hazy et al. (2010), has the single task of driving phasic
dopamine activity upon detection of a novel stimulus. Furthermore, because of its learned
decay mechanism, repeating stimuli will trigger incrementally lower bursts of dopamine.
Both PV and LV systems share the same learning mechanism, whose core is based on the
same learning principle as the Rescorla-Wagner rule (see 3.2.3). This means that it learns from
the discrepancy between the predicted and actual outcomes. As detailed above, if the excitatory
component of the PV system represents the actual reward (PVe = rt), and the inhibitory
component is the expected outcome (PVi = ν(St ,ωt)), then the basic Rescorla-Wagner equation
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Figure 3.6 The Primary Value Learned Value (PVLV) model, as introduced by O’Reilly, Is made
up of two systems, which can each be sub-divided into two modules. The excitatory component
of the PV system (the PVe) is triggered whenever a primary reward is received. Its inhibitory
component (the LVi), on the other hand, slowly learns to expect the occurrence of a given
unconditioned stimulus (US). Hence, it implements a habituation mechanism. The LV system,
also made of two sub-components, only learns whenever the dopamine system is triggered.
The excitatory (LVe) and inhibitory (LVi) modules have a similar interaction. This means that,
while LVe learns to expect a given conditioned stimulus (CS) reliably paired with a US, the LVi,
slowly suppresses LVe’s activity. In this, figure is also present an extension, later suggested by
Hazy, that of the Novelty Value (NV) system. This system implements yet another habituation
mechanism, by which new unforeseen stimuli trigger a spike in activity, repeating stimuli do so
with increasingly less intensity.
Source: O’Reilly et al. (2007, p.42), reproduced with permission from the American Psycho-
logical Association, Inc.
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(Equation 3.1) can be re-written as:
δPV = PVe −PVi (3.11)
This value is then used to train PVi to expect the occurrence of a given US, using the same
formula as described in Equation 3.2.
Before detailing the learning algorithm for the LV system, Hazy et al. (2010) define the
condition upon which the LV system relies to determine when to learn:
PVf ilter = PVe has a value or (PVi > 0.8 or PVi < 0.2) (3.12)
It should be noted that PVf ilter is therefore a boolean value. Consequently, whenever this
variable evaluates to true both sub-components of the LV system update their synaptic strengths
(ωt) following an expression similar to Equation 3.2, but based on the discrepancy between
actual and CS associated outcomes:
∆ωt = ε × (PVe −LVe)×u(St) (3.13)
Where u(St) = u1(St),u2(St), . . . ,un(St) is the real-valued vector of stimuli. Similar to the PV
system, the LV system’s output that then contributes to phasic dopamine activity is defined as:
δLV = LVe −LVi (3.14)
The learned decay mechanism, introduced by Hazy et al. (2010) for the NV system, update
the synaptic strength (ωt) of its underlying neural population using the following equation:
∆ωt+1 = ωt − ε ×NVt ×u(St) (3.15)
With NVt the vector containing the current novelty value for each stimulus.
Bringing it all together the outputs from the PV, LV and NV systems are combined and
contribute to a global error signal, which correspond to the phasic activity of the dopamine
system, characteristic of reward expectation and delivery in classical conditioning experiments.
Hazy et al. (2010) hypothesized that whenever a primary reward is expected or actually
delivered, then the PV system should drive dopamine output. Otherwise, the LV and NV





















Where t indexes the current trial and t −1 the previous one.
In the original paper introducing the PVLV architecture, O’Reilly et al. (2007) briefly
describe the mapping between the sub-components of both PV and LV systems, and areas of
the animal’s brain. Hazy et al. (2010) later further developed those hypothesis using empirical
results from classical conditioning and electro-physiological experiments to support their claims.
What follows is a description of the mapping they established:
• PVe: The lateral hypothalamic area (LHA) has afferent connections from a broad variety
of primary sensory areas. Moreover, a wealth of empirical evidences point to the fact
that neurons of the LHA display a sustained activity in response to receiving excitatory
signals (Hazy et al., 2010; O’Reilly et al., 2007). Owing to both its direct and indirect
(via the pendunculopontine tegmental nucleus, PPT) projections to the ventral tegmental
area (VTA) and substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc), the LHA is in an ideal position to
react and therefore signal primary reward within the animal’s brain.
• PVi: Learning to inhibit the expected primary reward associated with a US, is the
role attributed to the striosome/patch-like neurons of the ventral striatum (VS). Electro-
physiological recordings show that these neural units exhibit a ramp-like pattern of firing,
which peaks at the exact time of US-onset. Since they send inhibitory projections to both
dorsal and ventral tiers of the dopamine system (unlike its dorsal striatum counter part),
it seems reasonable to suggest that patch-like neurons are responsible for suppressing
dopamine bursts at US-onset after training.
• LVe: The central nucleus of the amygdala (CA) receives projections from a wide variety
of cortical areas. It sends both direct, as well as indirect (via the PPT) connections
to the VTA and SNc. Although, it is still unclear if the CA has a direct excitatory
effect or an indirect disinhibitory one over dopamine neurons, evidences suggest that
sustained activity from the CA results in phasic bursts of dopamine. Furthermore, electro-
physiological recordings from classical conditioning experiments have shown that CA
neurons initially responsive to US alone, are able to learn to activate for a CS reliably
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paired with a US (as demonstrated in Chapter 4, but see Hazy et al. (2010); O’Reilly et
al. (2007) as well).
• LVi: Since it plays a role similar to the PVi, albeit at CS-onset, the inhibitory component
of the LV system is supposed to map to a sub-population of the patch-like neurons of
the VS. Empirical evidences support the idea that there exist two sub-populations of
the striosome cells. The first one showing signs of activity at US-onset, whereas the
second displays sustained firing at CS-onset. Therefore, it would be possible for the VS
to support the inhibitory components of both PV and LV systems.
Even though, the PVLV architecture has been introduced on its own, it is in fact only half
of a larger project detailing the mechanisms by which decision-making is implemented in the
brain. As will become apparent at the end of the next part, the PVLV describes a system within
the brain, which loosely plays a role similar to that of the ‘critic’ defined earlier (Hazy et al.,
2010; Maia, 2009; Sutton, 1984).
The basal ganglia: deciding what to do next?
Similar to the current fate befalling the concept of emotion, until recently there was little con-
sensus as to the role of the ‘basal ganglia’ within the brain (Redgrave et al., 1999). However, a
recurring idea born from empirical results and lesion studies, was that the basal ganglia imple-
mented some sort of selection mechanism. This idea was expended upon by many research
projects (Atallah, Frank, & O’Reilly, 2004; Berke, 2018; Frank et al., 2001; Grillner et al., 2013;
Gurney et al., 2001a; Gurney, Prescott, & Redgrave, 2001b; Hazy, Frank, & O’Reilly, 2006;
Houk, 2011; Maia, 2009; O’Reilly & Frank, 2006; O’Reilly & Munakata, 2013; Prescott et al.,
2002; Redgrave et al., 1999; Vitay & Hamker, 2010). Leading to the now standard view of the
basal ganglia complex acting as a gating mechanism, managing access to motor and cognitive
resources. Here, two such projects are explored. Each adopting a hybrid approach: a top-down
constraints analysis of the problem, followed by a bottom-up anatomical investigation of the
brain areas part of the basal ganglia complex and their interactions. Even though, Redgrave,
Prescott, and Gurney (1999) focused on the ‘action selection problem’, while Frank, Loughry,
and O’Reilly (2001) explored the role of the basal ganglia and pre-frontal cortex in relation to
working memory, both projects devised very similar computational models and mechanistic
theories.
Although there is little agreement about what working memory is, neuroscientists still
agree that both the pre-frontal cortex (PFC) and basal ganglia (BG) are involved in its im-
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plementation (Atallah et al., 2004; Frank et al., 2001; Hazy et al., 2006; O’Reilly & Frank,
2006; O’Reilly & Munakata, 2013). Furthermore, Frank et al. (2001) give the following broad
definition for the functionalities attributed to the working memory system:
“Working memory can be defined as an active system for temporarily storing
and manipulating information needed for the execution of complex cognitive tasks.”
— Frank et al. (2001, p. 138)
From this general description, two main constraints can directly be extracted. The fact that
working memory has to be an information storage, implies that it needs a mechanism for the
‘robust maintenance’ of neural activity (encoding the memory), even after the initiating stimulus
has disappeared. Furthermore, since information is only temporarily stored and should be
available for further processing by other brain areas, the second constraint is that new incoming
data should be able to quickly displace the content of working memory whenever deemed
important (this is referred to as ‘rapid updating’ by Frank et al. (2001)). Consequently, there is
a need for a second system to decide when and which stimuli should be maintained in working
memory. Since the brain is made up entirely of neurons communicating via synaptic connec-
tions, it stands to reason that information can only be stored either by modifying the synaptic
weights or as a recurrent pattern of activity. Assuming that working memory is supported
by a single weight-based system, both constraints would be incompatible. Indeed, a robust
maintenance of the information is only possible if synapses have a slow learning rate. On the
other hand, rapid updating calls for a fast learning rate, which enables the neural population
to retain information presented only once. Therefore, Frank et al. (2001) suggest working
memory to be implemented in an activation-based memory. Moreover, owing to its biological
characteristics (slow learning rate, sparse encoding and sustained activity), it seems that the
PFC is best suited to assume the role of robustly maintaining patterns of neural activity. Finally,
because the BG and PFC are known to be interdependent and share the burden of implementing
the functionalities attributed to the working memory system, Frank et al. (2001) hypothesized
that the BG implement a gating mechanism. Thus, granting other brain systems access to
working memory, while learning when to update its content.
On the contrary to working memory, the problem of ‘action selection’ or ‘decision-making’
has recently been explored in depth. This is in great part due to the need for controlling ever
more sophisticated robots interacting with humans in the real world. In its more abstract form
the action selection problem is defined by Redgrave et al. (1999) as:
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“A “selection problem” arises whenever two or more competing systems seek
simultaneous access to a restricted resource. For example, in a vertebrate or in a
robot, multiple sensorimotor systems may require access to the limited resource
that is the final common motor path. . . . Conflicts can also arise in domains where
behavioural expression is more indirect, for instance between systems competing
for access to limited cognitive resources.” — Redgrave et al. (1999, p. 1009)
Their main hypothesis is that the basal ganglia implement such a mechanism, selecting a
single behavioral program at the expense of others. Furthermore, according to Redgrave et
al. (1999), it is expected of a selection mechanism to execute the program with the highest
support. Whenever this program ends successfully, or if it proves inefficient, the selection
mechanism should switch to the next best program. Finally, if a competitor is able to garner
enough support, the behavior currently executing should be interrupted and access granted to
this competitor. To avoid having to deal with a wide range of command signals, sent by the
different control systems to support the competing behaviors, Redgrave et al. (1999) suggest
that the basal ganglia selects the winner based on a common currency. Since the behavioral
programs each depend on a specific set of ‘causal factors’ (of both intrinsic and/or extrinsic
nature), Redgrave et al. (1999) propose that each control system computes a kind of urgency
value, which they refer to as ‘salience’. Provided adequate weights those saliences can be used
by the basal ganglia to select the winning program. Consequently, because the basal ganglia
has no knowledge as to the nature of the control system’s command, the problem of action
selection can be reduced to one of ‘signal selection’. Furthermore, it also implies that the
selection mechanism, implemented by the basal ganglia, is not restricted to gating access to
motor resources. Indeed, similar to Frank et al. (2001) theory, the basal ganglia is hypothesized
to manage both motor and cognitive resources. In addition to the constraints described so
far, Redgrave et al. (1999) introduce three ‘desirable’ features for a robust selection mechanism.
These are:
• ‘Clean switching’: This alludes to the fact that the competition between multiple control
systems, to access a given resource, should be resolved rapidly and decisively in favor of
the program with the most support.
• ‘Absence of distortion’: Once the competition is resolved, the wining program should be
executed without any interference from the losing control systems.
• ‘No dithering’: It describes the behavior of a selection mechanism in the case where two
competitors are closely matched. Execution of the winner will reduce its salience, until it
110 Decision making
is below that of the next best program. Following expectations, the selection mechanism
will switch to the next program, reducing its salience. Consequently, the mechanism will
keep switching back and forth between the two programs, wasting energy to achieve very
little.
According to Redgrave et al. (1999) a system implementing a ‘winner-takes-all’ strategy fulfills
the first two desirable characteristics. The last one being achievable using a non-linear positive
feedback loop.
Despite the fact that Redgrave et al. (1999) and Frank et al. (2001) started in two different
places, one in working memory and the other in action selection, by the end of their top-down
analysis, they managed to reach similar conclusions. Thanks to Redgrave et al. (1999) we
now know that, any mechanism answering the decision-making problem should implement a
‘winner-takes-all’ strategy. Clearly the gating mechanism, that Frank et al. (2001) suggest the
basal ganglia to be implementing, fits this requirement. The question that now remains is: how
do the different brain areas, part of the basal ganglia complex, interact to support this gating
behavior?
The brain areas usually considered as being part of the basal ganglia complex, and the focus
of this bottom-up analysis, are:
• the striatum, which is made of the caudate nucleus, the putamen and the ventral striatum.
The caudate and putamen, both sub-divisions of the dorsal striatum, are viewed as being
part of the basal ganglia’s input module.
• the sub-thalamic nucleus, which makes up the rest of the basal ganglia’s input module.
• the globus pallidus, which can be further sub-divided into internal and external segments,
usually labeled GPi and GPe respectively. The GPi being one of the major output areas
of the basal ganglia.
• finally, the substantia nigra, that can also be split into two components. The first, which
is referred to as ‘substantia nigra pars compacta’ (SNc), is a major site of dopamine
activity. While the second, called ‘substantia nigra pars reticulata’ (SNr), is considered
as an other output area of the basal ganglia (in addition to the GPi).
For the different control systems, each supporting either a motor or a cognitive action, it
is essential to be able to send the details of the command directly to the motor or cognitive
3.3 The Actor-Critic 111
system. Indeed, since the basal ganglia only uses the common currency that is the command’s
salience, direct connections between control and executive systems are required. Both Frank
et al. (2001) and Gurney et al. (2001a) suggest the control systems to be contained within
the frontal cortex. The content of each program is then sent from the frontal cortex to the
thalamus, where it is redirected toward the appropriate brain area. O’Reilly and Munakata
(2013) and Frank et al. (2001) reason that any control a system wishes to exert over motor
behavior has to be done via working memory. The same being true for interaction between
cognitive systems. Therefore, rather than redirecting each command to a specific brain area, the
thalamus connects bi-directionally with the PFC. Hence, establishing sets of thalamocortical
loops, each enabling communication between a control and an executive system. To play its
role as a gating mechanism, the basal ganglia receive the saliences supporting each of the
behavior ‘suggested’ by the frontal cortex. The projections from the frontal cortex onto the
striatum, main input area of the basal ganglia, are organized into strip-like patterns (Atallah
et al., 2004; Frank et al., 2001; Gurney et al., 2001a, 2001b; Hazy et al., 2006; O’Reilly &
Frank, 2006; O’Reilly & Munakata, 2013). Each strip having little influence over the activity
of its neighbors, it isolates the support each behavior receives from its control system. After
processing this information, the basal ganglia then selects which thalamocortical loop remains
active, by sending inhibitory projections onto different neural populations within the thalamus.
To explain how it is possible for a single neural population (i.e.: a control system) to provide
both the content of and the salience for its corresponding program, Redgrave et al. (1999) rely
on the ‘dual population coding’ model. In this model the detail of the program is encoded in
terms of the distribution of cell activity within the population, while the salience is derived
from the overall intensity of the neural activity.
Inside the basal ganglia, most of the connections in-between regions are inhibitory in nature,
with the exception of the sub-thalamic nucleus which provides diffuse excitation to both seg-
ments of the globus pallidus (GPi and GPe) as well as to the SNr (Gurney et al., 2001a; O’Reilly
& Munakata, 2013; Redgrave et al., 1999). Furthermore according to Gurney et al. (2001a)
and Frank et al. (2001), the neural population within the striatum can be further sub-divided
depending on the type of dopamine receptor as well as the projection site of each neural unit.
Indeed, the first sub-population is characterized by D1-like dopamine receptors and sends
inhibitory connections directly to the GPi and SNr. On the contrary, the second sub-population
is equipped with D2-like dopamine receptors, while targeting principally the GPe. In turn the
GPe connects via inhibitory projections directly onto neurons of the GPi and SNr. The major
difference between these two families of receptors is in their interaction with dopamine. An
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Figure 3.7 This figure illustrates a standard representation of the gating mechanism imple-
mented by the basal ganglia (BG). The central part of the gate relies on the fact that neurons
within the dorsal striatum (DS) can be split into two sub-populations: those with D1-like
dopamine receptors and those with D2-like receptors. While dopamine has an excitatory effect
on units with D1-like receptors, it has an inhibitory impact on the second population. From
the striatum, two pathways extend to the cortex and through the thalamus. The first pathway
consist in the D1-like sub-population, sending inhibitory connections to the internal segment of
the Globus Pallidus (GPi). In turn, the GPi exerts an inhibitory influence over the thalamus.
This pathway is usually referred to has the ‘Go’ pathway, since an increase in DS1 activity
results in an increase in thalamic activity as well. The second, often called ‘NoGo’, pathway
originates in the D2-like sub-population. Those neurons have inhibitory projections to the
external segment of the Globus Pallidus (GPe). Then the GPe connects, via inhibitory kinks, to
the GPi. Consequently, a spike in DS2 activity, decreases the activation of GPe neurons. This
in turn, allows neurons within the GPi to be more active and increase their tonic inhibition of
thalamic activity.
Source: Scholarpedia.org, Author: Eugene M. Izhikevich.
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increase further excites neurons belonging to the D1-like sub-population, while inhibiting the
activity of D2-like units. The reverse holds true: a dip in dopamine inhibits D1-like neurons
and excites D2-like units. Consequently, the standard view and the one adopted by Frank et al.
(2001) is to separate the basal ganglia into two processing pathways. The ‘Go’ pathway consists
in the D1-like sub-population, which directly inhibits GPi and SNr neurons. Hence, a phasic
burst of dopamine increases the activity of D1-like neurons, inhibiting both GPi and SNr. As a
result, the tonic inhibition over the selected thalamocortical loop is lifted and the correspond-
ing program executed. The ‘NoGo’ pathway is made of the D2-like striatal sub-population
projecting to the GPe, via inhibitory links. A dip in dopamine levels increases the activity of
D2-like neurons, therefore indirectly disinhibiting the GPi and SNr. As a consequence the tar-
geted thalamocortical loop is further inhibited, thus preventing its program from being executed.
It should be noted that even though Frank et al. (2001) used the standard ‘dual pathways’
model as a basis to explain how the basal ganglia implement a gating mechanism, Gurney et
al. (2001a) suggested a slightly different interpretation. In their point of view, the pathway
consisting in the D1-like sub-population connected to the GPi and SNr, is responsible for
the actual ‘selection’. On the contrary, the D2-like and GPe pathway, having no influence
outside the basal ganglia, assumes a role akin to a ‘control’ system. Still the overall mechanism
implemented by the basal ganglia complex remains similar and both explanations fit within the
requirements extracted during the top-down analysis.
In conclusion, part of the learning process happens through conditioning. In other words, it
means that a previously insignificant stimulus can acquire reward predicting capabilities by
association with a stimulus natively signaling primary reward. According to O’Reilly et al.
(2007) and Hazy et al. (2010), this mechanism is implemented by three systems within the
ventral striatum, amygdala, lateral hypothalamus and both ventral tegmental area and subtantia
nigra pars compacta, part of the dopamine system. The dopamine activity being the main
output signal, it is used to influence learning inside and outside the architecture, and to critique
any decisions made. Although the role of the basal ganglia was not established a decade and a
half ago, it seems that projects and architectures, like that of Frank et al. (2001) and Redgrave
et al. (1999), have helped cement its role as a decision-making system. Using the dopamine
signal generated by the critic, the basal ganglia, especially the dorsal striatum, choose how to
act by influencing the different thalamo-cortical loops connecting control systems to executive
ones. Hence, the gating mechanism implemented within the basal ganglia’s dual-pathways,
can be compared to a higher-level control system. This idea of the brain being a hierarchy of
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control systems and distributed memory is beyond the scope of this project. Furthermore, it has
already been discussed at length by Hawkins and Blakeslee (2007). Finally, as Maia (2009)
suggested, given the brain structure described so far it possible to conceive of the actor and
critic as mapping directly on the striatum. The dorsal part being a major component of the actor,
while the ventral section is at the core of the critic. However, it should be noted that a number
of attempts have been made to identify the brain areas or neural sub-populations of the striatum
involved in reinforcement learning and the actor-critic model ( Joel, Niv, and Ruppin (2002)
make a selective review of several such models, but see O’Reilly and Frank (2006), Gurney
et al. (2001a), Suri and Schultz (1999), Niv (2009), O’Reilly et al. (2007), O’Doherty, Lee,
and McNamee (2015), Collins and Frank (2014), Hazy et al. (2010), as well as O’Reilly and
Munakata (2013) for other examples).
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The most basic form of learning within the brain is classical conditioning. Classical condi-
tioning describes a process by which a conditioned stimulus (with no particular value for
the individual) can acquire significance by association with an innately relevant stimulus.
Going one step further, through instrumental conditioning the likelihood of a rewarding action
to be performed again, should a similar situation arise, is increased. On the contrary, an
action which leads to a punishment is less likely to be executed another time. The fundamental
principles guiding the instrumental conditioning process have been mathematically modeled
by R. A. Rescorla and Wagner (1972), and later extended into a learning paradigm better
known as ‘reinforcement learning’ by Sutton and Barto (1998). In the animal’s brain, the
decision-making system, which includes learning, is split into two sub-systems: a critic and an
actor. The critic part is responsible for predicting the error in reward or punishment. According
to O’Reilly, Frank, Hazy, and Watz (2007) and Hazy et al. (2010), it mainly consists of two
mechanisms the ‘Primary Value’, which learns to expect the occurrence of an unconditioned
stimulus, and the ‘Learned Value’, which learns to predict the reward associated with condi-
tioned stimuli. Both mechanisms are connected to the ventral tegmental area, and, thus, directly
drive the activity of the dopaminergic system. The actor, on the other hand, based on the signals
received from the critic adapts its policy. Furthermore, it relies on the gating mechanisms
implemented within the basal ganglia to select which action to perform next given the current
situation. The dorsal striatum can be split in two populations of neurons, depending on their
affinity to dopamine. Indeed, within the dorsal striatum some neurons are excited by an influx
of dopamine (they are referred to as D2-like units), while the others are inhibited by dopamine
(they are called D1-like neurons). The D1-like population connects directly to the internal
segment of the globus pallidus (GPi) and from there to the thalamus. A burst of dopamine
activity will inhibit the D1-like neurons, hence, releasing the tonic inhibition the GPi has
over the thalamus. D2-like neurons, on the other hand, project to the external segment of the
globus pallidus (GPe), which sends inhibitory connections to the GPi. Therefore, an increase
in dopamine will result in an increase of activity in the D2-like population, and, thus, a further
inhibition of the thalamus, and vice versa for a decrease in dopamine concentration. The
thalamus being bi-directionally connected to the pre-frontal cortex, its activation or inhibition
will allow or deny, respectively, the command from the pre-frontal cortex to be forwarded to
the motor system. The brain mechanisms responsible for the entire decision-making process




Recreating: An anatomically constrained neural network model of
fear conditioning
When working on their research project Armony et al. (1995) had two objectives in sight.
As with any other scientific undertaking the main goal was to validate a set of ‘principles’, as
they are referred to by Armony et al. (1995) (the reasons for using the term ‘principles’ rather
than hypotheses or research questions will become clear in the coming section), and explain
two independent sets of findings. However, hidden behind this first standard aim was the desire
to highlight the usefulness of computational models in helping neuroscience move forward.
Certainly, this is a cause this thesis fully adheres to. By their very nature computational models
are the perfect tool to validate the mechanisms that brain systems are suggested to implement.
Furthermore, once the validity of a computational model has been established it can serve as an
abstract stand-in for the animal’s brain. Hence, allowing researchers to easily perform lesion
studies and make predictions that can later be more efficiently validated by neuroscience (a
fact exemplified by Armony, Servan-Schreiber, Cohen, and LeDoux (1997); Armony, Servan-
Schreiber, Romanski, Cohen, and LeDoux (1997)). Effectively, establishing a feedback loop
between computational models and neuroscience.
Another impetus for re-creating the experiment and re-implementing the neural network
described by Armony et al. (1995), is that the model of the ‘two-pathways’ to the amygdala
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suggested by LeDoux (1986, 1990, 1992, 1998), and Romanski and LeDoux (1992) has been
integrated within the PrimEmo architecture. Furthermore, even if only half of this model
appears in the ProtoEmo architecture it can be used to make predictions as to the capabilities
of the amygdala to accurately distinguish between similar stimuli, such as two tones with
adjacent frequencies for example.
The sections making up this chapter have been organized to mirror the layout of the original
paper from Armony et al. (1995). As such, the first section introduces the model of the two
pathways to the amygdala suggested by LeDoux (1986), before describing the neural structure
implemented by Armony et al. (1995) to validate said model. The next section details the
fear conditioning experiment used as a testing ground. The third section presents the results
gathered by re-implementing both the neural network and the conditioning experiment. Finally,
the last section discusses the differences between the results published by Armony et al. (1995)
and those collected in this re-creation.
4.1 A neural network constrained by fear
As stated above, the main goal of Armony et al. (1995) was to test the ability of three principles
to explain two sets of behavioral and physiological findings. To do so, Armony et al. (1995)
designed and implemented a neural structure based on the following assumptions:
1. Processing units: populations of real cells coding for the same piece of information can
be abstracted as non-linear summing devices;
2. Dual pathway connectivity: sensory information describing the state of the environment
is encoded by two parallel systems, before converging on the amygdala;
3. Learning: the synaptic strength for the connections between neurons is updated using a
modified Hebbian learning rule, also known as the Stent-Hebb rule (Stent, 1973).
Simulating a fear conditioning experiment, Armony et al. (1995) explored whether the neural
network would express conditioned responses similar to those observed in animals and known
to be the result of amygdala activation. At the physiological level, Armony et al. (1995)
examined if the neural units displayed any change in activities as a result of conditioning
analogous to those measured in single-cell recordings.
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4.1.1 Two pathways to the amygdala
In an effort to fully describe the neural circuitry underlying the emotion of fear, as well as the
mechanisms by which animals learn what to be afraid of, LeDoux (1986, 1990, 1992, 1998)
took advantage of the classical conditioning paradigm. Fear conditioning is a favored method
of investigation for several reasons. For one it is easily repeatable, since fear can be induced in
most animals via a simple foot shock. Further, in the post-conditioning test phase, the stimulus
triggering an adaptive reaction is known and, therefore, its point of origin in the brain is more
easily identifiable. Indeed, by definition (see Chapter 3 for more details) conditioning is a
process through which an animal learns to associate a CS (like a tone) with the rewarding or
punishing value of a paired US (a foot shock for example). Both the CS and US are chosen
and, thus, known by the experimenter. Consequently, to trace the paths through which the CS
is transmitted within the brain, one can start by investigating the brain systems in charge of
processing information of similar modality.
Considering that all of his experiments involved the conditioning of animals to a sound,
LeDoux let himself be guided by the natural flow of information (LeDoux, 1986, 1990, 1992,
1998; Romanski & LeDoux, 1992). Thus, setting the starting point of his investigation of the
neural circuitry of fear in the auditory cortex. Through a first lesion study, complete removal of
the auditory cortex proved to have no significant impact on the conditioning of rats (LeDoux,
1986, 1990, 1992, 1998; Romanski & LeDoux, 1992). Therefore, following the flow of in-
formation LeDoux decided to conduct a second study targeting the auditory portion of the
thalamus. Removal of the ‘medial geniculate body’ (MGB), an area of the thalamus responsible
for the transmission of data related to sound, proved to be detrimental to conditioning. In
fact, after removing the MGB, animals were unable to learn to be afraid of a tone, even when
paired with a foot shock. Surprisingly, however, they were still capable of reacting to other
innately relevant stimuli, such as the foot shock itself. Using chemical tracing methods, it was
determined that the auditory thalamus apart from sending connections to the cortex projected
significantly to four other sub-cortical areas too. Severing the link between the thalamus and the
first three regions yielded no results concerning conditioning. However, cutting the path from
the thalamus to the amygdala, resulted in the same interferences in the conditioning process, as
those observed after lesioning the thalamus.
Further conditioning experiments and lesion studies, involving not just a single, but two
similar tones, allowed (LeDoux, 1986, 1990, 1992, 1998) to conclude that: 1) there are two
pathways from the thalamus to the amygdala, one directly connects the two areas together,
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whereas the other involves sensory related cortical areas; 2) if a simple stimulus, a tone for
example, is used as a CS, then both pathways are equivalent; 3) however, in more complex
cases, such as conditioning using two similar tones, one of them paired with a US, the thalam-
o-amygdala pathway is incapable of differentiating between the two tones and reacts similarly
to both. Therefore, the indirect pathway through the cortex while slower provides more detailed
information concerning the CS. Thus, allowing animals to learn to react to one tone, but not
the other.
4.1.2 Model
The model suggested by Armony et al. (1995); Armony, Servan-Schreiber, Cohen, and LeDoux
(1997); Armony, Servan-Schreiber, Romanski, et al. (1997) is split into two modules, each
corresponding to one of the pathways to the amygdala. As shown in Figure 4.1, the first module
includes the medial section of the MGB (MGm) and a layer representing the amygdala. While
the second module is made of the ventral section of the MGB (MGv) and the cortex, which
receives data from both MGm and MGv, and then projects to the amygdala. Every layer is
populated with non-linear computational units, whose activation value can be thought of as the
average neural activity of a small population of real neurons coding for the same patterns. The
processing units used for this model strike a balance between capturing the basic features of the
response of a real cell and being computationally tractable. For each unit, its output remains
null as long as its net input is below the threshold xthr = 0, and it saturates upon reaching the
cell’s maximum firing rate, xsat = 1:
act(x) =

0 if x− xthr < 0
x− xthr if 0 < x− xthr < xsat
xsat if xsat < x− xthr
(4.1)
Where, in Figure 4.1, one layer projects to another, the author chose to fully connect every
sending units to each of the receiving units. Therefore, the net input of any neuron is computed




Where ωrs is the synaptic weight between the sending unit s and the current receiving unit r.
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Figure 4.1 Using the architecture presented above, Armony et al. (1995) sought to validate the
model of the ‘two-pathways to the amygdala’ suggested earlier by LeDoux (1986, 1990, 1992),
as well as Romanski and LeDoux (1992). According to this model, sensory information entering
the thalamus and destined for the amygdala takes two paths. The first one, links directly to
the amygdala and provides fast communication, but at the cost of precision. Indeed, the
information is very general and an animal could not tell the difference between two tones with
adjacent frequencies by relying on this data alone. The second path, goes through the cortex
(the auditory cortex in this case) and further refines the signal. Hence, providing much more
detailed information to the amygdala. In the case of a conditioning experiment, if an animal
has to simply react to a tone, then both pathways are equivalent save for the time it takes for the
signal to reach the amygdala (LeDoux, 1992; Romanski & LeDoux, 1992). However, if the tone
the animal has to react to is very specific, then the second pathway becomes very important,
since it allows the amygdala to discriminate between different frequencies. Therefore, the
overall role of the first pathway is to ready the body for a ‘fight-or-flight’ response, while the
second one helps decide if a reaction is actually necessary.
122 Recreating: An anatomically constrained neural network model of fear conditioning
To account for the presence of inter-neurons in real brain areas lateral inhibition has
been implemented through a soft version of the winner-takes-all mechanism. Following this
algorithm in each layer the winning unit (defined by strength of activation) inhibits all other
units by an amount proportional to its net input:
awin = activ(netwin) for the winner
ar = activ(netr −µ ×awin) for the other units
(4.3)
µ was set to 0.2 for all units, in all layers, and left unchanged for the whole duration of the
simulation.
In the competitive-learning scheme used for this model the number of input patterns for
which a given unit is activated is inversely proportional to the number of units in the layer.
Therefore, to capture the broad tuning capabilities of the first module, the MGm and amygdala
layers have very few neurons (for the current implementation the number of units in the MGm
and amygdala layers have both been set to n = 3). On the contrary, the MGv and cortical layers,
both part of the second module, are populated by n = 8 units per layer, more than double the
number of neurons. Hence, allowing units to acquire a narrower tuning which accounts for the
improved categorization capabilities of the cortex.
After the presentation of each input pattern, learning is achieved through the modification
of the synaptic weights of all excitatory connections, but not the inhibitory ones. For the
modification of the weights, Armony et al. (1995) used a variant of the Hebbian learning rule.
It is well known that the direct application of Hebb’s learning rule quickly leads to saturation.
Therefore, to work around this issue, the so called Stent-Hebb algorithm was applied (Stent,
1973). It allows for both increases and decreases in synaptic strength based on the correlation





ωrs + ε ×ar ×as if as > aavgωrs otherwise (4.4)
Where aavg is the average activation value sampled over the units of the sending layer and
ε = 0.1 is the learning rate. Furthermore, to account for the decrease in synaptic strength for
uncorrelated sending units, for each unit in the receiving layer the sum of its input weights is
kept constant through multiplicative normalization. That is, each weight is further processed








As a consequence, the synaptic strength of sending units whose activation value remain below
the layer’s average will decrease, while the weights of correlated units increases.
In the simulated conditioning experiment, sound was used as the CS, while the nociceptive
US was represented by a single binary unit connected to all units within the MGm and amygdala
layers (as depicted in Figure 4.1). The strength of the synaptic connections between the US
unit and the receiving neurons of the first module were set to 0.4 and remained unchanged for
the duration of the simulation. According to Armony et al. (1995) this design decision was
intended to “capture the effect of diffuse somatosensory information associated with a US such
as a footshock”. A set of training patterns was created by dividing the auditory spectrum into
16 pure tones of contiguous frequencies in an arbitrary scale. Consequently, the tones as well
as the CS were represented in the simulation by overlapping patterns of activation in the input
layer (as shown in Figure 4.2). In addition to the competitive learning algorithm (described in
Equation 4.4 and Equation 4.5), the use of overlapping nonorthogonal patterns facilitates the
development of topographical representations of the input in the model’s layers.
Figure 4.2 This figure depicts the input features used in Armony et al.’s (1995) conditioning
experiment. Frequencies are represented by nonorthogonal overlapping patterns of activities
in the input layer. When associated with the competitive learning mechanism (described in
Equation 4.4 and Equation 4.5), this type of pattern facilitates the development of topographical
representations in the model’s layers.
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4.2 Method
As alluded to at the beginning of Section 4.1, to ascertain the validity of the model of the dual
pathways to the amygdala suggested by LeDoux (1986, 1992), Armony et al. (1995) simulated
a fear conditioning experiment. The goal was to examine whether the neural network, whose
implementation was guided by the principles expressed in Section 4.1, could reproduce the two
sets of behavioral and physiological findings. At the behavioral level, it is expected that the
network’s behavioral output, defined as the sum total activity of the amygdala layer, should
drastically increase for the frequency corresponding to the CS, while showing a net decrease
in activity for all other frequencies. At the physiological level, the neural units within layers
receiving information about the US, either directly or indirectly, are anticipated to have their
receptive fields (RF) shift towards the CS’s frequency. A neuron’s receptive field is defined
in this context as the frequency range for which its output activity is non-zero. The effects of
conditioning should also be stronger the closer a unit’s best frequency (BF; the frequency for
which a neuron is maximally activated) was to the CS in the pre-conditioning phase. The fear
conditioning experiment has been split into three distinct phases.
Rather than programmatically constraining the initial synaptic weights so that input patterns
would be represented topographically in all layers, Armony et al. (1995) decided to randomly
initialize the synaptic strengths with values in the range [0,1], then let the learning algorithm do
the synaptic pruning. According to Armony et al. (1995), this is to ensure that any modification
in the receptive fields of the neural units is the result of conditioning alone, and not an unfore-
seen consequence of setting a specific set of weights. Consequently, the first, ‘development’,
phase consists in presenting sequentially all input patterns to the network without activating
the nociceptive US unit. After each pattern, the weights of the excitatory connections were
updated using the Stent-Hebb rule described in Equation 4.4, and normalized unit-wise using
Equation 4.5. The loop was repeated until all units within the neural network had developed a
stable RF. The curves labeled ‘Pre’ in Figures 4.3 — 4.6, show standard receptive fields for
units belonging to each layers.
Once all units in the neural network had developed stable topographic representations
for all input patterns, the conditioning paradigm was simulated. The ‘conditioning’ phase is
very similar to the previous development phase. The only difference is that, a frequency was
arbitrarily chosen to be the CS, and, therefore, associated with the activation of the nociceptive
US unit. All input patterns were again sequentially presented to the input layers. The weights
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of the excitatory connections were adjusted following the same extended Stent-Hebb rule
(defined in Equation 4.4 and Equation 4.5). Again, the process repeated until the RFs of all
units stabilized. The curves labeled ‘Post’ in Figures 4.3 — 4.6 depict the new receptive fields
units developed as a result of conditioning.
Finally, the ‘testing’ phase spreads across both of the previous phases. By measuring the
sum total response of the amygdala’s units (the behavioral response), Armony et al. (1995)
investigated the overall behavior of the network in response to the CS before and after condi-
tioning (see Figure 4.7). Additionally, for all neural units in the network their activation values
for each of the frequencies were also recorded after the first two phases to analyze any change
in receptive fields between pre- and post-conditioning (shown in Figures 4.3 — 4.6).
4.3 Results
The results presented in this section have been gathered by reproducing as closely as possible
the fear conditioning experiment designed by Armony et al. (1995). The next section discusses
the adequacy of my results compared to the ones published in the original paper (Armony et al.,
1995).
At the beginning of the development phase, when the synaptic strengths were randomly
initialized neurons responded, on average, equally but weakly to all input patterns. By repeat-
edly presenting the 15 tones to the network’s inputs and adapting the weights of the excitatory
connections using the competitive algorithm defined in Equation 4.4 and Equation 4.5, all
neural units developed a receptive field. That is the output activity of a unit was non-zero
for a range of adjacent frequencies. This receptive field is centered around a best frequency,
which correspond to the tone for which the neuron’s output is maximal. This is made clear
by the pre-conditioning graphs in Figures 4.3 — 4.6. Furthermore, the receptive fields of
units belonging to the amygdala and MGm layers are broad, supporting the idea that the direct
pathway to the amygdala can only encode coarse-grained data. On the contrary, units from
both the cortical and MGv layers have narrower receptive fields allowing for a finer-grained
encoding of the information along the indirect pathway. According to Armony et al. (1995)
this discrepancy in the breadth of the receptive fields is to be expected, since when using lateral
inhibition the representational capability of neurons in a layer is inversely proportional to the
number of units in said layer.
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After conditioning, a number of units displayed significant frequency-specific changes in
their receptive fields. This, however, only occurred in layers that received information about the
nociceptive input. Consequently, only units in the MGv layer saw no change in their activation
pattern after conditioning. The cortical layer, although not a direct target of the US binary
unit, does indirectly receive data concerning the US via its connections with the MGm layer.
Hence, forcing its units to adapt to the additional signal. Inside the concerned layers, units
whose best frequency was close to the CS before conditioning saw a drastic increase in activity
for the CS, resulting in a shift of their whole receptive field toward the CS. As a matter of
fact, any unit whose activity was non-zero for the CS exhibited an increase in activity for the
CS and a decrease for all other frequencies. The effects are more pronounced the closer the
unit’s best frequency was to the CS prior to conditioning. Which means that for units, that did
not include the CS in their receptive field at the end of the development phase, no substantial
change occurred. This is evidenced by the graphs showing the discrepancy in neural activity
pre- and post-conditioning in Figures 4.3 — 4.6.
Finally the behavioral response, which is defined as the sum total of the amygdala’s
activities, produced a twofold increase in the network’s response to the CS. Such a drastic
change between pre- and post-conditioning output can be explained by the results presented in
the previous paragraph. Indeed, given that units whose best frequency was close the CS prior
to conditioning displayed a significant increase in their activity, it follows that the weighted
sum of the activation values from those neurons would increase too. This aggregation of output
activities also explains why the farther a frequency is from the CS the less intense the behavioral
response is. As shown in Figure 4.7, this results in a curve climbing as the tone comes closer to
the CS, then reaching a peak for the CS, and falling back afterwards.
4.4 Conclusion
The fear conditioning simulation that I re-created based on the description from Armony et al.
(1995) seems to have yielded results similar to those published in the original paper. Due to the
random initialization of the synaptic strengths in the development phase the match is not exact.
However, the features necessary for drawing conclusions as to the validity of their principles
are present in my observations as well.
In conclusion, the neural network was able to reproduce the overall behavior of the amygdala
observed in fear conditioning experiments performed on animals. At the physiological level,
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Figure 4.3 This figure shows the activation of the neural units in the MGm layer at the end
of the development phase (line labeled ‘Pre’) and after conditioning (labeled ‘Post’). The
difference in receptive fields are quite apparent, as is the increase in activity for the unit with a
best frequency close to the frequency chosen as the CS (frequency 14 in this case). The actual
discrepancy in the activation of each unit before and after conditioning is made apparent by
the set of graphs on the bottom line. As Armony et al. (1995) remarked in the original paper,
the receptive field of all units shift toward the CS, this is not a phenomenon limited to only a
single unit.
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Figure 4.4 This figure shows the activation of the neurons in the MGv layer pre- and post-
conditioning. As mentioned by Armony et al. (1995), since the MGv does not receive any
information about the nociceptive US the receptive fields of its neural units are not modified by
the conditioning paradigm. This is made abundantly clear by the flat lines on the second and
last row of this figure, which represent the difference in activity before and after conditioning
for each unit.
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Figure 4.5 This figure displays the activation of the neural units in the cortical layer before and
after conditioning. Although, the auditory cortex does not receive any direct information about
the nociceptive US, it does receive indirect data via the connections between the MGm and
cortical layers. Hence, neurons inside the cortex also display a modification in their receptive
field.
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Figure 4.6 This figure depicts the activation of the neurons in the amygdala layer. According
to LeDoux (1986, 1992) the amygdala is the target of two pathways. The first connecting
directly the thalamus with the amygdala provides coarse information about incoming stimuli.
The second pathway, going from the thalamus to the amygdala via the auditory cortex while
slower than the first pathway, sends more fine-grained stimuli related data. Hence, the thalamo-
cortico-amygdaloid path allows animals to be conditioned with tone of more specific frequencies,
without reacting to tones with adjacent frequencies. In the model designed by Armony et al.
(1995) the amygdala, therefore, receives information directly from the nociceptive US, but also
from the MGm and the cortical layers. As a result, the receptive fields of the different neural
units are substantially modified after conditioning occurs.
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Figure 4.7 This figure shows the evolution of the behavioral response against the different
frequencies before and after conditioning. Since the behavioral response is defined as the total
activity of the amygdala layer, and neurons in the amygdala see a drastic increase in activity
around the CS frequency after conditioning, it follows that the behavioral response is at its
maximum for the CS frequency. Activities for frequencies around the CS also see an increase in
activity. However, the further a frequency is from the CS, the less it is impacted and can even
decrease as a result of the shift in the receptive fields of the amygdala’s neurons.
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the neural units did develop receptive fields that were subsequently altered via conditioning
in a way similar to what was observed in single-cell recordings in animals (see Armony et al.
(1995) for graphs depicting those empirical results). As a consequence, Armony et al. (1995)
concluded that the principles that guided the design of the neural network were indeed correct.
Meaning that the model of the dual pathways to the amygdala suggested by LeDoux (1986,
1992), and Romanski and LeDoux (1992) can also be considered valid. More importantly
though, Armony et al. (1995) were able to show that:
“. . . a neuroanatomically constrained network, together with a biologically
plausible learning algorithm, can capture important aspects of the behavioral
and physiological consequences of fear conditioning. The model offers a comple-
mentary approach to experimental studies for examining issues pertaining to the
acquisition and expression of fear learning in the brain.” — Armony et al. (1995,
p. 252)
Furthermore, results pertaining to the simulation of a lesion study (Armony, Servan-Schreiber,
Cohen, & LeDoux, 1997; Armony, Servan-Schreiber, Romanski, et al., 1997), proved the model
capable of predicting the effects of severing the connections between different parts of the
network. Thus, adding their voices to the mounting evidence that computational models should
be an essential tool in the belt of any neuroscientist.
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The study presented by Armony et al. (1995) and reproduced in this chapter has two purposes.
The first is to validate the three following principles:
1. Processing units: populations of real cells coding for the same piece of information can
be abstracted as non-linear summing devices;
2. Dual pathway connectivity: sensory information describing the state of the environment
is encoded by two parallel systems, before converging on the amygdala. This is a model
suggested by LeDoux (1986, 1992), as well as Romanski and LeDoux (1992);
3. Learning: the synaptic strength for the connections between neurons is updated using a
modified Hebbian learning rule also known as the Stent-Hebb rule (Stent, 1973).
Secondly, it attempts to show that computational models could be a worthwhile tool to validate
mechanisms suggested by neuroscience and then inform future endeavors by making predic-
tions. To test the validity of their three principles, Armony et al. (1995) built an anatomically
constrained neural network, and tested it using a simulated fear conditioning experiment.
Through this simulation they evaluated whether the network would exhibit behavioral responses
characteristic of conditioned animals. At the physiological level, they examined whether the
neural units making up the network would develop ‘receptive fields’ similar to those observed
in single-cell recordings. Since sound was used as the CS in this experiment, the term receptive
field is defined as the frequency range for which a neural unit produces a non-zero output.
The outcomes of my re-creation of this experiment match very closely the results published
by Armony et al. (1995). As both sets of findings were reproduced by the neural network. It
follows that the three principles guiding the model’s design are valid. More importantly though,
this project constitutes further evidence that computational models “offer a complementary
approach to experimental studies” Armony et al. (1995, p. 252). Finally, the model of the
two-pathways to the amygdala has been integrated in the design of the PrimEmo architecture
(see Chapter 6 as well as Appendix B). Furthermore, even though ProtoEmo lacks any cortical
area (see Chapter 5 and Appendix A for a description of ProtoEmo’s design), the model
suggested by LeDoux (1986, 1992) and validated by this study helps predict the encoding and,




ProtoEmo: Warning the brain about survival-relevant stimuli
The idea that emotions evolved to improve the chances of survival of our animal ancestors,
is not novel. In fact, it has been tackled, in one form or another, by other well-known scientists
such as Cannon (1929), MacLean (1949, 1952), Panksepp (1998, 2005); Panksepp et al. (1982)
and Damasio (1997, 2008). It is an idea that originated from Darwin’s ‘The Expression of
Emotions in Man and Animals’ (see Chapter 2 for a more extensive recount of his theories).
Recently, it has once again inspired the work of LeDoux (2012), which led to the introduction
of the survival circuit theory, whose core ideas can be found in Sub-Section 2.6.2. Nowadays,
the primary methods of investigating emotions in the animal’s brain are rooted in conditioning
(both classical and instrumental). Not only does conditioning rely on this idea of survival being
improved by affect, it also exploits the associative mechanism by which new triggers for innate
emotions are acquired. Furthermore, according to LeDoux (2012), it can be interpreted in
light of yet another debate concerning emotions: whether they are inherited from our animal
ancestors or learned through countless experiences, usually summarized as ‘nature versus
nurture’ (Damasio, 1997, 2008; Hawkins & Blakeslee, 2007; LeDoux, 1995; Newell, 1973;
J. a. Russell, 2003). For conditioning to be possible, it seems emotions have to be both at the
same time. Innate emotions, therefore, are inherited from our ancestors (where ancestors in this
case means both our parents, and our animal ancestors), while our everyday experiences teach
us how to use them to our advantage.
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Empirical results from classical conditioning, as well as functional imaging studies, using
both positive and negative stimuli, have identified the amygdala as being the brain area of main
interest (Whalen & Phelps, 2009). Its activation for both types of stimuli has led to its inclusion
in models and theories of emotions, most notably the limbic system (MacLean, 1952, 1970)
and the ‘somatic marker hypothesis’ (Damasio, 2008). There its role is usually assumed to
simply be ‘processing emotions’, without giving too many details about its inner workings or
the specific emotional features being processed. Conditioning, on the other hand, has managed
to dive deeper in the amygdala’s anatomy and explain how associative learning is implemented,
as well as the type of information used for processing (Armony et al., 1995; LeDoux, 1990,
1992, 1995, 2014). At an abstract level its anatomy has been compared to a funnel (Whalen
& Phelps, 2009), where input stimuli are gradually integrated through the layers that make
up the amygdala. The main sensory input to the amygdala being the thalamus, it means that
the first few stages integrate data related to the state of the environment. Later inputs to the
basal nucleus from associative cortical areas, help contextualize this information (LeDoux,
1990, 1992, 1995). Therefore, the last stage of the process, the central nucleus, is thought
to deal with general concepts describing the state of both the environment and the body (via
afferent connections from the hypothalamus). Furthermore, the amygdala is also ideally placed
to fulfill any survival function attributed to emotions, since it is bi-directionally connected with
the hypothalamus and the thalamus. Hence, the central nucleus can influence, via inhibitory
projections, the functioning of the autonomic nervous system and the different thalamo-cortical
loops responsible for motor and cognitive actions. Another interpretation for the thalamus-
amygdala-thalamus loop, is that of a primary attention mechanism. Following that point of
view, the central nucleus of the amygdala would then control the amount of information that
enters the amygdala itself, as well as other cortices, by increasing or releasing its hold over the
thalamus.
It has long been accepted that the hypothalamus is the control center of the autonomic
nervous system. However, on the contrary to what was previously believed, the hypothalamus
fulfills its role of maintaining the body’s homeostasis, not by explicitly controlling other parts
of the brain or the body, but by influencing them (Saper & Lowell, 2014). The hypothalamus
spreads its influence via the release of hormones, which travel within the brain and cross the
blood-brain barrier. Each hormone triggers specific brain areas or organs, which in turn work
to re-establish the body’s delicate balance. Even though, the hypothalamus has received less
attention than the amygdala and its anatomy is not as well-defined, it is safe to assume that a
similar funneling phenomenon happens within it. This idea is all the more reinforced by the
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fact that the accepted role of the hypothalamus is to maintain the body’s homeostasis. Hence,
monitoring and detecting relevant internal stimuli, are integral parts of its task.
Bringing it all together, the lateral and basal nuclei of the amygdala receive external sensory
inputs from the thalamus. They channel these stimuli toward the central nucleus, all the while
reducing their dimensionality. The nuclei making up the hypothalamus apply a similar process
to internal sensory inputs. Finally, the central nucleus of the amygdala integrates information
from both the basal nucleus and the hypothalamus. Thus, making it the ideal brain area for
detecting relevant stimuli and trigger an emotional episode if necessary. Consequently, if
the overall goal of this thesis, as stated in Chapter 1, is to investigate the role of emotions in
virtual agents, a reasonable first step would be to explore the applicability of both LeDoux
(2012)’s theory and the results from classical conditioning to those virtual agents. Therefore,
the hypotheses, this chapter seeks to investigate, are:
H1-1 The circuit, described so far and identified as essential to an animal’s survival, can
also be used by virtual agents to influence their actions and increase their own survival
capabilities.
H1-2 The amygdala acts as the trigger for this survival circuit.
H1-3 However, This survival circuit is not enough to elicit any emotion, where emotions are
differentiated from other mental states by their level of ‘arousal’ and ‘valence’ (see
Sub-Section 2.7.3 for the exact definition of emotion adopted in this thesis).
5.1 ProtoEmo: A model based on primitive circuits
To explore the validity and consequences of the hypothesis formulated above, the ProtoEmo
architecture (depicted in Figure 5.1) has been built. It is a structure made of three main neural
populations, each inspired by one of the brain areas mentioned so far: the thalamus, the hypotha-
lamus and the amygdala. ProtoEmo has two main input layers. The thalamus receives sensory
data describing the state of the environment (external stimuli), while the lateral hypothalamic
area processes internal stimuli. The main output layer is the central nucleus of the amygdala,
whose activity influences the decision-making process, as well as feeds back to both input layers.
The neural network representing the hypothalamus has been split into two layers. The
aforementioned lateral hypothalamic area and the rest of the hypothalamus. Since the di-
mensionality of the internal inputs, in the case of the following simulations, is quite small
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Figure 5.1 This schema represents the different brain areas, along with their connectomes, that
are included in the ProtoEmo architecture. The thalamus and lateral hypothalamic area (LHA)
receive sensory input, describing the external environment and the internal state, respectively.
The LHA compresses its input and sends it to the hypothalamus, hypothesized to be in charge of
informing the central nucleus of the amygdala (CA) of relevant stimuli pertaining to the body’s
homeostasis. Sensory data concerning the external environment, coming from the thalamus,
are forwarded to the lateral nucleus of the amygdala (LA). Within the amygdala, the pattern
formed by the inter-nuclei connections has been likened to that of a funnel, by Whalen and
Phelps (2009). As is the case for the LHA, this funnel serves to integrate sensory information
into more complex concepts. Finally, the CA is hypothesized to warn the rest of the brain about
stimuli relevant to the agent’s or individual’s survival. Via its inhibitory connections, to the
thalamus and hypothalamus, the CA implements two feedback control systems. On the contrary
to the roles usually assigned to the CA and hypothalamus, they do not directly control the body
or other parts of the brain, but simply influence them via a release of different hormones.
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already a single layer is enough to reduce it further. Thus, the lateral hypothalamic area extracts
higher-level descriptions of the internal state, which are to be categorized by the hypothalamic
layer. Aside from the internal sensory inputs, the lateral hypothalamic area also receives
inhibitory projections from the central nucleus of the amygdala. This layer projects directly
to the second hypothalamic layer. The second layer, labeled ‘hypothalamus’ for simplicity,
is then in charge of detecting stimuli relevant to maintaining the body’s homeostasis. It is
bidirectionally connected with the basal nucleus of the amygdala and sends efferent projections
to its central nucleus. Therefore, informing the central nucleus of the presence of any relevant
internal stimuli. This first circuit implements one of the low-level control systems.
The thalamus is represented by a single layer, which receives external sensory inputs as
well as inhibitory projections from the central nucleus of the amygdala. Its output activity is
sent directly to the lateral nucleus of the amygdala. Since the ProtoEmo architecture does not
contain any neocortical layer yet, the thalamus-amygdala-thalamus loop is interpreted here as a
primary attention mechanism. Through this second low-level control system, the amygdala can
restrict the amount and type of information that enters its lateral nucleus by further inhibiting
or releasing its grasp on the thalamic layer.
Finally, the amygdala has been split into its four main components: the lateral, the basal,
the intercalated and the central nuclei. As briefly described in the introduction, the organization
of the lateral, basal, and central nuclei resembles a funnel. As a matter of fact, it would make
more sense to compare the flow of information inside the amygdala to that of the visual system.
The lateral nucleus is usually considered as the interface to the amygdala (Whalen & Phelps,
2009), receiving sensory information related to the state of the world from the thalamus, as well
as the somatosensory cortex (see Chapter 4 for a description of the ‘dual pathways’ between the
thalamus and the amygdala). As the lowest level area in the amygdala, the lateral nucleus can
only detect and encode for very simple features of the world. This is similar to how neurons in
the first level of the visual system are tuned to detect edges in a specific orientation. The lateral
nucleus then projects directly to the basal and the intercalated nuclei. Continuing the metaphor
with the visual system, based on the activation patterns of the lateral nucleus the basal nucleus
can detect more complex features. The final stage of the amygdala, the central nucleus, receives
afferent connections from both the basal and intercalated nuclei. As it is the highest level of the
amygdala, the central nucleus is, therefore, capable of representing intricate features relevant to
the survival of the individual. Consequently, the amygdala’s central nucleus can be conceived
as a group of detectors, an idea not unlike MacLean’s (1949) ‘cerebral analyzers’ or Scherer
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and Ekman’s (2010; 1984) ‘Stimulus Evaluation Checks’ (introduced in Sub-Section 2.4.1).
The intensity of each detector’s output is here interpreted as a measure of the salience of the
corresponding feature. As a result, the activation pattern of the amygdala’s central nucleus
represents the saliences of all the features from the environment that are of major concern for
the survival of the individual (an idea supported by McClure et al. (2004, p. 262)). As described
in Chapter 4, Armony et al. (1995) showed that through the interplay of Hebbian learning
and lateral inhibition it is plausible for the amygdala’s neurons to develop those detectors, as
well as tune them via conditioning (as explained in Appendix A lateral conditioning has been
implemented in the ProtoEmo controller, however, Hebbian learning has been replaced with a
genetic algorithm).
In the brain of animals, the central nucleus sends inhibitory feedback connections to both
the thalamus and lateral hypothalamic area. Additionally, for the purpose of the simulation
described below the central nucleus also projects to an output layer, whose activity is then used
in the decision-making process (see Appendix A for details on the policy followed by the Pro-
toEmo controller). Therefore, as described earlier, neither central nucleus nor hypothalamus
directly control motor and cognitive actions, instead they influence them via release of different
hormones.
From the activity received from the basal and lateral nuclei, the intercalated layer predicts the
amount by which the central nucleus should be inhibited. Therefore, it has been hypothesized
to implement a basic habituation mechanism, by Whalen and Phelps (2009) and O’Reilly and
Munakata (2013), since its inputs are similar to that of the central nucleus, while its learning
rate is slightly slower. Section A.1 provides more details as to the actual implementation of the
brain areas described so far, as well as the projection patterns between them.
5.2 Testing ProtoEmo on a resource foraging task
To test the performances of the ProtoEmo architecture, an adapted version of the ‘one-resource
foraging task’, described by Scheutz (2004), was used. A standard resource foraging task
usually consists in having a group of agents survive within a dynamic environment. To fulfill
their goal, the agents must explore the environment, in search of energy resources to forage.
Since undertaking any action expends some amount of energy, this experiment is designed to
test the strategy implemented by the group of agents to share the available resources among its
members. The results Scheutz (2004) gathered via his implementation of the resource foraging
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task, allowed him to conclude that virtual agents endowed with the concept of emotions are
‘better’ at surviving, than asocial and non-adaptive agents. Where ‘better’ was defined as a
measure of the number of agents remaining at the end of a simulation. Since Scheutz (2004)
has already gone to great lengths to show that his emotional agents have better survival skills,
our goal is to compare their performance with a group of agents controlled by the PrimEmo
architecture. To this end, we implemented our own version of the resource foraging task.
5.2.1 Experimental setup
The environment for this experiment is a two-dimensional surface of infinite proportions. This
simply means that wherever an agent decides to go, it will never ‘knock’ against any virtual
edge. Around the origin of this surface, an area of 1800 in width and 1800 in length is virtually
defined. It serves to restrict the possible locations at which energy resources can appear and
therefore the amount of movement agents have to perform between foraging events. At the be-
ginning of every simulation, circular obstacles are randomly scattered inside the pre-determined
area. These obstacles, of radius 0.05, are solid disks that agents have to avoid while traveling
between resources. They cannot be broken and remain in the same position for the entire
duration of the simulation. Similarly, resources are represented by circles (also of radius 0.05)
that can be entered by any agent wishing to forage its energy. By default each resource holds
800 units of energy, and disappears whenever it has been emptied. Regardless of the foraging
rate only one new resource appears, at a random location within the pre-determined area, at the
end of each simulation cycle.
Instead of being simple points in space, as is the case in Scheutz’s implementation, agents
are represented by disks of radius 0.037. Furthermore, each agent is characterized by a level
of energy (set initially to 2000 units) and an ‘action tendency’, which is a coefficient in the
range [0,1] indicative of the probability the agent chooses to fight rather than flee. During each
simulation cycle, agents have to decide which action to perform next, based on the state of the
environment and their own internal state. To make matters worse for the agents, a ‘Fog of War’
has also been implemented. This translates into a sensory horizon beyond which agents are
not able to perceive the state of the world. For this specific experiment the range within which
sensors where working, was set to a 300 units radius around the agent. Hence, based on these
incomplete sensory data agents have the chose between the following five actions:
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1. Move: this is the default action if nothing appears in the agent’s vicinity. The agent








Where gr is a coefficient indicative of the agent’s need in energy, ga represents how
much an agent wants to enter a battle (if positive the agent will be moving toward
others, while a negative value means that the agent will actively avoid others), and
gt corresponds to obstacle avoidance (similarly, a positive value means the agent will
try as much as possible to run into obstacle, while a negative value forces it to avoid
obstacles). resource(n), agent(m) and obstacle(k) are the scaled vector from the agent’s
current position to the nth resource, mth nearby agent (excluding itself) and kth obstacle,
respectively.
The maximum speed at which an agent can move is set to 4. Additionally, if its level
of energy is below the critical level (set to 400 units), its speed is further restricted to a
maximum of 1, to avoid using the remainder of its resources on movement alone. While
moving, an agent expands energy at a rate equal to the square of its linear speed.
2. Fight or Flee: when two or more agents are within a radius of f ight_thres = 0.3 of each
other, a conflict situation arises. The agent has to decide whether to fight or run away.
The process by which this decision is made, depends on the type of agent (as detailed in
the next Sub-section). However, it is always based on the agent’s current action tendency.
On the one hand, if it decides to fight, an agent looses 50 units of energy over a single
cycle. On the other, fleeing is equivalent to running away from the closest enemy, at a
speed of 7 for a random number of cycles (chosen in the range [5,10]).
3. Forage: when the agent is on top of a resource it will consume its energy, until empty.
There is no limit to how much energy an agent can consume.
4. Procreate: if an agent manages to survive for more than 250 cycles and has more than
2200 units of energy left, it will then automatically procreate. This means that a new agent
will appear at a random location inside the pre-determined area. The act of procreation
costs 2000 units to the parent.
Finally, at the end of a simulation cycle each agent loses one unit of energy as processing
power, urging them to move around and forage for energy as much as possible, since an
energy level of zero is equivalent to death. Upon dying an agent simply disappears from the
environment.
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5.2.2 Scheutz’s emotional agents
In Scheutz’s experiment four types of agent were defined: asocial non-adaptive, social non-
adaptive, asocial adaptive and emotional (social and adaptive). When a social agent finds
itself in a conflict, it fights only if its action tendency is the highest, otherwise it runs away.
Thus, battle between social agents are resolved after one turn only. Asocial agents, in the same
situation, do not take the action tendency of others into consideration, but use their own action
tendency as a probability for fighting, rather than fleeing. Therefore, a conflict between asocial
robots can last until one of them decides to run away or dies.
The capacity of an agent to adjust its action tendency makes the difference between adaptive
and non-adaptive individuals. On the one hand, if a robot is non-adaptive then its action
tendency is fixed and chosen at random upon initialization, following a Gaussian distribution
of mean 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.125. Adaptive agents, on the other hand, adjust their
action tendency depending on whether they lost or won the last fight. A losing agent increases
its action tendency, thus increasing its probability of winning the next battle, while a winning
agent decreases its action tendency. The adaptation rule (AR), as described by Scheutz (2004),
defines the amount by which the agent’s action tendency should be increased or decreased. If r
is the basic action tendency (randomly initialized at the beginning of the simulation) and m is
the current action tendency, then:
• After a loss:
AR+(m) =

m+ (1−m)2 if m ≥ r
2×m if m ≤ r2





2×m−1 if m ≥ r+ 1−r2
m







Emotional agents have the added possibility of setting a non-zero value for their fighting
tendency ga, by following the equation:
ga = 100×action_tendency−50 (5.4)
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Regardless of the agent’s type, the initial value for the other gains are fixed to gr = 20 and
gt =−20.
5.2.3 Control based on the ProtoEmo architecture
To evaluate the survival capabilities the ProtoEmo architecture is hypothesized to confer to
artificial agents, it has been implemented as an artificial neural network. Each of the brain
areas detailed in Section 5.1 is represented by its own neural population. The only exception
being the amygdala, whose nuclei are separated into independent layers, rather than being part
of a single amygdala network. This is to allow a more precise control over the underlying
mechanisms of the amygdala. The basic building blocs for this architecture are normalized
leaky rectified linear units (‘leaky ReLU’, first described by Maas, Hannun, and Ng (2013)).
More details about the actual implementation of the ProtoEmo controller are available in
Appendix A. To simplify the programing process and take full advantage of the acceleration
provided by GPU computing, the python libraries Keras and Tensorflow were used.
As mentioned previously, the ProtoEmo architecture relies on two sets of inputs. The exter-
nal inputs, gathered by the agent’s range sensors and through communication with other nearby
agents, are first normalized before being sent to the thalamus. To perform its resource foraging
task each agent uses the following information to determine the state of the environment:
• The maximum action tendency: This value is sampled over all the nearby agents. It helps
the current agent to decide when to fight and when to flee. In the case, where there are
no agents in its vicinity it defaults to 0.
• The distance to the closest obstacle: The distance to the closest obstacle is computed
relative to the current position of the agent. If there are no obstacles within the sensory
horizon, then the distance is set to 0 by default. This way the neurons encoding for this
value will not participate in the activation of the thalamic population.
• The distance to the closest source: The shortest distance to an energy source is computed
the same way as the one for the obstacle.
• The distance to the closest agent: The same remains true for this last distance, which
is relative to the agent’s current position. Moreover, it allows the agent to avoid any
conflict with hungrier agents. Thus, preventing any energy depletion from running away
or fighting.
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The hypothalamus being the control center for the autonomic nervous system, it receives
information from the internal inputs via its lateral area. In a manner similar to the external
inputs, the internal ones are also normalized before being sent to the corresponding input layer.
To perform its homeostatic duties, the hypothalamus monitors the following variables:
• The energy level: Same as for any other creature, the agent has to watch over its level of
remaining energy, since depletion means death.
• The current action tendency: In this specific case the agent’s action tendency, can be
interpreted as indicating how desperate, a particular agent is, to forage the nearest energy
source. It could be likened to what is usually described as ‘motivation’ in animals.
• The level of danger: Danger is a variable computed based on the distance between the
closest agent and the closest obstacle (see Appendix A for a definition of this variable).
It was introduced early on to elicit fear in the agent.
Given the description of ProtoEmo at both the architectural (see Section 5.1) and controller
levels, a few improvements over Scheutz’s (2004) implementation of his emotional agents
stand out. To begin with, agents controlled by the ProtoEmo architecture can use the output of
the network to influence the values of all their tendencies (more details relating to this process
are available in Sub-Section A.1.5), not just their action and fight tendencies. Therefore, if
for example an agent finds itself in a perilous situation, then it can suppress its hunger to
move away from danger before resuming its search for an energy source. On the contrary,
Scheut’s emotional agents have a fixed foraging tendency, which implies that they are always
‘hungry’ and will seek energy in priority regardless of the situation. Since ProtoEmo has been
implemented in populations of artificial neurons, it is highly parallelizable and can theoretically
approximate any function by combining the output of its different non-linear transforms. As
a result of its complexity and the free parameters available to the ProtoEmo controller it can
devise more complex and potentially better strategies. Even though, this can be conceived
as an improvement over Scheutz’s emotional agents, the next section discusses how in the
context of the resource foraging task learning an optimal strategy does not necessitate an
elaborate architecture. In fact, only a few modifications to the adaptation rule and fighting
tendency defined by Scheutz (2004) (in Equations 5.3— 5.2 and Equation 5.4 respectively) are
sufficient to replicate the strategy adopted by the ProtoEmo controller. A further consequence
of the inherently parallel nature of the ProtoEmo controller is that it can provide values for all
four tendencies at the same time, rather than rely on different functions to compute each one
sequentially, hence, reducing the time needed for an agent to decide on which action to perform
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next. Given the simplicity of the simulation and the few rules defined by Scheutz (2004), the
difference in responsiveness might not seem worth the overhead. However, any increase in task
complexity will emphasize the gain in simulation time.
Aside from the benefits afforded by its underlying neural network, each agent controlled by
ProtoEmo is aware of its own body in addition to the state of the world. Although, ProtoEmo
has access to the same input features as Scheutz’s emotional agents, ProtoEmo actually makes
use of all available inputs to compute an agent’s tendencies (as described in more details in
Appendix A). On the contrary, as made apparent by Equation 5.3, Equation 5.2, and Equa-
tion 5.4 the only parameters in the adaptation rule are the agent’s original and current action
tendencies, as well as the result of the last conflict (victory or defeat). Moreover, owing to
ProtoEmo’s organization in a hierarchy of interconnected layers simulating the brain and its
functional layout, sensory information describing the world and bodily state is not processed
all at once. Instead, it is split into two separate streams (a fact reminiscent of Papez’s (1937)
circuit described in Section 2.6). In each of those streams, the further the data travels through
the hierarchy the more it is consolidated into higher-level concepts, until it reaches the central
nucleus of the amygdala and is categorized as being relevant to the survival of the individual,
or not. This is a perspective that is briefly mentioned above and further explored in Appendix A.
Since the ProtoEmo architecture has many recurrent connections (see Figure 5.1), for each
new set of inputs the network was run until stability. Where stability is defined as the activation
values of the output neurons being the same for two consecutive activation cycles. The output
layer is made of four neurons. The first three corresponding to the coefficients (gr, ga and
gt), which influence the direction and speed of the agent’s movement (see Equation 5.1). The
fourth neuron represents the value of the current action tendency. Having the values of the
output layer contribute to both movement and motivation, fits with the idea that the amygdala
and hypothalamus implement control systems that only influence action selection, but do not
make hard decisions (see Sub-Section A.1.5 for more details on how those values are used to
influence the decision-making process).
A recurrent idea within affective science is that emotions evolved and are therefore inherited
from our ancestors. Furthermore, because it has been hypothesized that emotions facilitate
survival, learning in-between simulations is achieved by a genetic algorithm (details of its
implementation are described in Section A.2). The simple genetic algorithm used in this experi-
ment tries to optimize for the size of the population remaining at the end of each simulation, as
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Table 5.1 This table details the statistics describing the number of survivor at the end of a
simulation.
mean count std ci95_hi ci95_lo
ctrl
ProtoEmo 89.49 100 24.415 94.275 84.705
Scheutz 9.10 100 0.927 9.282 8.918
Table 5.2 This table details the statistics describing the maximum size the group of agents
reached during a simulation.
mean count std ci95_hi ci95_lo
ctrl
ProtoEmo 89.49 100 24.415 94.275 84.705
Scheutz 10.03 100 0.171 10.064 9.996
well as the maximum size reached by a population, at any point in time. The second objective
was introduced in an effort to promote equity within the population.
5.3 Results
To collect the data necessary to answer the different hypotheses laid out in Section 5.1, the
controllers described in Sub-Section 5.2.2 and Sub-Section 5.2.3 went through two phases of de-
velopment. The first was the ‘learning’ phase, in which the controller based on the ProtoEmo
architecture used its genetic algorithm to optimize its strategy for 70 generations. Since there is
no learning involved in Scheutz’s emotional controller, no changes were made in this first phase.
During the second ‘testing’ phase, both controllers went through 100 simulations, each lasting
2500 turns, where a simulation cycle is characterized by all agents having performed an action
and the environment being updated. For both phases, each simulation was initialized with a
group of ten agents, each agent having an initial level of energy of 2000 units. Furthermore, at
the beginning of each foraging task Scheutz’s emotional agents had their tendencies randomly
sampled from a normal distribution with mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.125. In contrast,
Agents using the ProtoEmo controller had their tendencies computed directly based on the
neural activity of the architecture’s output units.
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Figure 5.2 Bar plot representing the average number of survivors for each type of controller.
Survivors are simply defined as the agents left alive once the simulation reaches its maximum
number of cycles. The error bar represent the 95% confidence interval.
Table 5.3 This table details the statistics describing the life span of agents within a simulation.
mean count std ci95_hi ci95_lo
ctrl
ProtoEmo 2461.851 9241 232.279 2466.587 2457.115
Scheutz 2366.903 1004 451.503 2394.832 2338.975
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Figure 5.3 Diagram depicting the average size of the maximum population, per game and per
controller. It is different from the number of survivors, in that some of the agents, present in
this population, might die before the end of the game, without being replaced. The error bar
represent the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 5.4 Bar chart representing the average life span of an agent, in number of cycles, for
each type of controller. The error bar represent the 95% confidence interval.
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Table 5.4 This table details the statistics describing the percentage of time agents spend
procreating during a simulation.
mean count std ci95_hi ci95_lo
ctrl
ProtoEmo 1.559e-03 9241 2.433e-03 1.609e-03 1.509e-03
Scheutz 2.831e-06 1004 5.620e-05 6.307e-06 -6.458e-07
Table 5.5 This table details the statistics describing the percentage of time agents spend fighting
during a simulation.
mean count std ci95_hi ci95_lo
ctrl
ProtoEmo 1.549e-06 9241 1.178e-04 3.952e-06 -8.533e-07
Scheutz 1.857e-04 1004 9.136e-04 2.422e-04 1.292e-04
The bar charts of Figure 5.2, Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4, show the results for the aver-
age number of survivors, the average maximum population and the average life span of an
agent, respectively. The error bars for all the graphics represent the 95% confidence interval.
From these results it is clear that the circuits identified by LeDoux (2012) as important to
the survival of animals can also be used to influence virtual agents and increase their own
survival potential (this is referred to as H1-1 in Section 5.1). Indeed, both the average num-
ber of survivors and the average maximum population for ProtoEmo is almost nine times
higher than that of Scheutz’s emotional agents (see Tables 5.1 — 5.3 for a more detailed results).
Remarkably, the average life span is quite similar across all controller types. Moreover,
taking into account the data from Figure 5.5 and Table 5.4, it is interesting to note that the
average time spent reproducing per agent and per game is three orders of magnitude higher for
ProtoEmo when compared to Scheutz’s emotional agents. This discrepancy, and, therefore,
the difference in the number of survivors at the end of the game can be explained by the results
of Figure 5.9 and Table 5.8. Indeed, Scheutz’s emotional agents having a lower energy level on
average means that they have to put more effort into exploring the environment and foraging
for food before being able to procreate. However, the more time is spent exploring and foraging
the higher the probability two or more agents will find themselves in a conflict. This in turn
increases the risk of the agent losing more energy or even dying before being able to procreate.
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Figure 5.5 Illustration of the average time an agent spends reproducing, for each controller
type, per game. It is expressed as a percentage, since not all agents have the same life span, so
the value needs to be normalized. The error bar represent the 95% confidence interval.
Table 5.6 This table details the statistics describing the percentage of time agents spend running
away during a simulation.
mean count std ci95_hi ci95_lo
ctrl
ProtoEmo 1.736e-06 9241 1.669e-04 5.139e-06 -1.667e-06
Scheutz 1.256e-03 1004 4.019e-03 1.505e-03 1.007e-03
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Figure 5.6 Plot showing the average time spent fighting for each controller type. The error bar
represent the 95% confidence interval.
Table 5.7 This table details the statistics describing the percentage of time agents spend foraging
during a simulation.
mean count std ci95_hi ci95_lo
ctrl
ProtoEmo 0.005 9241 0.004 0.005 0.005
Scheutz 0.010 1004 0.002 0.010 0.010
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Figure 5.7 Bar chart depicting the average time an agent spends fleeing during a game, per
controller type. The error bar represent the 95% confidence interval.
Table 5.8 This table details the statistics describing the energy level of agents during a simula-
tion.
mean count std ci95_hi ci95_lo
ctrl
ProtoEmo 1296.644 7415732 526.746 1297.024 1296.265
Scheutz 898.768 2376205 416.519 899.298 898.239
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Figure 5.8 Diagram showing the average time spent foraging for energy, for each controller
type. The error bar represent the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 5.9 Figure depicting the average level of energy, for each controller type. The error bar
represent the 95% confidence interval.
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By taking into consideration Figures 5.6 – 5.10, as well as Tables 5.5 — 5.9, it is possible
to extrapolate the strategies employed by each type of controller. Scheutz’s emotional agents
apply a more egoistic strategy, where each agent has to fight for its survival. Indeed, from
Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7 it is clear that they spend more time fighting each other than the
agents controlled by ProtoEmo. A fact made clear by the detailed results of Table 5.5 and
Table 5.6. Fighting and fleeing are two actions which use a great amount of energy, especially
for the fleeing agents. As a result, Scheutz’s agents need to regularly forage for energy as can
be seen in Figure 5.8 and Table 5.7. This in turn leads to more battles and so even more energy
used. The main consequence of this strategy, as shown in Figure 5.9 and in Table 5.8, is that
the average energy level per agent is only around 900 units, a level lower than ProtoEmo’s
average of 1300 units and far too low to meet the requirement for procreation (which is 2200
units). Consequently, all Scheutz’s emotional agents can do during a simulation is to move
toward the closest energy source, battle for it and finally forage its energy to be able to fight
for the next source. This strategy leaves no room for any reproduction, since an agent that just
procreated would be too weak to either fight or flee, and would simply end up dying.
In contrast, even though ProtoEmo achieves a higher population size on average (according
to Figure 5.3 and Table 5.2), very few battles take place. Consequently, almost no energy is
used on either fleeing or fighting with other agents (as can be seen in Figures 5.6 and 5.7, and
Tables 5.5 and 5.6). Instead, agents seem to avoid each other and only move to discover new
energy sources. This means that for an agent that just reproduced and gave most of its energy
to its offspring, it is quite easy to forage for energy and, thus, avoid death. Against Scheutz’s
law of the strongest, ProtoEmo therefore suggest a ‘first come, first served’ alternative.
Another possible strategy that the ProtoEmo controller might be implementing would
involve a few select agents constantly reproducing and foraging, whereas the rest of the popula-
tion spends most of its time exploring, while avoiding each other and occasionally foraging
for energy. This alternate strategy, would help explain why so much of an agent’s time is
dedicated to simply moving around (according to Figure 5.10 and Table 5.9, this is true for
both Scheutz’s emotional agents and for ProtoEmo). However, a more optimal strategy would
have any agent not currently foraging for resources or procreating, stay idle to conserve its
energy as much as possible, hence, dedicating all resources to the procreating agents. It is
possible for an agent to not move at all by setting its tendencies to zero. This means that on
each simulation cycle, the agent would only lose one unit of energy to processing. However,
because agents are initialized with only 2000 units of energy and each simulation lasts 2500
158 ProtoEmo: Warning the brain about survival-relevant stimuli
Table 5.9 This table details the statistics describing the percentage of time agents spend moving
during a simulation.
mean count std ci95_hi ci95_lo
ctrl
ProtoEmo 0.994 9241 0.006 0.994 0.994
Scheutz 0.988 1004 0.003 0.989 0.988
cycles (as described in Sub-Section 5.2.1), if an agent decides to remain idle it will still have to
forage at least one energy source per simulation. This strategy is not without risks though, since
an agent whose energy level is below 400 units has its speed limited to only 1 (as explained
in Sub-Section 5.2.1). Therefore, the agent risks dying on the way to foraging the nearest
energy source. Consequently, for this strategy to work any agents not selected for procreation,
would have to strike a balance between remaining idle to conserve energy with foraging to stay
alive and be able to move at full speed to the nearest energy source. It would be interesting
to explore which of the strategies is the optimal one, and if given time the genetic algorithm
would converge toward this solution.
Although, the strategies employed by Scheutz’s emotional agents and the ProtoEmo
controller seem vastly different, they could be reconciled by replacing the adaptation rule
specified by Scheutz (2004) in Equations 5.2 and 5.3. Rather than defining the action tendency
based on an agent’s victories or defeats, which is only indicative of its ‘frustration’, the action
tendency should be dependent on the level of energy. Therefore, the lower an agent’s energy
level is, the more it is willing to fight for an energy source. A similar concept should also be
applied to the fighting tendency (ga). An agent’s fighting tendency should not only always be
negative (ga ≤ 0), but also increase the lower the level of energy is. Thus, an agent with a high
level of energy will avoid fighting at any cost, whereas an agent with a low energy level while
not seeking a fight directly will be less prudent when exploring the environment in search for
energy. The following definitions for the action and fighting tendencies could yield a strategy





ga = 50× (action_tendency−1) (5.6)
Considering Figures 5.11 and 5.12, it should be noted that although the tendencies are not
equal to the activation of the neural units in the central nucleus of the amygdala (CA), they do
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Figure 5.10 Plot showing how much time an agent spends moving on average during a game,
for each controller type. The error bar represent the 95% confidence interval.
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depend on them. Indeed, the different tendencies the agents use to influence the next action
they will perform are computed based on the activities of the output layer. The output layer,
however, is only (fully) connected to the CA layer, as shown in Figure 5.1. Therefore, even
if a direct mapping between a change in tendencies and the activity of any one unit from the
CA layer cannot be established, it still reflects a change in the global activation pattern of the
CA layer. Consequently, to explore the veracity of the second hypothesis (H1-2, detailed in
Section 5.1) Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12 can be considered as interchangeable. Moreover, since
the polynomial regressions shown in Figure 5.12 lend themselves more easily to interpretation,
they will be used for the remainder of this section.
In the context of speculating about the strategies that each controller type might have
employed, Figure 5.12 is especially interesting, since it highlights the individual rules each
agent follows. Concerning the ProtoEmo controller, a few simple behaviors stand out:
• The lower an agent’s energy level is the higher it forage tendency. This means that, as for
animals, ‘hunger’ motivates an agent to look for ‘food’.
• Supporting the results from Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7, an agent’s fighting tendency
remains the same regardless of its distance to other agents. Moreover, since the value is
quite low (−10), an agent will generally do its best to avoid any fight. In fact the only
time an agent might seek out a battle with its peers is when the agent is far away from
any obstacles.
• As expected, an agent’s action tendency will increase the lower its energy level is. For an
agent to have a high action tendency does not imply that it seeks to fight with others. The
agent is simply making ready in case it finds itself in a battle situation.
• However, as the second and last diagrams on the top row indicate, the action tendency is
also decreasing with the distance between the agent and the closest energy source. This
supports the strategy laid out above, as it translates to the agent lowering its defenses
when getting near a forage location.
• Within expectations as well, is the fact that the avoidance tendency decreases the closer
an agent gets to an obstacle.
• It seems that for both obstacles and other agents, the nearer they are to the current agent,
the higher the forage tendency is. It is as if agents are pulled away from dangerous
situations to rather focus on looking for more energy.
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Not only do the rules, outlined above, and the results from Figure 5.12 support the strategy
ProtoEmo is speculated to have used, but they also substantiate Hypothesis 1-1 and Hypothe-
sis 1-2. Indeed they show that, ProtoEmo behaves in a way similar to how basic organisms
are expected to act, and that it managed to detect situations or features relevant to the agent’s
survival. Furthermore, with the central nucleus of the amygdala being the only layer capable of
influencing an agent’s tendencies, it is safe to conclude that it acts as a trigger for this survival
circuit.
In the context of Hypothesis 1-3, the last set of diagrams depicting the average overall
activity of the CA layer against the different input features (see Figure 5.13) are quite surprising.
Indeed, from any living organism it would be expected that the closer it is from a relevant
object, the higher its amygdalar activity. However, from the different plots in Figure 5.13 only
the second one, describing the evolution of the average CA activity against the distance to the
nearest energy source, shows an increase in activity when an agent is close to an energy source.
Nevertheless, analyzing the results of Figure 5.13 within the context of the strategy outlined
above, for the ProtoEmo controller, the last two columns do make sense. Since ProtoEmo’s
agents have been found to avoid fighting with each other at all costs, and because inert obstacles
do not represent any danger for the agent’s survival, there is no need for the amygdala to be
further activated the closer an agent is to either an obstacle or another agent. It is important to
note that as soon as either an obstacle or another agent enters the detection range the amygdala
is positively excited and remains in this state. This could be interpreted as an agent noticing a
new obstacle or another agent and being aware of them at all time. Regardless of the context in
which the first plot is interpreted, the data it represents goes against all expectations. Since the
average activity of the CA layer is negative, when the agent’s level of energy reaches zero, and
is positive, when the agent’s energy level is at its maximum, it means that nearing ‘death’ is
less important for ProtoEmo than being full of ‘life’. In the light of these last results, therefore,
Hypothesis 1-3 has to be considered invalid.
In conclusion, using the ProtoEmo architecture I was able to show that the survival
circuits found in animals can also be used to increase the survival potential of virtual agents.
Furthermore, within the identified circuit the amygdala, especially the central nucleus, acts as
a trigger detecting opportunities relevant to the agent’s survival. Concerning the role of the
amygdala in the ‘arousal’ part of emotions it seems that further investigation is required, since
the average activation value of the central nucleus of the amygdala did not have the correct
correlations with the different input features. For anyone interested in reproducing the resource
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Figure 5.11 Line plots of polynomial regressions (order=3) modeling the evolution of the
activation values of each of the neural units in the central nucleus (CA) layer, against the
different input features.
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Figure 5.12 Line plots of polynomial regressions (order=3) modeling the evolution of the
average value of an agent’s tendencies versus the different input features. This chart has been
drawn in addition to Figure 5.11, because a change in the activation pattern of the CA layer is
reflected as a change in tendencies, and tendencies are easier to interpret in terms of strategy.
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Figure 5.13 This figure shows the line plot of the polynomial regressions (order=3), each
modeling the evolution of the average total activity of the amygdala’s central nucleus (on the
Y-axis) against one of the inputs provided to the controllers during the resources foraging task
(on the X-axis). Given that the amygdala is hypothesized to function as an alarm mechanism,
detecting survival relevant situational features, interrupting ongoing processes, and reallo-
cating cognitive resources (see H1-2 in the introduction to this chapter). Consequently, if the
average total activity of the central nucleus increases for a specific input, it indicates that this
stimulus is significant for the survival of the virtual agent.
foraging experiment described in this chapter, the source code corresponding to the simulation,
as well as both of the controllers is available on Gitlab 1.
1https://gitlab.com/davinellulinvega/epuckvsscheutz.git
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As described in details in Chapter 2 LeDoux (2012) suggests, in his ‘Survival Circuit’ theory,
that emotions are the results of the conscious mind detecting the triggering of a survival circuit.
In addition, LeDoux (2012) also identified a neural structure at the base of the brain, which is
essential to an animal’s survival. This circuit consists of the thalamus, receiving stimuli from
the environment and projecting to the lateral nucleus of the amygdala, the hypothalamus, in
control of the autonomic nervous system, it sends information concerning the internal state
directly to the central nucleus of the amygdala, and finally the amygdala. According to the
many classical conditioning experiments involving the amygdala, it is thought that they play
a major role in processing emotions. However, what type of processing and the underlying
mechanisms are not well-known yet. Before being able to entertain the possibility that virtual
agents can have emotions it is, therefore, necessary to first investigate if the survival circuit
suggested by LeDoux (2012) can be applied to virtual agents and increase their survival
potential. Consequently, I hypothesized that:
H1-1 The circuit identified as essential to an animal’s survival, can also be used by virtual
agents to influence their actions and increase their own survival capabilities.
H1-2 The amygdala acts as the trigger for this survival circuit.
H1-3 This survival circuit, however, is not enough to elicit any emotions. Where emotions are
differentiated, from other mental states, by their ‘arousal’ and ‘valence’ (see Chapter 2).
To investigate the veracity of the different hypotheses, the ProtoEmo architecture was built and
tested on a ‘resource foraging’ task. In this experiment, groups of robots using the ProtoEmo
controller and emotional agents described by Scheutz (2004) had to survive by foraging energy
sources. The robots were also capable of reproducing to increase their population, and of
fighting in case two or more agents wanted to forage the same resource. However, each
agent could not directly decide which action would be performed next, instead it had to rely
on four tendencies to influence the decision-making process. According to the results, the
ProtoEmo architecture was indeed able to improve the survival capabilities of the virtual
agents it controlled. Furthermore, the amygdala was able to detect opportunities relevant to
the agents’ survival. However, it was determined that the amygdala’s central nucleus could not
fulfill the ‘arousal’ part of emotions.
Summary
CHAPTER 6
PrimEmo: Primitive emotions and decision-making in the brain
PrimEmo (shown in Figure 6.1) is the name given to the system born from the aggrega-
tion of: ProtoEmo, the Primary Value Learned Value and the basal ganglia models (whose
detailed descriptions can be found in Section 5.1 and Sub-Section 3.3.2 respectively). While
ProtoEmo was inspired by the survival circuits theory, suggested by LeDoux (2012) (see
Sub-Section 2.6.2), it only implements half of such mechanism. According to LeDoux:
“survival circuits are sensory-motor integrative devices that serve specific
adaptive purposes. They are tuned to detect information relevant to particular
kinds of environmental challenges and opportunities, and they use this information
to control behavioral responses and internal physiological adjustment that help
bring closure to the situation.” — LeDoux (2012, p. 5)
Therefore, as hypothesized in Section 5.1, ProtoEmo only provides the mechanism for de-
tecting stimuli relevant to the survival of virtual agents. If the hypothalamus were to be used
as an output influencing the agent’s internal state, ProtoEmo would also fulfill the role of
‘internal physiological adjustment’ mentioned above. As a consequence, by taking further
advantage of the PVLV’s and basal ganglia’s capabilities, the PrimEmo architecture fully
implements LeDoux’s (2012) survival circuits.











6.1 The PrimEmo architecture 169
6.1 The PrimEmo architecture
As depicted in Figure 6.1, the ProtoEmo architecture introduced in the previous chapter shares
two neural populations with O’Reilly et al.’s (2007) PVLV model: the central nucleus of the
amygdala and the lateral hypothalamic area. The main role of the PVLV is to activate the
dopamine system for innately relevant stimuli or associated ones. Hence, it provides a reward
prediction error signal to its target brain areas. In PrimEmo, the dopamine and serotonin sys-
tems have been merged into a single neural population, whose activation range is [−1,1] instead
of the standard [0,1]. 0 is considered to be the neutral point. Consequently, if the population’s
average activity (denoted a) is strictly positive (a > 0), then the PVLV’s output represents a
reward. Otherwise (for a < 0) the signal is interpreted as a punishment. As was established
in Sub-Section 3.3.2, processing within the PVLV is split between the ‘primary value’ and
the ‘learned value’ systems. O’Reilly et al. (2007) and Hazy et al. (2010) hypothesized the
excitatory components of those mechanisms to be implemented by the lateral hypothalamic
area and the amygdala’s central nucleus, respectively. However, in their model both brain areas
were represented by a single neural population. Hence, restraining the encoding capabilities
of those layers. Due to its design and the fact that its inputs are spread over many processing
stages, ProtoEmo provides a more specific detection of innately relevant stimuli, as well as
those acquired through conditioning. Furthermore, the representation of the amygdala’s basal
and central nuclei into separate layers means that in addition to the saliences provided by
the central nucleus ProtoEmo also sends a ‘novelty’ signal to the PVLV’s striatum. Thus,
complementing the amygdala’s main contribution to the PVLV model. Consistent with the
mathematical model of the Actor-Critic, explored in Sub-Section 3.3.2, the PVLV and basal
ganglia are two independent structures. Their only means of communication is through the
dopamine system, whose activity is controlled by the PVLV. Using its gating mechanism the
basal ganglia decides the next action to perform, based on the current state (both internal and
external) and the expected reward (computed by the PVLV).
Upon receiving a punishment or reward from the environment after execution of a specific
action, the basal ganglia, as well as the PVLV, use the reward prediction error signal to update
the policy and value function, respectively. On the contrary to what has been the case so far, the
basal ganglia system and ProtoEmo architecture do not have any neural population in common,
within PrimEmo. Although, the somatosensory (SSC), pre-frontal (PFC) and motor (MC)
cortices do feed back to the basal and central nuclei of the amygdala (both part of ProtoEmo).
Following LeDoux’s (1986; 1992) suggested model of the ‘two pathways’ to the amygdala
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(explored in Section 4.1) the SSC provides more refined representations of incoming stimuli
used by the central nucleus for conditioning. On the other hand, both PFC and MC project to
the basal nucleus and maintain a context for the amygdala to better process the relevance of a
given stimulus.
Finally, it is important to note that even though the structures making PrimEmo have been
presented in a sequential fashion, they form a recurrent loop. Furthermore, as discussed in
the previous chapter, most of the mechanisms rely themselves on feedback control systems to
operate. Thus, PrimEmo is a recurrent architecture made of smaller control loops, and most
of its activity is asynchronous. As a consequence, for PrimEmo’s output to be useful to an
external program, it needs to be run until it reaches stability. Stability in this case is defined
by the activity of the output layer being the same for more than two cycles. More details
related to the exact structure and implementation of the PrimEmo architecture can be found in
Appendix B.
Although the previous chapter set out to prove that ProtoEmo is quite a capable archi-
tecture in itself, it still lacks the ability to take any definitive decision. Both the amygdala
and hypothalamus are limited to influencing other parts of the brain. PrimEmo, on the other
hand, takes advantage of the basal ganglia’s gating mechanism to control the ‘species-specific’
reaction to an innately triggering stimulus, as mentioned by LeDoux (2012). Furthermore,
through the activity of the merged dopamine and serotonin systems, controlled by the PVLV,
PrimEmo should able to build on ProtoEmo’s saliences to support primitive emotions. As a
complete implementation of LeDoux’s (2012) survival circuits PrimEmo, therefore, should
enable virtual agents to better survive in complex and dynamic environments, in addition to
endowing them with primitive emotions.
In conclusion, the two main hypotheses explored in the remainder of this chapter, can be
expressed as:
H2-1 The use of a system capable of encoding the salience of survival relevant situational
features will enhance the survival capabilities of virtual agents in complex and dynamic
environments.
H2-2 Furthermore, the mechanisms responsible for representing the salience of the survival
relevant situational features will trigger an emotional episode. Emotions are differentiated
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from other mental states, by their level ‘arousal’ and ‘valence’ (see Sub-Section 2.7.3 for
the exact definition of emotion adopted in this thesis).
6.2 Viking Doom: A competition putting PrimEmo to the
test
Having outlined the PrimEmo architecture in the previous section, as well as dedicating a
complete chapter to its different sub-components, this next section describes the experimental
setup designed to observe PrimEmo’s performance in complex and dynamic environments.
When mentioning performance, this thesis is less interested in having PrimEmo demonstrate
its superiority, solving a given task, compared to other state-of-the-art algorithms, than it is in
emphasizing the role emotions play in the decision-making process. As a result of those specific
requirements, a complete game has been designed from the ground up. The need for a task
(and an environment) complex enough to warrant the use of emotions in the decision-making
process, is further reinforced by the fact that despite recent efforts (from companies such as
OpenAI and DeepMind), there is currently a lack of standard framework for training and testing
different types of agents. Here different types is taken to mean agents whose learning process is
based on reinforcement learning, genetic algorithms or other neural network based techniques.
The reasons for choosing a game, rather than a simulation, as a testing ground for the PrimEmo
architecture, will become apparent in the next Sub-Section.
6.2.1 Why a competition rather than a simulation?
Considering that both PVLV and the basal ganglia models (described at length in Sub-
Section 3.3.2) have already been proved capable of solving complex tasks (Atallah et al.,
2004; Collins & Frank, 2013; Frank & Claus, 2006; Girard, Cuzin, Guillot, Gurney, & Prescott,
2003; Gurney et al., 2001b; Gurney, Prescott, Wickens, & Redgrave, 2004; Hazy et al., 2006;
Hazy, Frank, & O’Reilly, 2011; Prescott, Montes González, Gurney, Humphries, & Red-
grave, 2006), the ‘one-resource foraging’ experiment suggested in Chapter 5, would not allow
PrimEmo to demonstrate its full potential. As a consequence, a more involved experiment,
shaped as a game called: ‘Viking Doom’, was implemented. As the name implies, it is a viking
themed roguelike game to be played by virtual agents only. Roguelike are usually characterized
by a party of mortal heroes having to explore and fight their way out of a procedurally generated
dungeon. On the contrary to most other game genre, in a roguelike, when the main character
dies, it is not brought back to life immediately. Instead, the player has to start again from the
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beginning, losing all of his progress so far (a concept usually referred to as ‘permadeath’).
Rooms in the dungeon are represented as a tile-based map, where player and monsters are
allowed to freely roam around. Finally, the actions of both players and non-playing characters
are considered sequentially, by the game engine. The idea behind Viking Doom was to organize
a competition open to the public. By having PrimEmo take part in the competition, it would
be pitched against many different strategies. With enough participants, and therefore data
concerning PrimEmo’s behavior, Viking Doom would provide us with a solid basis to draw
conclusions as to the performances of the PrimEmo architecture.
6.2.2 The game and its website
The Viking Doom project has been split in two parts. The first is the engine containing all the
logic, communication protocols and objects required for playing the actual on-line game. The
second, is an accompanying website, that serves two purposes. It describes the experiment’s
goal, and introduces the rules and the game’s lore. However, its main function is to act as the
display, showing what is happening within the game engine in real time (an example of a game
being displayed on the website is shown in Figure 6.2 and more can be seen in Figure C.1; a
live version of this display is also available in video format 1). The whole project has been
written in Python and is publicly available on Github 2. While the website relies on the Django
framework and its REST extension (Holovaty & Willson, 2017) to do the heavy lifting, the
game engine at its core implements the Actor pattern (first introduced by Hewitt, Bishop,
and Steiger (1973)). By definition, upon receiving a message an actor can only perform a
limited number of actions: 1) modify its internal state, 2) send messages to other actors, 3) and
create new child actors. Since actors do not share any modifiable memory, their only way of
communication is via messages, thus avoiding the need for any lock mechanism. The actor
pattern is therefore ideal for implementing stateful tasks for massively concurrent systems. As
the game engine can be decomposed into a set of independent tasks, that can each be assigned
to a single actor, this allows it to take advantage of the parallel processing capabilities of the
host server. To allow the participants to implement their virtual agents (usually called bots in
this context) using the programming language of their choosing, Viking Doom uses a ‘client /
server’ architecture for the interaction between the game and its players. Thus, one of the actors
making up the game engine, implements a simple HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) server.
To control their heroes, participants send requests to this server, which in turn communicates
with the node in charge of updating the game’s state, to finally have the corresponding hero
1https://youtu.be/yndgfQ2HobM
2https://github.com/casparluc/VikingDoom.git
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Figure 6.2 This figure is a simple example of a Viking Doom game being played, on the front
page of its website. In the middle of the viking themed frame, is the map with the four heroes,
some enemies, mines, markets and items. All the movable elements, such as the heroes, skeleton
units and upgrade caravans, are updated in real time, thanks to the Websocket client handling
the bi-directional communication in the background. At the bottom of the frame, the statistics,
relevant for each of the four heroes, are displayed. The top line is the amount of gold gathered
so far, while the bottom row indicates the level of health.
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move. As an answer to their requests, players receive the new state of the game as a JavaScript
Object Notation (JSON) formatted object. As a consequence, the implemented bots are simple
clients deciding on the next move based on the data received from the game’s server. Due to
the client / server nature of the architecture and the Actor pattern at the core of the engine,
players can move their heroes asynchronously from each other. Consequently, neither players
nor enemies have to wait for others to act before being allowed to do so themselves. Since
the game itself is hosted on a remote server and manages requests from connected clients,
it has to be able to gracefully handle players disconnecting at any point in time. This is the
main reason behind the game having a set pace (the game completes a cycle every second)
and players’ requests being processed asynchronously. However, it also has important conse-
quences for the bots’ design. To win a player has to implement a strategy that strikes a balance
between being complex and it being fast. Finally, in the case of a competition it gives an
advantage to participants with fast Internet connections and a lot of computing power. Never-
theless, those advantages are negligible when compared to the ones afforded by a better strategy.
A typical game is characterized by a maximum number of 1000 cycles, a set of four players,
each controlling its respective hero and a map. Obstacles on the map are static and have been
drawn by hand on the background. To avoid any bot design taking advantage of the map’s
layout, twelve maps have been configured and one out of those is chosen at random at the
beginning of each game. To make things more challenging for the players, upon initialization a
map is populated with:
• Four heroes, one for each of the players taking part in the game. Heroes are characterized
by a level of health, a level of strength and a level of gold. The goal for all heroes is to
gather as much gold as possible, which can be done by either collecting purse and chest
items or by defeating orcs and gaining ownership of many mines. Engaging in combat
has the potential for increasing the hero’s strength level, as a reward for defeating its
opponent, but comes with the cost of losing health in case the hero takes damage. A
simpler, but less cost effective solution for increasing a hero’s strength and regaining
some life is to buy upgrades and potions from the different markets. Upon death (defined
by a level of health equal to zero) a hero loses ownership of his mines and is reincarnated
at his original position. His level of gold and strength, however, remain as they were
before his demise.
• Different enemy units, of which there are three types: skeleton, orc and dragon. The
sprites corresponding to the enemy units can be found on the second row in Figure 6.3.
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Of all the enemy units, skeletons are the weakest, but they are also the only mobile
units. At the end of each turn of the game, all skeletons move in a random direction.
Due to its overwhelming strength there is only one dragon unit per game, which stay in
the same location at all time, patiently waiting for heroes to attack. In terms of enemy
units, the orcs are a bit different in that each unit is tied to a mine. The role of the orcs
is to guard the mines, making it difficult for heroes to acquire them. Regardless of the
type, by defeating an enemy a hero is always reward with both strength and gold units.
Furthermore, dead enemies disappear from the map and are automatically replaced at
the end of each game turn. Each orc being tied to a specific mine, once defeated it will
reappear to guard the interest of its conqueror. Skeletons and dragons, on the other hand,
are scattered randomly around the map.
• An assortment of items to be collected. The type of a specific item is chosen among
the following possibilities: purse, chest and health potion. All three types of items are
depicted on the right of the hero, on the bottom row of Figure 6.3. Upon collection,
both purse and chest items increase the gold level of the hero by a set amount, while
potions heal the hero’s wounds, if any. Collected items are automatically replaced by
other items at the end of each game turn. The locations and types of the new items are
chosen randomly.
• Two types of markets: upgrade caravans, which allow the hero to gain strength in
exchange for some gold, and potion markets, from which health can be purchased. An
example of the sprites for both the market and caravan, as well as the mine, described
below, are shown on the top row of Figure 6.3.
• And finally mines, which can be acquired by defeating the orc guarding them. Once
owned, a mine contributes five units of gold to the owner on each turn of the game.
Even though, the game engine is really the heart of the Viking Doom project, what matters
more for the user is the second part, namely the accompanying website. Although, it is made of
only five pages, the website contains everything a participant would need to understand the
rules of the game and implement his own bot. The home page, welcomed any visitor with a
screen (implemented in JavaScript) displaying one of the games currently taking place (see
Figure 6.2 and Figure C.1 for examples of this display). It also allowed further navigation to
the project’s back story (adding a fantasy element to the whole game) and rules, as well as
a detailed technical documentation explaining the communication protocols and data to be
expected when writing a controller. An on-line form was also included so that new participants
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Figure 6.3 These are the main sprites used in the Viking Doom game. From left to right and top
to bottom they are: the mine guarded by the orc, which provide gold to its owner; the upgrade
caravan, providing strength upgrade to the heroes; and the potion market, where heroes can
replenish their health. On the next line, the different enemies are: the dragon, which is the
most powerful enemy, skeletons, the weakest and most plentiful and finally orcs, that protect the
mines. Finally, the last line contains the different items and an example of a hero. The purse
and chest items both contain gold, but in different amount, while the potion grants some health
back.
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could register as players for the games to come. Each player was attributed a single identi-
fication number upon registration. This helps the game engine to keep track of the relations
between participants and heroes. More importantly, thought, this same number is also used
to link a player to his overall rank. To make the competition more interesting and motivate
visitors to join, a leader board is included below the screen on the home page. Finally, the last
page on this domain explained the reasons behind the Viking Doom project and the goal of
the PhD project it is a part of. More details concerning the interface developed for players
to implement their own virtual agents, as well as the protocol adopted for communicating
between the players and the game engine are presented in Section C.1. Additionally, if you wish
to run your own version of Viking Doom the source code is available for download on GitHub 3.
Despite all the advertisement and the posts on different social platforms, related to AI or
Machine Learning (ML), the competition was not as successful as expected and did not yield
any useful results. Unfortunately, only a few people took part in the month long competition,
but even those were only here to play around and did not make a real attempt at competing with
each other. Still an effort was made to try and still have the PrimEmo architecture compete
against a standard Q-learning algorithm and an Actor-Critic agent. However, it quickly became
apparent that the game setup itself was fatally flawed. Indeed, since the different items were
appearing at random location on the map and a hero only had to stand on a neighboring tile to
collect an item, it means that a valid solution to the problem of gathering gold while staying
alive, is for a hero to simply stand in place, doing nothing until the end of the game. While it is
true that this is a valid solution, it is far from optimal. Furthermore, because this thesis is more
interested in the agent’s strategy than it is in the final level of gold gathered, needless to say
that a motionless hero is not ideal for observing the role of emotions in decision-making. There
is one positive point though. The fact that all three agents, at some point or another, converged
toward this specific solution is interesting in its own right. At any rate, having only a limited
amount of time to complete this experiment, the issue was dropped and the first version of the
Viking Doom project with it.
3https://github.com/casparluc/VikingDoom.git
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alone
Given the limited time frame and available resources implementing a great number of unique
strategies, to push the PrimEmo architecture to its limits, was not realistically feasible. There-
fore, it was decided to rebuild the game engine from the ground up (fixing the previous design
mistakes along the way) and compare the architecture to only two other types of agents: a
Deep Q-learning and an Advantage Actor-Critic (A2C). At the time, those were considered
state of the art in reinforcement learning, but have since been bested by other methods, such
as Proximal Policy Optimization (Schulman, Wolski, Dhariwal, Radford, & Klimov, 2017) or
Deep Deterministic Gradient Descent (Lillicrap et al., 2016). Regardless, the remainder of this
section describes the new game engine, its rules and the different objects populating the map.
6.3.1 A new game engine, a new set of rules
Similar to the first version, Viking Doom is still a viking themed roguelike game, in which
heroes have to gather as much gold as possible, while surviving in a complex and dynamic
environment. Unlike its predecessor,however, this version is much closer to a true roguelike.
Retaining the tile-based map and dungeon crawling elements introduced in the first version,
this new game engine drops the asynchronous communication (and by extent the asynchronous
movements of the heroes) to implement a turn based system and permadeath. As explained
in Sub-Section 6.2.1, permadeath is a video game term describing the fact, that whenever the
main character dies the game is over. Depending on the game, all progress made can be lost
and the player usually has to restart from the beginning. The new game engine adheres to this
idea, which means that when a hero’s health points go down to zero, the hero dies and does
not come back to life. As a consequence, there are two conditions in which the game ends:
1) Either all heroes are dead, 2) or the game has reached 1000 turns. This condition has been
set to prevent games from running indefinitely. For a game a turn is defined by the execution of
the following sequence of events:
1. Observe the environment’s state and provide the features describing this state to all heroes
taking part in the game.
2. Each player then decides what action his respective hero should perform next, based
on the provided features. The players’ decisions are sent to the engine. Once all action
requests have been gathered, the engine considers them in random order. This is to avoid
any player taking advantage of the sequential nature of the main loop.
6.3 Viking Doom version 2.0: Experimenting with PrimEmo alone 179
3. A player can only choose an action from among the following five: Up, Down, Left,
Right and Idle. If he chooses to move in one of the four directions, the game engine tries
to move the hero. Invalid moves (moving on an obstacles or out of the map) are still
considered as action. After each movement and before ending its turn, a hero collects any
item present on the tile. In case a player decides not to move his hero (done by requesting
Idle), the game engine will automatically try to make it fight against either the closest
hero or the closest enemy unit, if any. Otherwise, the hero does nothing and the turn
ends.
4. To allow heroes to run away from a fight their actions are considered first. After all
heroes are done moving around, fighting or idling, it is time for any enemy units that
can act to do so. As will be detailed later, there are two types of enemy units that
can move around to target heroes passing by: skeletons and dragons. The actions of
enemy units are considered in a similar fashion, movement first, battle next. For static
enemies, such as Trolls, the movement part is entirely skipped, hence living them with
only two possibilities: fighting or doing nothing. Dead enemy units are removed from
the environment on this step as well.
5. The whole environment having moved a step forward, new enemy units and items are
scattered around the map if necessary, before ending this game’s turn and moving on to
the next.
Even though, the asynchronous nature of the game engine was restricted via the imple-
mentation of a main sequential loop, the architecture at its core still relies on multiprocessing
to take full advantage of the processing capabilities of the CPU executing the program and
overall accelerate the experiment. In fact both the players, controlling the heroes, as well as the
enemy units are executed in child processes, which communicate with the game engine via a
set of queues. This not only facilitate the development of new controllers for the heroes, it also
allows for them to learn and decide of the next action, simultaneously. The same is true for the
different mobile enemy units. Parallelizing any independent task means that the game engine
spends less time waiting for requests and more time actually moving the game forward.
6.3.2 Designing a complex and dynamic environment
The description of the main loop in the previous Sub-Section, makes it look like the game
engine is doing all the heavy lifting, when in fact it is the environment’s responsibility to
manage all the objects populating it. While the game engine orchestrate the communication
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between the different processes and manages the controllers (linked to the different heroes), the
environment handles the actual game. The environment is in the ideal position to perform this
task, since it contains and has access to all the objects that appear on the map.
As backdrop for the adventure happening within the environment, a tiled map of size 10 by
10 is used. On the contrary to the first version of the Viking Doom project, obstacles are not
hand drawn on the map, they are defined in a configuration file and later rendered over the map.
Although the first steps of the experiment use a smaller map, the full game is intended to be
played on a 50 by 50 grid. To simplify the rendering process the different types of obstacles
(tree, water, house, lava, rock and grass) present in the previous version have been abandoned
in favor of a single type, represented by a stylized rock tile. Furthermore, the edges of the map
are also considered as obstacles or rather tiles that should not be stepped on. This will become
important later on, when describing the formula used for computing the reward for an agent’s
action. Sub-Section C.2.1 shows an example of configuration file, as well as explains how each
parameter influences the map’s design.
6.3.3 Danger and incentives
To make the game more complex, dynamic and, therefore, more interesting in terms of strategy,
incentives and dangers have been introduced in the form of items to collect and enemy units
to avoid or fight. To avoid any strategy where the hero can ‘win’ the game without having to
move, to collect an item or fight an enemy the hero has to stand on the same tile as the other
object. Furthermore, items and enemies cannot be initialized on an already occupied tile.
Only two types of items can be found on the map. Gold items, such as purse or chest, when
collected increase the hero’s level of gold. This item type has been introduced to create a dense
virtual reward from which the different reinforcement learning based controllers can efficiently
learn.
The second item type is the health potion. As the name implies, collecting this kind of
item increases the hero’s health. This item is a required resource for the hero’s survival. Since
fighting implies taking damage, potions are the only way a hero can get back a portion of its
health and avoid death. Collecting those items then is a real incentive, compared to collecting
gold ones.
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In the viking doom project, danger comes in the shape of different enemy units. As is the
case for the items, there are three different types of enemies, characterized by their level of
health and strength. The weakest of them all are the skeletons. Skeletons are intended to be the
entry-level enemy units that heroes meet early on in the game. Since they are quite weak, it
allows the controllers to experiment with different strategies to deal with enemies. However, to
avoid repeating the same mistake as in the first version of this project (where a player could
gather gold and fight enemies by simply staying still for the whole game), the behavior of
skeleton units are not random anymore. Instead, each unit is assigned an initial position and
an area of effect. Whenever a hero is within the area of effect, it becomes a target and the
skeleton moves toward the hero’s position, looking for a fight. If the hero dies, or exit the
area of effect, the skeleton goes back to its initial position and waits for another hero to come by.
The next type of enemy is the troll. As the orcs in the previous version, trolls are found
close to the mines that they guard. In this version, however, mines have no purpose and are
only present for the sake of presentation. Trolls are further characterized by the fact that they
are static. This means that for a hero to fight with a troll, it has to voluntarily step on the tile
the troll is already occupying. The main reason for introducing this kind of enemy unit, which
is not all that threatening, is to create virtual obstacles or bottlenecks in some areas of the map.
The final and strongest opponent a hero can encounter on the map, are dragons. Dragons
are quite the fierce opponents capable of ending the life of any hero in only four turns. Dragons
have the exact same behavior as skeleton units. As a result of their massive built, however,
dragons have slower movements. This means that they can only move every two turns of the
game. Still, they can fight on every game turn.
During a fight, the amount of damage dealt is equal to the enemy’s strength level and is
subtracted from the hero’s current health level. Furthermore, upon death the enemy unit is
deleted from the map, by the environment, and replaced on the next game’s turn. The different
sprites used for representing the enemy units, as well as the heroes and items remain the same as
the ones shown on the two bottom rows of Figure 6.3. Additional details required to implement
the full game engine are described in Sub-Section C.2.2.
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6.3.4 Heroes and controllers
With the environment firmly in place, it is time to focus on the main character of this game,
namely the hero and its associated controller. As mentioned in Sub-Section 6.3.1, to minimize
the time required to go through a single turn of the game, the engine takes advantage of the
multiprocessing capabilities afforded by the Python language and the multi-core architecture of
the host’s CPU. As such any task that could be independently run has been delegated to a child
process, managed by the engine. Controllers are such tasks. Indeed, once the environment
has moved one step forward, each controller can independently observe the new input state
(made of both the environment’s and corresponding hero’s states), learn and decide on the
next action to perform. Rather than having controllers wait for each others’ decisions and
waist precious compute time, it is more efficient to implement them in different processes.
Upon initialization each controller is attributed: 1) a hero, which in a sense embodies the
controller, 2) and two queues, used for communicating with the game engine. One for receiv-
ing the environment’s state on each turn and the other to send the next action to the game engine.
The last entity appearing on the map, but not described so far is the hero. A hero is a simple
container, managed by the environment and read by its associated controller. It is characterized
by a level of health, a level of strength and a level of gold gathered so far. The environment,
however, also tracks the number of items collected for each item type, as well as the number
of enemies fought, for each enemy type. To easily keep track of those numbers for each hero
on the map, the different counters are all stored within the hero itself. Upon initialization, a
hero has 100 units of health, a single unit of strength and no gold. A hero can only move Up,
Down, Left or Right one tile at a time, or remain Idle for a turn. In case the controller decides
that its hero should remain Idle, the game engine will automatically check for the possibility
of having the hero fight against either an enemy or another hero. If none of the above can be
applied, then the hero will truly stand still for a turn. However, to avoid any problems with
heroes idling for too long, the reward provided to the controller’s learning process, includes a
−0.001 term. This term is a sort of incentive for the hero to always move and at the very least
explore its environment. For animals, this could be interpreted as the cost in energy to maintain
the body’s homeostasis.
In addition to being implemented as processes, all controllers within the Viking Doom
project are required to inherit from a generic interface. A simple and common Application
Programming Interface (API) has been designed to ensure that any controller, that wishes to
play the game, has access to exactly the same information (concerning the state of both the
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environment and associated hero). In the context of this thesis, a common API means that all
experimental parameters are the same for all controllers, and only the learning and decision
processes can affect the outcome of the game. In addition to ensuring that all things are equal
for everyone, this generic interface also implements a standard loop for the hero. The generic
controller loop, repeats the following steps until either the end of the game or the death of the
associated hero:
1. Based on the current or initial state of the environment and that of the associated hero,
decide the next action to perform. The chosen action is then sent to the game engine.
2. Next the controller waits for the environment to move forward. Once this is done,
the game engine broadcasts the environment object, containing the new state, to all
controllers.
3. From this environment object the controller extracts the input features, which are then
used by both the learning and decision-making processes.
4. Based on the same environment, the controller also computes the reward associated with
the action chosen on the first step.
5. Finally, using the different extracted input features and the computed reward, the con-
troller learns from its mistakes.
6. To be able to extract any strategy or observe the role of emotions in the decision-making
process, an additional step has been introduced. This last step monitors the state of both
the environment and the hero. All monitored data are written to an external file for further
processing to extract the results discussed in the next section.
Even though a standard control loop has been implemented for all child classes, a specific
controller can still overwrite this loop to fulfill more specific needs.
As mentioned multiple times already, the decision-making and learning process rely on the
environment’s state and the levels of the hero’s attributes. More precisely, the input features
extracted by the controller on each loop are:
• Enemies: For the two nearest enemies, the controller is told about their positions, as
well as their respective health and strength levels. Knowing the enemies’ positions is
fundamental for the controller to be able to avoid such danger. Rather than dedicated
a single flag to determine the type of enemy, providing both the health and strength
means that each hero can decide to either fight or flee, depending on its own internal state.
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Consequently, a hero at full health and strength could very well decide, for example, to
try defeating a dragon already been weakened by someone else.
• Items: The positions of the two nearest gold items and health items are provided to the
controller as part of the environment’s state. For the gold items, however, the controller
is not told of their values (a purse is worth 5 gold and a chest 25). This is so that, when
making a decision the agent cannot expect a set reward, and each choice has to be made
based on past experience and a careful evaluation of the situation.
• Heroes: If any heroes are present, other than the one managed by the current controller,
the positions, health, strength and gold levels of the two nearest are extracted from the
environment’s state. Similar to the enemies, a controller has to know the exact location
of any potential dangers to be able to avoid them. Although heroes are not separated in to
different types, their levels of strength and health can evolve during a game. Therefore,
for a controller to decide whether it should fight or avoid a given hero, it has to know if it
can be defeated (this depends on its strength and health) and if this is worth the risk (this
is indicated by its gold level).
• Obstacles: To avoid the current hero getting trapped in an inescapable situation, the
positions of the three nearest obstacles are given to the controller.
• Current Hero: Finally, the hero’s internal state is represented by its levels of strength,
health and gold. The hero’s current position is not required and might lead to controllers
learning the exact position of every event, rather than generalizing from experience.
It should be noted that the different positions described above are all relative to the hero’s
current position. This is to avoid having to provide the current hero’s position in addition to
all the other inputs and hopefully make it easier for the controllers down the line, since none
of them will have to learn how to compute the relative location of a given object. Moreover,
to avoid any gradient explosion, when using the back-propagation algorithm for learning, all
features have been normalized to the range [0,1].
The last element, that the generic controller computes and provides to the specific con-
trollers (detailed in the next Sub-Section), is the reward. For each action taken by the hero, a
corresponding reward is computed based on the new state of both the environment and the hero.
The general idea behind the formula used for computing the reward is primarily to guide the
controllers toward the game’s main goal: collecting as much gold as possible, while staying
for as long as possible. However, along the way some hints are also given to the controllers to
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facilitate the learning process. That is the main reason behind the inclusion of both the health
and strength levels in the reward. Strength is used to signal the controller that enemies can
be defeated and the more you do the stronger the enemies you can take on. Health, on the
other hand, acts as both a punishment and a reward. Heroes are rewarded for collecting potions,
which increase their health, but punished for fighting against enemies and with each others (an
activity that decreases a hero’s level of health). Health, more than gold and strength, teaches
the controllers about the different dangers and how to survive in this complex and dynamic
environment. The final formula used for computing the reward normalizes its value to the range











Where Xcurr and Xprev correspond to the variable’s current (t) and previous (t − 1) values,
respectively. Furthermore, as mentioned above a −0.001 term has been added to the reward to
force controllers to optimize their paths between rewards and avoid any strategies, where the
hero survives by simply staying idle for the whole game.
Given the limited resources available and time frame for running the experiment, comparing
PrimEmo to a great number of unique strategies was not feasible anymore. Therefore, it was
decided to compare the architecture to only two other types of virtual agents. The first one
controlled by a Deep Q-learning algorithm, while the second one implements an Advantage
Actor-Critic (A2C). The specifics required for the exact implementation of those controllers are
presented in Sub-Section C.2.3.
For the PrimEmo architecture, the learning process is not as straight forward as the other
standard models. This is mostly due to the fact that within PrimEmo there are many recurrent
connections, as depicted in Figure 6.1. Although, a version of the backpropagation algorithm
exists, which is compatible with recurrent units, such as Long Short-Term Memory (Hochreiter
& Schmidhuber, 1997) and Gated Recurrent Unit (Cho et al., 2014), it requires each recurrent
loop to stop after a given number of steps and for the user to keep track of the network’s
state at each time steps to be able to compute the error. However, in PrimEmo’s case the
controller waits until the output activity is stable, before making a decision. Here, the stability
of the output layer is defined as: each neuron having the same activation value (down to
a certain precision) on two following cycles. Since it is impossible to predict how many
time steps it will take to reach such equilibrium, learning via backpropagation is not feasible.
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Furthermore, keeping track of all the network’s states would require a huge amount of memory
and processing power, thus rendering the whole process ineffective and quite costly. As an
alternative to backpropagation, a simple Genetic Algorithm (GA) has been implemented. As a
metaheuristic GAs have some advantages over the standard backpropagation:
1. While backpropagation based methods, can easily get trapped within local optimums,
thanks to the way they explore the space of possible solutions GAs are capable of back
tracking to find a path to the global optimum. However, GAs are very slow to converge
to said optimum, if they converge at all.
2. Since GAs use a simple fitness term, attached to each individual a given population, for
their selection process, it means that individuals can be evaluated independently from
each other. This in turn means that GAs are massively parallelizable and, therefore, cost
effective, when run on high performance computers.
3. From a more subjective point of view, GAs are easier to implement and debug. This,
though, is becoming decreasingly relevant, because of the increasing availability of
libraries such as PyTorch and Tensorflow, which handle the heavy lifting.
4. Finally, even though some scientists have tried to map backpropagation to learning
processes within the brain, it is still a divisive topic within the scientific community.
Thus, GAs, which are actually inspired by the theory of evolution, are more biologically
plausible. Moreover, using GAs for learning within the PrimEmo architecture draws
a nice parallel between animals evolving emotions to survive and now virtual agents
evolving emotions of their own.
Due to its ease of use and its efficiency in scaling computation across multiple nodes, the
DEAP library introduced in Sub-Section 5.2.3 was used once again to implement PrimEmo’s
learning process. Finally, considering that all three architectures (DQN, A2C and PrimEmo)
have been built in populations of neural units and to simplify the implementation process all
controllers use the Keras framework (Chollet, 2015), backed by the Tensorflow library (Abadi
et al., 2015), for the different neural layers. More details on the exact implementation of both
the PrimEmo controller, as well as the Genetic Algorithm used for the learning process are
available in Appendix B. Furthermore, the source code corresponding to the Viking Doom
project, as well as all the controllers described so far, can be found on Gitlab 4.
4https://gitlab.com/davinellulinvega/vikingdoomv2.git
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6.3.5 A display to monitor the learning process
A problem that arose quite late in the first Viking Doom experiment was due to the controllers
(all three of them) exploiting the randomness built into the first version of the environment. As
described in Section 6.2, the goal for all controllers was to find the optimal strategy allowing
them to collect as much gold as possible, while staying out of harms way (survival was not an
issue at the time). However, because the different mines, a player could own, were providing a
constant source of reward, and because the movements of the different enemy units were truly
random, as opposed to limited to a given area, it created an unfortunate chain of circumstances,
where a locally optimal strategy was to just stay put and wait for gold chests and purses to
appear around the player. Since the number of gold items within the environment was higher
than the number of mobile enemy units, the probability of getting attacked, while standing on a
single tile, was quite low compared to having an item appear in one of the four neighboring
tiles. In and out of itself, it is quite interesting to see that all three controllers managed to learn
a similar sub-optimal strategy, given the same environment and set of rules. For the purpose of
this research project, though, it makes for very poor results and needed to be addressed.
Two solutions have been put forth to remedy this issue. The first one was to rethink Viking
Doom’s design from the ground up. This resulted in the game described in Section 6.3, in
which mobile enemy units are tied to a certain area of attack and gold items cannot appear
on the same tile as a hero. As a result, if the hero does not move, its environment remains
unchanged and no reward is received. In fact, a −0.001 term has even been added to the
reward formula (see Equation 6.1) to prevent this scenario from happening again. The second
solution was to implement a display (an example of which is shown in Figure 6.4), so that
the user can visually monitor what the controller is currently doing. The rationale behind
this display is, that for a human it should be quite easy to notice if a controller is developing
some peculiar strategy, like not moving at all. As can be seen in Figure 6.4, the display is
very simple. Its goal is only to show the latest state of the environment, not to interact with
the experiment. Considering that the experiment is going to be run on a high performance
computer (HPC), the display is build on top of a client server architecture. The server part
is living, on the HPC, right next to the game engine, which feeds the server up to date in-
formation concerning the game’s state. The server is then in charge of simply sending this
data to all connected clients. Between the server and its clients bidirectional communication
relies on SocketIO, a Python websocket framework. Thanks to the capabilities afforded by
SocketIO, clients can connect to a server from anywhere in the word, as long as there is an
Internet connection. No login is required. On the client side, the actual display is managed
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Figure 6.4 An example of the display built for monitoring a game of Viking Doom. A live
version of this display can also be seen at the following url: https: / / www .youtube .com/
channel/ UCXALLsPnKf1cNJOopIPAKNw
6.4 Results 189
Table 6.1 In this table are detailed the different statistics corresponding to the average life span
of each controller.
mean count std ci95_hi ci95_lo
ctrl
A2C 325.212 400 326.366 357.196 293.229
DQN 718.500 400 394.887 757.199 679.801
PrimEmo 327.935 400 349.940 362.229 293.641
Random 139.007 400 142.326 152.955 125.060
via Pyglet. Pyglet is a windowing and multimedia library, which allows to easily instantiate a
window and build within it complex animations. Owing to this display, one can easily moni-
tor what is currently happening within a game, whether it is running locally or on a remote HPC.
6.4 Results
When considering the performances of the PrimEmo controller compared to the other two
competitors, it is expected to have similar results to the ones using an Advantage Actor-Critic,
but better than those controlled by the Deep Q-learning algorithm. The logic behind this
statement stems from the fact that by definition the DQN learning process only updates its
value function (as explained in Section 3.2) and has a fixed policy. On the contrary, both
PrimEmo and the A2C simultaneously optimize their value function and policy (as detailed
in Section 3.3 and 6.1). They are, therefore, able to change their strategies on the fly and
possibly take advantage of environmental features to build a better solution to the task. Since
the PrimEmo architecture and A2C model operate on the same principles, they should perform
similarly. For this particular implementation (detailed in Appendix B), PrimEmo may have a
slight edge over the agents using the A2C model, because of the difference in depth. Indeed,
for this experiment, the A2C has been implemented in a network made of six layers, whereas
PrimEmo has 20. Thus, in theory, PrimEmo is capable of extracting more features or concepts
from the same sensory inputs, than the A2C. Consequently, with more detailed information to
rely on PrimEmo, should devise a different and possibly better strategy.
Looking at Figure 6.5 and Table 6.1, it seems that both the prediction above and Hypothesis
2-1 might be entirely misled. Indeed, in Figure 6.5, as well as in Table 6.1 the DQN controller
clearly has better survival capabilities than both the A2C and PrimEmo, which are performing
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Figure 6.5 Bar chart representing the average life span of a hero for each of the four controllers:
DQN, A2C, PrimEmo, and a controller choosing a random action on each cycle. The error
bar represent the 95% confidence interval.
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(a) Regardless of its environment, the hero first
moves in one direction (left in this case).
(b) On the next game cycle, the hero moves back
in the opposite direction.
(c) This loop repeats for tens of game cycles. (d) Before the hero is again able to move in a more
reasonable fashion.
Figure 6.6 A storyboard illustrating the oscillatory behavior displayed by the DQN controller.
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Table 6.2 This table details the statistics describing the total reward each controller received
during game.
mean count std min max ci95_hi ci95_lo
ctrl
A2C 26.220 400 39.710 -61.349 151.951 30.112 22.329
DQN -16.036 400 19.489 -96.437 10.801 -14.126 -17.946
PrimEmo -6.438 400 8.238 -27.838 34.070 -5.631 -7.246
Random -7.222 400 5.214 -15.039 18.265 -6.711 -7.732
Table 6.3 This table details the statistics describing the number of fights each controller has
been involved in during a game.
mean count std ci95_hi ci95_lo
ctrl
A2C 0.009 130485 0.097 0.010 0.009
DQN 0.572 287800 1.401 0.577 0.567
PrimEmo 0.640 131574 1.076 0.646 0.634
Random 1.970 56003 2.932 1.994 1.946
better than random, but still very poorly. However, the videos showing a typical game for each
of the controller type 5, tell a different story. From these it appears that the DQN controller
either has not had the time to learn a complete strategy, or has already overwritten part of its
initial strategy because it did not have enough neural units to store it in full. Either way, it
seems that the only reason behind the DQN’s longevity is that it displays oscillatory behaviors.
At some point in the game, the hero controlled by the DQN algorithm moves back and forth
between the same two tiles for hundreds of cycles before continuing (see Figure 6.6 for a
representation of the DQN’s oscillatory behavior). The rest of the time it manages to mostly
stay out of harms way, but does not optimize its path toward the closest gold item or even try to
avoid fighting enemies. As a result, even though the DQN has a longer life span than any other
controllers, its overall performance shown in Figure 6.7, and in more details in Table 6.2, ends
up being worse than that of the random controller. Consequently, the remainder of this section
will focus solely on the results from the A2C and PrimEmo architectures.
5see: https://youtu.be/sG_weRLOhZQ for PrimEmo, https://youtu.be/RHE2DJM1MCA for the DQN,
https://youtu.be/_8M6KnuJgSM for the A2C and finally https://youtu.be/rekPM-9K3sI for the random
controller, as a comparison
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Figure 6.7 Violin plot representing both the average total reward for each of the four controller,
as well as the distribution of the total rewards for all the games played.
194 PrimEmo: Primitive emotions and decision-making in the brain
Figure 6.8 Graph displaying the average number of time a hero fights during a game, for each
of the four controllers. The error bar represent the 95% confidence interval.
6.4 Results 195
Figure 6.9 Diagram displaying the average number of potions each controller picks up during
a game. The error bar represent the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 6.10 Chart depicting the average number of gold chests each controller collects within
a game. The error bar represent the 95% confidence interval. To win a game in Viking Doom a
hero has to amass as much gold as possible, while staying alive.
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Table 6.4 This table details the statistics describing the number of potions each controller
gathered during a game.
mean count std ci95_hi ci95_lo
ctrl
A2C 5.164 130485 5.552 5.194 5.134
DQN 0.833 287800 1.288 0.837 0.828
PrimEmo 1.683 131574 2.251 1.695 1.671
Random 1.304 56003 2.255 1.323 1.286
Table 6.5 This table details the statistics describing the number of gold items each controller
gathered during a game.
mean count std ci95_hi ci95_lo
ctrl
A2C 40.970 130485 34.875 41.159 40.780
DQN 2.944 287800 2.686 2.954 2.935
PrimEmo 10.711 131574 8.658 10.758 10.664
Random 6.551 56003 6.146 6.602 6.500
By analyzing the videos mentioned above, as well as Figures 6.8 — 6.10 and Tables 6.3
— 6.5, it is interesting to see that PrimEmo and the A2C controller have adopted opposite
strategies. Indeed, on the one hand, A2C seems to be focused on gathering as much gold as
possible and as quickly as possible, but at the cost of its hero’s life. This is best illustrated by
the fact that, although the A2C almost never fights (as shown in Figure 6.8 and Table 6.3), it
is by far the controller that collects the most potion on average per game (see Figure 6.9 and
Table 6.4). This might be surprising at first. However, a typical game cycle has the heroes act
before the enemy units. This is so that heroes have the possibility to run away from a fight.
What the A2C is doing in this case is quite the opposite. Since dragon units are moving at
half the speed of a hero, whenever one of them is blocking the path to the nearest chest, rather
than going around, the A2C chooses to step on the same tile as the enemy unit. As a result,
the enemy performs an attack on the same turn, damaging the hero. On the next turn, the hero
simply runs away in the direction of the closest chest without ever fighting (see Figure 6.11 for
an illustration of the A2C controller’s strategy). Once the hero’s health reaches a certain level,
the A2C simply collects one or more potion items before moving on to the next gold item (see
Figure 6.13 for a depiction of this behavior). It is quite an effective strategy, since the A2C
manages to place first not only in terms of gold gathered, but also in terms of average total
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reward per game, even if it is at the expense of the hero’s well being.
On the other hand, PrimEmo seem to favor avoiding enemy units over collecting gold
items. It is important to note that, given the difference in processing speed (clearly apparent in
the videos) PrimEmo has had less time to refine its strategy and still shows signs of moving
randomly at times. This is reinforced by Figure 6.7 and Table 6.2, which shows that PrimEmo’s
overall performance is similar to that of the random controller. Pieces of a strategy can still be
observed, since whenever PrimEmo finds itself near an enemy it tries to avoid it at all costs
as depicted in Figure 6.12. If a battle is inevitable and the hero is damaged, PrimEmo will
instruct it to move toward and collect the closest potion, to replenish its life as illustrated in
Figure 6.13.
Even though, PrimEmo did not manage to learn as much as A2C, it is already quite an
achievement for PrimEmo to be able to reach an average life span similar to heroes controlled
by the A2C algorithm, which at the time of this implementation was considered state-of-the-art
in reinforcement learning. Regarding Hypothesis 2-1, as disappointing as it may be, this means
that it is impossible for the moment to give any definitive answer, since PrimEmo did not
significantly outperform both DQN and A2C, but was not defeated either. However, given more
time to optimize its strategy, it is certainly possible that PrimEmo could improve its overall
performance, by gathering more gold and extending its hero’s average life span.
Concentrating on Hypothesis 2-2, it could be assumed that the conclusions drawn in Sec-
tion 5.3 remain valid and, thus, only the second half of the hypothesis needs to be tested.
However, this assumption is unsustainable because the context in which the amygdala operates
has changed drastically. As shown in Figure 6.1, the amygdala receives input connections
not only from the hypothalamus and thalamus, but also from the different cortical areas (from
the somatosensory cortex to the central nucleus, and from both the pre-frontal and the motor
cortices to the basal nucleus). As such, the information available to the amygdala is much more
complex in PrimEmo, than it was in ProtoEmo. Therefore, it needs to be determined whether
or not the amygdala is still responsible for detecting the salient features of a given situation
and, hence, in charge of the ‘arousal’ portion of emotions.
According to the top row of Figure 6.14 showing a polynomial regression (order=3) between
the average activity of the central nucleus (CA) layer and the different input features, it appears
that for at least the first four columns (concerned with the distances between the hero, the enemy
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(a) The hero deliberately moves on the same tile as
the dragon.
(b) On the same game cycle, the dragon attacks.
(c) On the next game cycle, the hero runs away. (d) While the dragon is idle, the hero moves toward
the gold chest.
Figure 6.11 A storyboard describing the main steps in the strategy implemented by the A2C
controller.
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Figure 6.12 A figure depicting the strategy employed by the PrimEmo architecture, when it
comes to dealing with an enemy.
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(a) The hero deliberately moves on the same tile as
the dragon.
(b) On the same game cycle, the dragon attacks.
(c) On the next game cycle, the hero defeats the
dragon.
(d) The hero first collects the potion item to replen-
ish its health, then moves toward the gold chest.
Figure 6.13 A storyboard representing a common strategy adopted by both the A2C and
PrimEmo controllers. When the hero’s health drops under a certain threshold, both controllers
seem to prioritize collecting health items over gold ones.
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Figure 6.14 Diagram showing the different polynomial regressions (order = 3) between the
activities of the amygdala’s central nucleus (CA), the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and the
different input features: the distance to the two nearest enemy units, the distance to the two
nearest gold items, the distance to the two nearest health potions, and finally the current hero’s
health level. The shadow around each line plot represent the 95% confidence interval.
units and the gold items) the amygdala is indeed capable of detecting information relevant to
both the hero’s survival and its goal. Concerning the top row of the fifth and sixth columns,
showing the evolution of the average CA activity against the distances to the two closest potion
items, the negative correlation does not seem to be as strong. This is surprising, since potions
being related to the hero’s health should be quite valuable and, therefore, should trigger a burst
of activity within the CA layer the closer the hero is to them. This could be explained by either
PrimEmo needing a longer learning phase, or the data from the last column, which focus on
the hero’s health level. In this last facet, the CA layer is shown to have its highest activity,
whenever the hero is at full life, while a decrease in health is accompanied by a decrease in
activity. This is surprising not only because it means that PrimEmo does not value the life of
its hero very highly, but also because it goes against the strategy extrapolated from the video
and highlighted above. However, if the hero’s health is indeed not a priority for PrimEmo,
then it would make sense for the amygdala to not react to the potion items. The top row’s last
diagram, might also help shed some light on the results concerning the ventral tegmental area.
With respect to Hypothesis 2-2 the amygdala was not capable of fulfilling its role. Moreover, it
only aroused the rest of the architecture for some of the features relevant to the hero’s survival,
failing to detect the most important one: the level of health.
Given what is already known about the Ventral Tegmental Area (VTA) in animals (see
Chapter 3), it is expected of the VTA layer to have a similar function within PrimEmo. More
precisely, if the VTA layer is to predict the error in expected reward, then it should be positively
correlated to the distance between the hero and the two nearest enemies, and to the level of
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health, meaning that the closer PrimEmo is to an enemy, the lower the reward. The same holds
true for the evolution of the reward in regard to the hero’s health.
In contrast, the VTA’s activation value should be negatively correlated to the distance
between the hero and both the two closest potions and the two closest gold items. Hence,
the closer a hero gets to an item the more appealing the state. However, the results of the
polynomial regression (order=3) in the bottom row of Figure 6.14 do not fully match those
predictions. As highlighted above it appears that, during the learning phase, PrimEmo focused
mainly on preserving the hero’s life. As a result, the VTA’s activity is clearly decreasing
the closer a hero gets to an enemy unit. Remarkably, however, the VTA’s activation values
are also positively correlated to the distances between the hero and both the gold and potion
items. It is especially surprising for the potions, since this would indicate that heroes should be
running away from health items, while in the video PrimEmo was able to collect many of them
without too much trouble. For the gold items, on the other hand, it further supports the fact that
PrimEmo has not had the time to optimize its strategy. It also serves as an explanation for the
random behaviors observed when a hero was near a chest. Since the CA layer only activates
when the hero is at full health or far away from any potion items, as discussed above, it follows
that the VTA would only activate and learn from those same situations. Hence, the polynomial
regressions for the average VTA activation value, are only a consequence of activity of the CA
layer. Consequently, because it was concluded earlier that the amygdala did not function as
expected, it is only natural for the VTA layer to perform poorly as well. In regard to Hypothesis
2-2, this means that the VTA could not fulfill its role either.
Unfortunately, in its current state PrimEmo cannot trigger an emotional episode. Never-
theless, taking into account the fact that none of the controllers were able to complete their
learning phase, it is impressive for PrimEmo to perform so well already, especially when
compared to the A2C algorithm. It is, therefore, safe to speculate that, given more time to
refine its strategy, PrimEmo would probably outperform the A2C controller. In so doing, both
the amygdala and ventral tegmental area would also learn to perform their respective function
more appropriately. Hence, validating Hypothesis 2-2 in the process.
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To give it power over the decision-making process, and further increase its survival capabili-
ties, the ProtoEmo architecture described in Chapter 5 has been integrated with O’Reilly et
al.’s (2007) ‘Primary Value Learned Value’ mechanism and with the basal ganglia system,
responsible for decision-making in the brain (see Chapter 3), resulting in the PrimEmo ar-
chitecture. Given the increase in complexity and available information for the amygdala, I
hypothesized that:
H2-1 The use of a system capable of encoding the salience of survival relevant situational
features will enhance the survival capabilities of virtual agents in complex and dynamic
environments.
H2-2 Furthermore, the mechanisms responsible for representing the salience of the survival
relevant situational features will trigger an emotional episode. Emotions are differenti-
ated from other mental states, by their level ‘arousal’ and ‘valence’ (see Sub-Section 2.7.3
for the exact definition of emotion adopted in this thesis).
To test the performances of the PrimEmo architecture in complex and dynamic environments,
as well as explore the validity of the different hypotheses, a game called ‘Viking Doom’ has
been created. Furthermore, two other controllers have been introduced as a comparison. The
first one uses a ‘Deep Q-Learning’ (DQN) algorithm, while the second one implements an
‘Advantage Actor-Critic’ (A2C) model. In ‘Viking Doom’ each controller is responsible for a
hero, which can move in four directions (up, down, left and right) or stay idle. The goal for all
heroes is to gather as much gold as possible before the end of the game, while staying alive. To
do that, the different controllers have to build a strategy optimized for collecting gold items
and avoiding as much as possible any fight with enemy units. Collecting items or fighting with
enemies happens automatically, whenever a hero finds itself on the same tile as an item or an
enemy unit, respectively. From the results gathered during this experiment, it was clear that
none of the controllers were able to learn a complete strategy. This is best exemplified by the
DQN controller, which displayed oscillatory behaviors during its testing phase. Focusing on
PrimEmo and the A2C algorithm, although the latter had a much better overall performance,
both controllers had similar average life spans. This means that because PrimEmo did not
outperform A2C in terms of survival, hypothesis H2-1 was deemed invalid for the moment.
However, given that PrimEmo had less time to refine its strategy and that it still performed
comparably to the A2C model, it is suspected that with some improvement hypothesis H2-1
could be verified. Finally, even though the average overall activity for the amygdala’s central
nucleus had the right correlations with the input features, the layer corresponding to the ventral
tegmental area was not able to learn the correct values for the different situations encountered




In conclusion to this thesis, this last chapter takes a look back at this project. First synthesizing
its content, to then be able to clearly answer the research hypothesis, formulated in the
introductory chapter, that guided this endeavor. It then explores the different contributions
brought forth by the experimental results gathered and architectures designed during this
journey. Finally, possible future extensions to the work presented in this thesis are highlighted,
before the concluding statement.
7.1 Scope of this thesis
The overall goal of this project was to understand the role of emotions in the decision-making
process, as well as investigate the brain regions involved. Since it is believed that emotions
are widespread among the animal kingdom, and because nature usually does not like to waste
energy on non beneficial systems, it means that emotions have some evolutionary advantage.
Otherwise, they would be a much rarer trait or even extinct already.
However, before even beginning to think about the influence emotions have over the rest
of the brain, it is important to survey the field of affective science to understand what sets
an emotion apart from any other neural activity. Chapter 2, therefore, covered the history
of emotions. How they were conceptualized, from ancient Greece, to Descartes and finally
to today. Three school of thoughts were explored in more details, because of their current
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prominence. Section 2.4 focused on the appraisal theory, which view emotions as state of
mind labeled by a cognitive system. Using the tools afforded by mathematics, especially
statistics, dimensional theories usually consider emotions to be a point in a dimensional space.
Section 2.5 detailed some of the dimensions that have been used to characterize emotions.
Amongst the more popular ones, Mehrabian’s (1980; 1996) Pleasure-Arousal-Dominance scale
is the one that stood the test of time. The last sub-field surveyed, that of anatomical theories,
sits at the intersection between affective science and neuroscience. Consequently, researchers
in this field usually focus their investigation on the brain regions that might originate emotions.
Section 2.6 gives a chronological overview of the many discoveries made since Darwin. Along
the way some theoretical models of the origin of emotions within the brain were also studied.
Models such as Papez’s (1937) circuit or MacLean’s (1970) triune brain (both described in
Section 2.6) still influence our current interpretation of the brain and emotions within it. One
model, though, differentiate itself from the rest. Extensively reviewed in Sub-Section 2.6.2,
the ‘Survival Circuit’ theory (advocated by LeDoux (2012)) reflects on the many criticisms
made against the ‘basic emotion’ theory (detailed in Sub-Section 2.6.1). Borrowing the idea
that emotions evolved to improve survival, from Darwin (1872), it suggests to focus on the link
between emotion and survival, rather than looking for a “happiness circuit” within the animal’s
brain. A survival circuit is, therefore, described as an innate neural architecture capable of
detecting opportunities relevant to an individual’s survival and of triggering innate reactions.
LeDoux (2012) purposefully avoids defining the concept of emotion, instead relegating it to
a simple label applied by our conscious mind whenever the triggering of a survival circuit is
detected. This thesis takes inspiration from the defense circuit established in LeDoux (2012).
This overview of the landscape of affective science was followed by an exploration of the
most popular or recent computational models of emotions hailing from the three main sub-fields.
The reason for this second survey is that implemented models are grounded in reality, while
theories often suggest abstract answers. Computational models are a realization of the chosen
theory. Rather than painting a picture with broad strokes, the author has to be more precise and
define every little details before being able to implement the model. It restricts the theory to a
single interpretation, but at the same time it might also provide concrete answers to some of the
questions left behind. Furthermore, this also gives an idea of the direction the field is headed
toward, as well as the questions that remain unanswered. Finally, because it represents a single
interpretation and due to the many design decisions made during the building process, usually
only the most relevant or core features of a given theory are actually embedded in the final
model. As such, it is easier to understand what are the recurring features used to characterize
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emotions across the different sub-fields. From the surveyed models, we were able to derive that
the most consistently used qualities to discriminate emotions from other mental states seem
to be ‘valence’ and ‘arousal’. Borrowing the vocabulary of dimensional theories, ‘arousal’
describes the level of physiological activity associate with an emotion, while ‘valence’ denotes
either a pleasurable or non-pleasurable feeling accompanying an emotion.
Next, the ProtoEmo architecture was designed to both validate the chosen definition of
emotions and show that the circuit implemented by the thalamus, hypothalamus and amygdala
is capable of encoding the saliences of survival relevant situational sensory stimuli. The impor-
tance of this seemingly small architecture, cannot be overstated since it stands as the beginning
of an emotional episode. Indeed, assuming a role akin to an alarm system, ProtoEmo is capable
of warning other brain areas of the presence of relevant stimuli. Where the relevance of a
given stimulus is relative to the individual’s believes, desires and intentions. This in turn allows
the brain to better manage its limited cognitive resources and only focus on the important
matters. In terms of emotions, ProtoEmo only implements an archaic version of the concept,
since it can only influence the decision-making process and contributes to arousal of the brain.
However, it has the advantage of knowing about both internal and external states, along with
having a widespread influence.
Guided by the concept behind the survival circuits theory, suggested by LeDoux (2012),
the next logical step was to explore the brain mechanisms dedicated to action selection. Indeed,
according to the survival circuits theory, emotions evolved among the animal kingdom as
a system to increase an individual’s chances of survival. As explained in more details in
Chapter 2, the main way in which this benefit to survival manifests itself is via the direct control
of behaviors. To put it more simply, it steers the animal toward rewarding stimuli and away
from punishing situations. As detailed at length in Chapter 3, the underlying mechanisms
theorized to signal reward and punishment within the brain are the dopamine and serotonin
systems, respectively. Of the two, the dopamine system has been the center of attention and
its activity has been mathematically modeled. Thanks to the work of Sutton and Barto (1998)
it is in fact the basis for a well-known paradigm called reinforcement learning. Within this
paradigm, an agent will simply learn to solve a task through a trial-and-error process, in which
the environment provides rewards and punishments to guide the agent toward the goal. The
dopamine system, though, is only the Critic part of the decision-making process. According to
both Redgrave et al. (1999) and Frank et al. (2001) the part of the brain that actually learns the
policy and selects the next action to perform are the basal ganglia. The basal ganglia implement
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a gating mechanism, which under the influence of the dopamine system’s activity either allow
or prohibit a single action to be executed. In this case the action can either be motor or cognitive
in nature. This means that the basal ganglia, not only control outward behaviors, they also
manage the access to cognitive resources by other control systems within the brain.
To explore the role of emotion in the decision-making process described in Chapter 3,
along with the benefits afforded by the alarm system implemented by ProtoEmo, a second
architecture was designed. This new architecture has been referred to as PrimEmo, since
it is hypothesized to support a primitive form of emotions, characterized by their level of
arousal and valence (as mentioned above). To ascertain the capabilities in terms of survival and
decision-making of the PrimEmo architecture, an online roguelike game was implemented.
In it an agent controlled by PrimEmo had to compete against other players, namely a Deep
Q-learning agent and an Advantage Actor-Critic agent. The goal of the game, apart from
surviving in a rather harsh environment (populated by enemies) was to collect as much gold as
possible.
From the experimental results gather through this game, it was concluded that agents
controlled by the PrimEmo architecture had similar performances in terms of average life
span than those using the A2C controller. In contrast with the A2C controller, the agent
under PrimEmo’s influence was more focused on preserving its life, than collecting gold.
Unfortunately, since PrimEmo did not have enough time during the learning phase to refine its
strategy, neither the amygdala layer nor the ventral tegmental area layer were able to behave as
expected. Therefore, it is impossible to draw any conclusions regarding PrimEmo supporting
a primitive form of emotions characterized by their valence and arousal.
7.2 Answers to the research questions
At the beginning of this thesis is was established that to make its scope more manageable, the
overall research question should be narrowed to single cognitive system. Therefore, rather than
exploring ‘the role of emotions in autonomous social agents’ in general, the goal of this thesis
is to understand the function emotions play in the decision-making process. In this context
it was hypothesized that: “Emotions inform the brain as to the nature of a given situation,
interrupt any ongoing action, and guide the decision-making process to increase the chances
of survival of virtual agents”.
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After extracting the different features that make emotions unique within the brain, as well as
exploring their role in improving an animal’s survival potential and their neural underpinnings,
it became apparent that the primary hypothesis needed to be broken down further if we ever
hoped to answer it. Consequently, Chapter 5 sought to verify that:
H1-1 The circuit identified as important to animal’s survival, can be used by virtual agents to
influence their actions and increase their survival capabilities.
H1-2 Within the previously established circuit, the amygdala acts as the triggering mechanism,
by encoding the salience of features relevant to the survival of the individual in a given
situation.
H1-3 This same circuit, however, is not enough to elicit emotions as characterized at the end
of Chapter 2.
To verify the veracity of these hypotheses, the ProtoEmo architecture was built. Its perfor-
mances were tested on resource foraging task, against another type of emotional agent described
by Scheutz (2004). From the results gathered during this experiment (detailed in Section 5.3),
we extrapolated that while Scheutz’s agents were implementing a strategy, were only the
strongest survives, ProtoEmo had a fairer approach, in which agents would avoid fighting at all
cost and would explore the environment if the nearest energy source was already being targeted
by someone else. Consequently, not only did ProtoEmo have a higher number of survivors at
the end of each simulation, but it also had a greater maximum population, on average. As a
result, it was concluded that in this case the Hypothesis 1-1 was verified. Further investigating
the correlation between the value of the tendencies and the different input features, showed that
the central nucleus of the amygdala behaved within expectations. In other words, the amygdala
was able to detect the different opportunities relevant to the agent’s survival, while avoiding
any potential danger or battle with other agents. Hence, confirming the validity of Hypothesis
1-2. However, even if the correlation between the average activity of the amygdala’s output
layer and the input features, revealed that the closer an agent was to either danger or an energy
source, the higher the activation rate, the same signal did not carry any information concerning
the valence of the situation. Therefore, Hypothesis 1-3 was considered true as well.
Building on the knowledge accumulated so far, Chapter 6 introduced PrimEmo, which
extended the ProtoEmo architecture with neural mechanisms capable of making decisions
(see Chapter 3 for more details on action selection). The goal, in building PrimEmo was to
substantiate the following hypotheses:
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H2-1 The addition of a system capable of encoding the salience of situational features relevant
to the survival of the individual will enhance the survival capabilities of virtual agents in
complex and dynamic environments.
H2-2 Furthermore, the mechanisms responsible for representing the salience of survival
relevant situational features will trigger an emotional episode, where emotions are
differentiated from other mental state by their level of ‘arousal’ and ‘valence’.
In lieu of a complex and dynamic environment, an on-line roguelike game was implemented,
so that PrimEmo’s performances could be compared to that of a Deep Q-Learning (DQN) and
an Advantage Actor-Critic (A2C) algorithms. After collecting the results from this experiment
and watching the controllers at play (footage of typical games are available on-line for each
controller 1.), it is apparent that none of them were able to complete their training phase. Nev-
ertheless, the data was analyzed to draw tentative conclusions regarding the hypotheses. Given
that the DQN controller displayed oscillatory behaviors and performed worse than the random
controller, it was left out of the comparison. In terms of average life span, both PrimEmo and
the A2C algorithm performed similarly. Concerning their respective strategies, though, they
could not be further apart from each other. While the A2C is clearly focused on gathering
as much gold as possible, at the cost of its agent’s life, PrimEmo seems to favor avoiding
enemy units as much as possible. However, because PrimEmo did not significantly outperform
the A2C controller, it was concluded that a definitive answer to Hypothesis 2-1 could not be
given. Still, the fact that PrimEmo was able to perform as well as the A2C controller, and
that its strategy seems focused on preserving its agent’s life above all, seems to indicate that,
given more time to refine its strategy, PrimEmo could indeed enhance the survival capabilities
of virtual agents. For the second hypothesis (H2-2), the conclusion was even worse. The
correlation between the average amygdala activity and the different input features made it clear,
that, although, the amygdala was able to detect danger coming from nearby enemy units, it was
unable to recognize, when the agent’s level of health was alarmingly low. Similarly, the ventral
tegmental area, suspected to be in charge of the ‘valence’ of emotions, rewarded the agent for
being far from any enemy units, but also for having a low level of energy. Consequently, in its
current state the PrimEmo architecture could not verify the second hypothesis.
In view of the problems encountered in Section 6.4, it is unfortunately not possible to
give any conclusive answer to the main hypothesis. The results from the first simulation
1https://youtu.be/sG_weRLOhZQ for PrimEmo, https://youtu.be/RHE2DJM1MCA for the DQN,
https://youtu.be/_8M6KnuJgSM for the A2C and finally https://youtu.be/rekPM-9K3sI for the ran-
dom controller
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indicate that the survival circuit identified by LeDoux (2012) are indeed capable of increasing
the survival potential of virtual agents. Although, the integration between this circuit and
the decision-making process needs further investigation it still shows a lot of promise. In
conclusion, therefore, even if the main hypothesis has not been verified yet, allowing the
PrimEmo architecture to further refine its strategy could see it succeed in confirming both of
its associated hypotheses. In turn, this thesis would have been able to show that: “Emotions
inform the brain as to the nature of a given situation, interrupt any ongoing action, and guide
the decision-making process to increase the chances of survival of virtual agents”.
7.3 Future Work
Even though the work presented in this thesis is restricted to the study of the role of emotions
within a single cognitive system, the ideas and methodology followed should act as a trigger
for a host of research projects and discoveries in both cognitive and affective science. As such,
the extensions highlighted in this section represent a possible trajectory between the results
presented in this thesis and fulfilling the goal of both AGI and cognitive science.
Before any further experimentation occur two points should be addressed. To begin with,
as pointed out in Sub-Section B.1.1 the neural units used for the actual implementation of the
PrimEmo controller all applied a ‘Softsign’ activation function to the weighted sum of their
input activities. This is an error on my part, since the softsign function was meant to be used for
the neurons in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) only. Indeed, as argued in Sub-Section A.1.1
a ReLU activation function is enough and in this case better suited to model the behavior of
cortical neurons. Furthermore, the reason for using a softsign activation function for neurons
in the VTA is that modulation within the PrimEmo controller has been implemented as a
product between the VTA’s output activity and the activation values of the neurons part of the
layer receiving projections from the dopaminergic system (see Sub-Section B.1.1 for more
details). Since a single layer was used to represent the activity of both the dopaminergic and
serotonergic systems (as explained in Section 6.1), and because the values of softsign are in
the range [−1,1], it means that a VTA output of −1 is interpreted as a punishment, a value of
1 would be a reward, and 0 is considered neutral. The issue with the current implementation
of modulation is that, if the VTA layer sends a neutral signal to any of its targeted areas, then
the neurons of the receiving layer would be completely silenced. To solve this problem two
solutions are available. The first is to simply add a constant to the output activity of the VTA
layer, so that 1 would be considered the neutral signal, 0 a punishment, and anything above
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1 would be interpreted as a reward. Another possibility is to implement modulation as an
additive operation as suggested by Litt et al. (2006) (and supported by Frank (2005) and Gurney
et al. (2001b)). Adopting this solution, the output activity of a neuron targeted by both the
dopaminergic and serotonergic systems is expressed as:
a(t) = a0(t)+β ×DA(t)+ γ ×5−HT (t) (7.1)
Where a0(t) represent the neuron’s activity at time t before modulation, DA(T ) is the output
value of the dopaminergic system, and 5−HT (t) is the output activity of the serotonergic
system at time t.
The next step, then, before looking into the future should be to adjust the different con-
trollers’ hyper-parameters, including those related to PrimEmo, until all controllers are able to
play Viking Doom in its complete form (with all items, enemies, obstacles, and heroes on the
same map) to a reasonable level. Only then will it be possible to gather data relevant to the
hypotheses described in Chapter 6, and analyze those results to draw definitive conclusions for
both PrimEmo and the global hypothesis presented in Chapter 1.
Once such a baseline has been established, it would be interesting to explore the conse-
quences of modifying some of the connections in ProtoEmo. As introduced in Section 6.1
and further detailed in Section B.1.2, in PrimEmo the hypothalamic layer (labeled ‘Hypot’ in
Figure B.1a and Sub-Figure B.1a) is bidirectionally connected with the basal nucleus of the
amygdala (BA). While the projection in the direction hypothalamus to BA makes sense, since
it provides the BA with a description of the internal state of the individual, the connection in
the other direction (BA to hypothalamus) might not be required. Indeed, the link from BA to
hypothalamus has been described as relatively weak (Whalen & Phelps, 2009). Furthermore, if
the loop formed by the lateral hypothalamic area, the hypothalamus, the BA, and the CA is to
be interpreted as an attention mechanism (as explained in Chapter 2 and Sub-Section A.1.4), in
this context then the projection from the BA to the hypothalamus serves no purpose, save maybe
redundancy or descending feedback (but see Sub-Section B.1.2 for another interpretation).
Now that the BA receives information about the internal state of the individual directly from
the hypothalamus, and given that the function of the BA has been described as contextualizing
the states of both the individual and the environment using the content of working memory (see
Sub-Section B.1.3), it would be interesting to investigate the usefulness of the projection from
the hypothalamus directly to the central nucleus of the amygdala (CA). Indeed, in Chapter 5
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the structure of the amygdala has been described as being similar to that of a funnel, where
information entering the lateral nucleus of the amygdala (LA) is incrementally refined until
it reaches the CA. At which point, the CA is only responsible for detecting stimuli relevant
to the survival of the individual. Therefore, having a connection from the hypothalamus to
the BA, as well as to the CA seem redundant, and could interfere with the function attributed
to the CA. Removing the projection between the hypothalamus to the CA would mean that
the BA integrates sensory information describing the state of both the environment and the
individual with the content of working memory and funnels the result to the CA, which is then
only responsible for alarming the rest of the brain whenever a stimulus of major concern is
detected.
The lateral nucleus of the amygdala (LA) has been presented in Chapter 5 and Appendix A
as the interface to the amygdala. In the implementation of the PrimEmo controller detailed
in Appendix B, though, the LA only receives sensory related data from the thalamus. The
somato-sensory cortex (SSC) instead connects directly to the central nucleus. Once again
by-passing entirely the funneling structure described in Chapter 5. Therefore, for the design to
be more biologically appropriate, and for it to more faithfully reproduce the ‘dual pathways’ to
the amygdala as suggested by LeDoux (1986, 1992) (see Chapter 4 for a complete description
of this model), the SSC should send efferents targeting the LA rather than the CA.
Having experimented with and refined the PrimEmo architecture, it is finally time to
look into the future and explore the possibilities this thesis created. A starting point on the
path toward AGI, is the integration of PrimEmo into a cognitive architecture. Taking ACT-
R (J. R. Anderson et al., 2004) as an example, PrimEmo would replace the decision-making
module. Communicating via the different buffers to request and retrieve information necessary
to its role. A well-known architecture, such as ACT-R or SOAR (Laird et al., 1987), would
provide the perfect testbed for integrating a connectionist system within a symbolic one. The
fact that those architectures are well-known, means that they have been and still are used
for both scientific and industrial application. Consequently, there should be an abundance of
empirical results from different tasks, depicting the capabilities of those cognitive architectures.
A successful integration of PrimEmo within such systems, would be characterized by its ability
to perform in a similar fashion or even better than the original architecture, on the same sets of
tasks.
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In a later phase, it would be beneficial to both cognitive and affective science, to replace
or rebuild each module from ACT-R or any other cognitive architecture, with biologically
plausible mechanisms. Taking care to always include both cognition and emotions as the focal
point of the study. This would not only increase our current understanding of the brain’s most
basic systems, but also establish a strong and reliable basis upon which the next phase could
expand. Furthermore, in a similar fashion than in the first step, there is still the advantage of
having the original architecture to assess the capabilities of its biologically plausible counterpart.
The reasoning behind this suggestion, is that a lot of thoughts have already been given to the
cognitive systems that are necessary for a minimal functioning brain replica. Thus, investigating
the underlying neural circuits, as well as the role emotions play in all those systems (similarly
to what has been done in this thesis), seem like the most sensible next step towards AGI.
Once a reliable core architecture has been designed, it is only a matter of repeating the same
process to each and every cognitive systems. Hence, incrementally extending the capabilities of
the original construct, until it reaches a point where it is endowed with human-level intelligence.
Unfortunately, the further the architecture develops, the more complex it will be to go on. This
is because, as cognition and emotions reach higher levels, both systems become increasingly
more intricate and so do their interactions (Alexandrov & Sams, 2005; Ortony et al., 2005). It
is small wonder some think that humanity will never fully explain the concept of consciousness.
If that is true, then the same could be said of full-fledged emotions. Currently, it feels like
affective science is still lagging behind cognitive science. The hope is that by grounding the
different theories of emotions in reality (through the implementation of modules for cognitive
architecture) affective science should quickly catch up. From this point on both fields would
then be co-evolving. Discoveries made in one, would inform the other and vice versa, creating
a ‘never’ ending positive feedback loop.
7.4 Conclusion
In the end, what this thesis really contributes to the edifice of cognitive and affective science,
is not knowledge. Where knowledge is understood as a theory or model of emotions. Rather,
it provides evidences that emotions can be investigated by relying on their roles, instead of
their many aspects. Furthermore, it also offers a point of view where affect and cognition are
two co-evolving and inter-dependent systems. Where the line between those two concepts is
blurry. Consequently, reaching AGI will require many more projects of a similar nature. Each
investigating the interactions between a given cognitive system and emotions. Each extending
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APPENDIX A
The ProtoEmo architecture in detail
As stated in Chapter 1 the goal of this thesis is to explore the role emotions play in intelligence.
More specifically, the objective is to show that emotions inform the brain as to the nature of
a given situation, and guide the decision-making process to increase the chances of survival
for a virtual agent. However, as made abundantly clear in Chapter 2 the concept of emotion
does not have a standard definition yet. Moreover, most of the theories and models focus on
emotions at a higher-level where cognition already interferes (according to the model suggested
by Ortony et al. (2005) and presented in Section 2.6.3, but see Alexandrov and Sams (2005),
and Izard (1993) for similar ideas). Consequently, before investigating the role of emotions in
the decision-making process it is important to understand the low-level mechanisms triggering
emotional episodes.
ProtoEmo is the artificial neural architecture introduced in Chapter 5. It was implemented
as a controller in a resource foraging task to explore the relevance of the ‘Survival Circuits’ for
virtual agents, as well as the role of the amygdala in those homeostatic mechanisms. LeDoux
(2012) defined the concept of survival circuits (see Sub-Section 2.6.2 for an in-depth description
of this theory), based on ideas from the ‘basic emotions’ theory (presented in Sub-Section 2.6.1),
as well as Darwin (1872) suggestion that emotions are a mechanism that evolved to improve
the survival potential of animals. Briefly, in the animal’s brain survival circuits are responsible
for maintaining the body’s homeostasis. As such, they are capable of detecting stimuli relevant
to the survival of the individual. Upon triggering, a survival circuit sends signals to recruit
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different brain systems in an attempt to bring the body’s state back to balance or defend against
danger.
As a continuation to Section 5.1 this appendix dives deeper into the design decisions made
during the development of the ProtoEmo architecture (shown in Figure A.1), as well as specify
all the elements required for its implementation. The final portion of this appendix presents the
genetic algorithm used as the learning process for the ProtoEmo architecture.
A.1 From brain areas to layers of artificial neurons
Before explaining how the activation values on the output layer of ProtoEmo are used to
build a strategy, this section first describe the basic building block used for implementing the
architecture. Details about the brain areas included in ProtoEmo, their connectome and the
layers used to model them are reported here as well.
A.1.1 Basic building block: the artificial neuron
The basic building block used throughout the implementation of the ProtoEmo architecture
is the artificial neuron. To compute its output activity each neural unit applies a Leaky ReLU
function (introduced by Maas et al. (2013)) to the weighted sum of its inputs. The Leaky ReLU
activation function used for this implementation can be described as:
f (x) =
αx if x < 0x otherwise (A.1)
Where α the negative slope coefficient has been set to 0.2. There are two main reasons for using
a ReLU function to compute the output activity of neurons within the ProtoEmo architecture.
First, according to Glorot, Bordes, and Bengio (2011) ReLU is a good enough approximation
for modeling cortical neurons. Indeed, Bush and Sejnowski (1995) have shown that pyramidal
cells from the visual cortex of cats rarely reach their saturation regime. Furthermore, Douglas,
Koch, Mahowald, Martin, and Suarez (1995) using anatomical evidences developed an electri-
cal circuit to model the firing rate of pyramidal cells, while taking into account both recurrent
and inhibitory connections to a neuron. Thanks to their electrical circuit they were able to show
that the frequency at which cortical neurons fire action potentials is proportional to its input
current. Second, when compared to other standard activation functions, such as the sigmoid
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Figure A.1 A visual representation of the layers implemented for the ProtoEmo controller. It
should be noted that the order of appearance is the same as the sequence followed to propagate
the activities of the input units through the architecture.
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function or tanh, the Leaky ReLU function takes less CPU time to compute. This might at
first seems like a small time save, but it can become quite significant when hundreds of virtual
agents are using hundreds of neurons for thousands of simulation cycle. Even on modern
computers, using Leaky ReLU as an activation function instead of the sigmoid function, for
example, could mean the difference between a simulation that complete in a matter of minutes
and one that takes an hour.
Moving a level higher in the organizational hierarchy, in ProtoEmo neurons are arranged
in fully-connected layers. Moreover, within a layer each neural unit can influence the activity of
all the others via lateral inhibition. In animals, the vast majority of neurons in the neocortex are
excitatory pyramidal cells (Bush & Sejnowski, 1995; Douglas et al., 1995; Gutnick & Mody,
2012). Those neurons send 80% of their connections to other excitatory cells within a 1mm
neighborhood referred to as a ‘column’. However, according to Douglas et al. (1995) for cortical
columns to be able to perform any sort of useful computation, pyramidal cells need to project to
and receive activity from inhibitory neurons. A fact that Armony et al. (1995) also highlighted
in their experiment (see Chapter 4 for more details). When designing their computational
model of the dual pathways to the amygdala, Armony et al. (1995) realized that by introducing
a graded version of the ‘winner-takes-all’ mechanism, in lieu of lateral inhibition, neural
units developed what they called a ‘receptive field’. In the context of Armony et al.’s (1995)
experiment, it means that a neuron is strongly activated by a single frequency (called the ‘best
frequency’), but will also respond weakly to adjacent frequencies. Furthermore, Douglas et al.
(1995) differentiates between two types of inhibition:
“The feedback inhibition mediated by linear synapses acts as a multiplicative,
shunting-like inhibition that changes the gain of cortical response to a given input
current, whereas linear feedforward inhibition acts more like an offset that reduces
the input current by a given amount.” — (Douglas et al., 1995, p.982-983)
This reliance of a brain area on inhibition to perform its duty, echoes suggestions made
about the inner workings of the amygdala. Indeed, due to the feedback and feedforward
inhibitions the central nucleus of the amygdala is subjected to (from the inter-neurons and the
intercalated nucleus, respectively) only novel or strongly energized stimuli can elicit a burst
of activity (Whalen & Phelps, 2009). As a result, neurons within the amygdala are usually
described as “silent” (Whalen & Phelps, 2009). This is in line with the accepted role of the
amygdala in animals. As discussed at length in both Chapter 2 and Chapter 5 (and summarized
later in this appendix), the amygdala is ideally placed to detect stimuli relevant to the survival
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of the individual and warn the rest of the brain whenever such stimulus appears. Consequently,
since most inhibition in ProtoEmo can be considered feedback, lateral inhibition has been









As shown in Equation A.2, to determine the final activity of a single neural unit, therefore, the
activation values of all the neurons in a layer are taken into account.
So far the implementational details corresponding to ProtoEmo’s basic building block, the
artificial neuron, as well as the layers that make up the architecture have been described. Hence,
the remainder of this section describes the role and the connectome of the different brain areas
modeled (see also Figure A.1 for an overview of the connections implemented).
A.1.2 The thalamus
The first brain region to be included in the ProtoEmo architecture is the thalamus. In animals
the accepted role of the thalamus is to redirect information coming from the senses to the
corresponding brain systems. Indeed, except for the olfactory system, all sensory data projects
in a topographically organized manner onto the thalamus, which then dispatches the filtered
information to the targeted cortical and sub-cortical areas (J. R. Anderson et al., 2004; Armony
et al., 1995; Connors, Landisman, & Reid, 1998; Jones, 1985; O’Reilly & Munakata, 2013;
O’Reilly, Wyatte, & Rohrlich, 2014; S. Sherman, 2006; S. M. Sherman, 2016; S. M. Sherman
& Guillery, 2002, 2005; Toga, 2015). As a result, the thalamus was the focus of many theories
and models of emotions (see Section 2.6 and Chapter 4 for more details). Within the ProtoEmo
architecture, the thalamus is represented by a single layer of 20 neurons. It receives inhibitory
connections from the central nucleus of the amygdala, as well as the following external inputs
describing the state of the environment:
• the distance to the closest obstacle,
• the distance to the closest source,
• the distance to the closest robot,
• and finally, the maximum action tendency sampled over all neighboring agents, if any.
Otherwise, this input defaults to zero.
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It should be noted that only the distances between the current agent and the different objects
are necessary to build a complete strategy, since the agent does not decide on the exact
direction and speed of its movement, but only influences the computation of its velocity, as
has been described in Section 5.2. Given that the sensory modality of the thalamic inputs to
the ProtoEmo controller are similar in nature, a single layer is enough to model the thalamus.
Finally, given the lack of neocortical areas needed for further refinement of the external sensory
information, the thalamus only projects to the lateral nucleus of the amygdala.
A.1.3 The hypothalamus
After focusing on the (external) state of the environment, the next brain region looks inward to
ensure the survival of the individual and the species. The hypothalamus has been described
as the control center for the Autonomic Nervous System (ANS). In animals this system is in
charge of maintaining the body’s homeostasis or overcome stressors (a process also referred
to as ‘allostasis’) (Dalgleish, 2004; J.-m. Fellous, 1999; Kreibig, 2010; Saper, 2009, 2012;
Saper & Lowell, 2014; Swanson, 2000). To perform its duty, the hypothalamus receives
inputs from a wide variety of sensory regions describing the state of the individual. The
main recipient of those sensory inputs is the lateral hypothalamic area (LHA) (Saper, 2012;
Saper & Lowell, 2014). Moreover, the hypothalamus can be seen as an aggregation of many
‘centers’, each responsible for a different regulatory function. Thus, whenever a center detects
a discrepancy it activates an autonomic, endocrine, or behavioral response to bring the internal
milieu back to balance (Saper, 2012; Saper & Lowell, 2014; Swanson, 2000). As such, the
hypothalamus is not really a ‘control center’, since it only influences the individual’s motivation
to perform certain actions (J.-m. Fellous, 1999; Saper, 2012; Saper & Lowell, 2014). Among the
centers involved in the different homeostatic and allostatic functions, the medial hypothalamus
plays an important role in energy regulation, and in defensive, aggressive and reproductive
behaviors. The preoptic area is implicated not only in reproductive behavior as well, but also in
thermoregulation, and in arousal (Saper, 2009, 2012; Saper & Lowell, 2014; Swanson, 2000).
Therefore, within the ProtoEmo architecture the hypothalamus has been split into two layers.
The LHA, with a size of 10 neurons, receives the sensory inputs describing the agent’s internal
state. The second layer, represents the union of the medial hypothalamus and preoptic area. It
contains five neural units, and has simply been labeled as Hypothalamus (Hypot) in Figure A.1.
The features used to describe the internal state of virtual agents in the resource foraging task
are:
• the current energy level of the robot,
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• the current value of the action tendency,
• and a computed value defined as:
Danger = (2×obs_thres−min(2×obs_thres,obs_dist))
× (3× f ight_thres−min(3× f ight_thres,rbt_dist)) (A.3)
Where obs_thres = 0.5 is an arbitrary threshold warning the robot of an incoming obstacle,
and f ight_thres = 0.3 is the distance between two agents under which they are considered to
be in a battle situation.
In addition to taking care of the internal balance of an individual, it has been suggested that
the hypothalamus also plays a major role in the association of drives and reward (J.-m. Fellous,
1999). An idea that echoes the role attributed to the LHA by O’Reilly et al. (2007) and Hazy et
al. (2010) in their PVLV architecture (see Sub-Sub-Section 3.3.2 for a detailed explanation on
this model). Given its position and influence over the ANS, neuroendocrine, and behavioral
systems, the hypothalamus has been considered by some as the locus for emotional expres-
sion (J.-m. Fellous, 1999).
Aside from receiving inputs from internal sensory devices, the LHA is also the target of
inhibitory projections coming from the central nucleus of the amygdala (CA). Activation values
from the LHA are directly sent to the Hypot layer, which then connects to the CA. Hence,
creating a feedback loop in which the amygdala can influence the sensory data entering the
hypothalamus.
A.1.4 The amygdala
The amygdala is the last brain region to be included in the ProtoEmo architecture. This area has
grabbed the attention of many researchers in the affective science community, and as a target in
fear conditioning experiments. In anatomic theories of emotions (discussed in Section 2.6) the
amygdala is usually construed as simply processing emotions. However, based on observations
from fear conditioning studies researchers have been able to map out its structure, and have
suggested its role to be similar to an alarm system (Dalgleish, 2004; J.-M. Fellous & Arbib,
2005a; O’Reilly & Munakata, 2013; Sloman, 1999; Whalen & Phelps, 2009; Yilmazer-Hanke,
2012). Indeed, as explored in more details in Chapter 5, the amygdala is ideally placed to
detect stimuli that are relevant to the survival of the individual and the species. Detection of a
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significant stimulus leads to the activation of the amygdala’s central nucleus (CA), which sends
action potentials to a wide array of cortical and sub-cortical areas, including neuromodulatory
systems (dopamine and serotonin). The release of neuromodulators in the brain alter cognitive
processing, and guide the emotional and behavioral responses of the individual (Whalen &
Phelps, 2009).
Within the ProtoEmo architecture the amygdala has been implemented as four separate
layers: 1) the lateral nucleus (LA, size 5), which is considered to be the sensory interface to
the amygdala, since it receives connections from the thalamus; 2) the basal nucleus (BA, size
10), which is an aggregation of the basal and accessory basal nuclei found in the animal’s
brain; 3) the intercalated nucleus (Itc, size 10); 4) and finally, the central nucleus (CA, size 10),
which is also considered to be the output of the amygdala. At an abstract level, the amygdala’s
structure has been compared to a funnel. Sensory information arriving from the LA has to travel
via the BA to reach the CA. Each traversed module further reducing the dimension of its input
data and extracting higher-level concepts. Both the LA and BA also target the Itc, which in turn
send inhibitory projections to the CA. According to Whalen and Phelps (2009), and O’Reilly
and Munakata (2013), this feedforward inhibition implements a habituation mechanism. As a
result, only strongly activating stimuli can lead the amygdala to send action potentials. Hence,
earning the amygdala the label of ‘silent’ (Whalen & Phelps, 2009).
As depicted in Figure A.1, in terms of extrinsic connections the amygdala receives sen-
sory data describing the environment’s state from the thalamus, which projects onto the LA.
Information related to the state of the individual is relayed directly to the CA via the Hypot
layer. Finally, as mentioned in Section 5.1 the CA sends inhibitory projections that target
both the thalamus and LHA. Via those connections the amygdala is able to ‘filter’ the sensory
data arriving to the CA. Hence, implementing two primary attention mechanisms. The final
excitatory synapse links the CA to the output layer.
A.1.5 Outputs
The output of the ProtoEmo architecture is the only layer that differs from the rest. It contains
four neural units, whose activation values result from the application of the softmax function
over the weighted sum of their respective inputs. The standard softmax function, for a vector x⃗
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for i = 1, . . . ,n (A.4)
Usually the softmax function is used on a layer when its output values are meant to represent
probabilities, since a property of the softmax is that the sum of the elements of the resulting
vector is always equal to 1. Though, in the context of PrimEmo as a controller there were only
three reasons for choosing the softmax activation function. The first one is that the activation
values of the output layer had to fall within the [0,1] range. To achieve this effect, a standard
sigmoid function could have been used as well. However, the sigmoid function has a steeper
curve between its boundaries compared to the softmax function, which means that activation
values tend to get pushed towards the extrema. This is something that is also present, but to
a lesser degree with the softmax function. Lastly, using the softmax function also introduces
lateral inhibition to the output layer. However, the significance of this lateral inhibition is
different from the one specified for all the other layers. Indeed, for the output layer it is
interpreted as a modeling of the fact that when an animal’s well-being is in danger, other needs,
such as eating or drinking, are actively suppressed to free up cognitive resources and efficiently
deal with the aversive stimuli (LeDoux, 2012).
As explained in Section 5.2, the different controllers implemented for the resource foraging
task can only influence how the controlled robots move, as well as if they stand their ground
or flee in a conflict. ProtoEmo is no exception. Therefore, the activity of each neuron in
the output layer provides the value for a different coefficient. The activation rate of the first
neuron is directly assigned as the action tendency of the virtual agent. In a conflict situation,
similar to Scheutz’s emotional agents (described in Sub-Section 5.2.2), a robot controlled
by the ProtoEmo architecture retrieves the action tendencies from its neighboring peers. If
the action tendency of the current robot is the highest, it fights. Otherwise, the agent runs
away. The other three neurons all provide values that affect the robot’s movement. As stated
in Sub-Section 5.2.1 for any agent the direction and speed of movement are computed using
Equation 5.1. Three coefficients are part of this computation, and reflect the agent’s current
needs and goals. Borrowing from Scheutz’s (2004) design the fighting tendency (ga) is defined
as:
ga = 100×out put_activity2 −50 (A.5)
Where out put_activity2 is the activation value of the second neuron from the output layer.
Similarly, both the tendency to avoid obstacles (gt) and the forage tendency (gr) are computed
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based on the activity of the third (out put_activity3) and fourth neurons (out put_activity4),
respectively, as follows:
gt =−20×out put_activity3 (A.6)
gr = 20×out put_activity4 (A.7)
A.2 Evolving ProtoEmo for optimal survival
Inspired by Darwin’s (1872) theory dictating that emotions are a mechanism that evolved
to improve the survival potential of individual and the species, a simple genetic algorithm
(GA) was used for training the ProtoEmo controller. This draws a nice parallel between
animals evolving emotions and now virtual agents evolving emotions of their own. Aside from
satisfactory parallels, a GA was also chosen for two main reasons. First, due to the fact that the
ProtoEmo architecture has two recurrent loops and does not reach stability at a fixed point in
time (as explained in Sub-Section 5.2.3), it would be unwieldy and memory intensive to use
backpropagation through time (Lillicrap et al., 2016; Werbos, 1990). Second, even though other
meta-learning algorithms, such as simulated annealing, could be used as well, GAs have the
advantage of being highly parallelizable by nature. The Distributed Evolutionary Algorithms in
Python (DEAP, written by Fortin, De Rainville, Gardner, Parizeau, and Gagné (2012)) library
was used for the actual implementation of said genetic algorithm. Besides streamlining the
evolutionary process, it also made splitting the workload over different computing nodes much
easier.
The remainder of this section first defines the individuals and population used for the genetic
algorithm. The next part of this section, goes over the evaluation protocol and its associated
fitness function. Finally, the operators selecting and mating individuals from each population
to create the next generation are explored in details.
A.2.1 Populations of synaptic strengths
The only means by which it is possible to teach the ProtoEmo controller the optimal strategy
to promote the survival of the individual and the species within the environment of the resource
foraging task, is to update the strengths of the synapses connecting layers together. Furthermore,
since the actual implementation of the ProtoEmo controller uses the Keras framework (Chollet,
2015), backed by the Tensorflow library (Abadi et al., 2015), it means that the connection
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weights for a given layer are stored in a matrix. Consequently, the chromosomes used for the
learning process take the shape of matrices implemented as lists of lists. Thus, weight matrices
can be represented as:
W =

w0,0 w0,1 · · · w0, j
w1,0 w1,1 · · · w1, j
...
... . . .
...
wi,0 wi,1 · · · wi, j
 (A.8)
Where i the number of rows represent the size of the current layer, and j is the number of
units projecting to the current layer. At the beginning of the training phase, each individual is
independently initialized with random values sampled from a Gaussian distribution of mean
µ = 0.5 and a standard deviation σ = 0.5.
Rather than evolving the synaptic strengths of the whole architecture at once, the principles
of cooperative coevolution (Potter & De Jong, 2000) have been integrated within the training
process. In nature, the concept of coevolution is defined by two or more species reciprocally
influencing each other’s evolution through natural selection. Within the context of genetic
algorithms, and especially in DEAP, cooperative coevolution is achieved by first defining
multiple populations. Then, to evaluate the fitness of an individual from a given population
it is aggregated with the representatives of other populations to form a solution to the task.
Here a species’ representative is construed to be the best individual found so far. Once all
individuals from a species have been evaluated, selected, and mated, the algorithm moves on
to the next species. A generation, therefore, consists in going through all the populations in
order, evaluating and mating their individuals. When applied to the connection strengths of a
neural network, like the ProtoEmo controller, coevolution forces each layer to find the most
efficient way to use the best data that its input layers can provide. Consequently, instead of
defining a single population containing the weights corresponding to all the layers, the current
implementation uses one population per layer. As a result, the implemented GA simultaneously
evaluates and updates eight species, comprised of 20 individuals each.
A.2.2 Evaluating individuals
By definition, in computer science a genetic algorithm is a meta-heuristic, whose purpose is to
find solutions to search and optimization problems. To find the optimal solution to a problem
GAs evaluate populations of individuals and assign a ‘fitness’ value to each of them. The fitness
usually is a single value representing how good of a solution a particular individual is. In the
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DEAP framework it is possible to define multiple objectives for a single GA. Hence, each
individual can have one or more fitness values (one for each of the objectives). In the particular
context of the resource foraging task, two objectives have been outlined. The most important
goal for all virtual agents is to survive for as long as possible. Therefore, the first objective is to
optimize for the number of survivors at the end of a simulation. To guide the GA in reaching
this first goal, a second objective of maximizing the size of the group of robots in a simulation
has been set as well. Between the two objectives maximizing the population of survivors takes
precedence, and this has been defined in DEAP by setting a weight of 1 for the first objective
and of 0.5 for the second one.
Within the GA implemented for the ProtoEmo controller’s training phase, the evaluation
process involved the following steps:
1. Build a neural network embodying the design described in Section A.1, and shown in
Figure A.1, using placeholder weights for the connections.
2. As mentioned in the previous Sub-Section, since each layer is considered as a separate
species the individual to be evaluated has to first be combined with the representatives of
the other species.
3. The matrices representing the synaptic strengths are then assigned to their corresponding
connections in the neural network.
4. Now that the individual is finally ready, it is used as the ‘brain’ controlling all the robots
for a resource foraging task. The task lasts for 2500 cycles.
5. At the end of the simulation, the number of surviving agents, as well as the maximum
size the robot population attained during the simulation are assigned as fitnesses for the
individual under evaluation.
To obtain the results presented in Section 5.3 the ProtoEmo controller has been trained over
200 generations. Keep in mind that a single generation entails evaluating all 20 individuals
from all 8 populations. Therefore, in total around 32000 individuals have been evaluated.
A.2.3 Making the next generation
Once all individuals inside a population have been evaluated, they are then selectively mated
to produce the next generation. Beginning with the selection process, there are many ways to
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choose individuals to be the parents of the next generation. Usually, though, selection mecha-
nisms use the individual’s fitness to decide whether to pick it or not. This way the probability
of an individual to be chosen for inclusion as a parent increase the higher its fitness is. In
the GA implemented to train the ProtoEmo controller a ‘tournament selection’ mechanism
has been used with a tournament size of 3. The idea behind the tournament selection is quite
straight forward. Given a population of individuals and a tournament size of k, first randomly
select k individuals from the population. Out of this sub-population, the individual with the
highest fitness gets selected. To select multiple individuals simply repeat the process as many
time as needed. Due to the simplicity of its implementation, as well as the ease with which
selection pressure can be adjusted the tournament selection has been commonly used by GAs
for a long time (Miller & Goldberg, 1995). Furthermore, with a tournament size of 3 it means
that the resulting population will be a mix between individuals with high fitnesses, while still
maintaining a good diversity by including individuals with lower fitnesses.
In GAs the standard mating process is usually split into two mechanisms: crossover and
mutation. Crossover is an operation through which the genetic information of both parents are
combined to form one or two children. In the GA implemented for the resource foraging task,
a row-wise two-points crossover procedure has been implemented. This means that for every
other rows (the crossover probability is set to 0.6) of both parents two indexes are selected at
random. The data before the first index and after the second index is then swapped between the
parent to produce two new children. After all parents have been combined to produce the next
generation, the children are then mutated. Mutation as in nature randomly changes the value of
a gene, to maintain genetic diversity, and hopefully not get trapped in a local optima. Given
that individuals are matrices representing synaptic weights, the implemented GA employs a
Gaussian mutation. Each row of an individual has a 0.1 probability of being considered for
mutation. Next, each element in that row has a further 0.01 chance of being mutated. Finally, if
an element is selected for mutation, then its value is replaced by another one sampled from a
Gaussian distribution with mean µ = 0.5 and standard deviation σ = 0.25.
After evaluating all the individuals in a population, selecting the fittest to be the parents for
the next generation, combining those parents to produce offspring, and finally mutating those
children to maintain genetic biodiversity, the genetic algorithm moves to the next species, and
does it all over again for many generations.

APPENDIX B
The PrimEmo architecture in detail
After validating that LeDoux’s (2012) ‘Survival Circuits’ theory is applicable to virtual agents,
and indeed improve their survival potential, using the ProtoEmo architecture (described in
Section 5.1 and further detailed in Section A.1), the next part of this thesis finally explores
the role of emotions in the decision-making process. The PrimEmo architecture results from
the integration of the PVLV and basal ganglia models (both introduced in Sub-Section 3.3.2)
with the ProtoEmo architecture. PrimEmo has been built to investigate whether virtual agents
can acquire primary emotions using the brain structures afforded to them. Furthermore, if
the concept of primary emotions can indeed emerge from those brain circuits, it is then hy-
pothesized that emotions inform and guide the decision-making process. Thus, increasing the
survival chances of the individual, as well as the species. Remember that in this thesis primary
emotions have been differentiated from other patterns of brain activity by their level of arousal
and valence (see Chapter 2 for more details).
This appendix first describes the inner workings of the PrimEmo architecture as it has
been implemented to play Viking Doom (a game introduced in Section 6.3 and detailed in
Section C.2). It then presents, in a second part, the genetic algorithm used to train the PrimEmo
controller to survive in a complex and dynamic environment.
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B.1 The PrimEmo architecture in detail
Before outlining the layers, and connections between those, that are part of the implementation
of PrimEmo, this section starts by defining the building block used throughout the architecture.
The second sub-section addresses the differences in implementations between the ProtoEmo
architecture presented in Sub-Section A.1 and the one integrated with the PVLV and basal
ganglia models to make up PrimEmo. Lastly, this section focuses on the connections between
the different models and their role in the animal’s brain.
B.1.1 Basic building block: the artificial neuron
Similar to the brain structure that it models the fundamental building block of the PrimEmo
architecture is the neuron. The artificial neuron used in the implementation of the PrimEmo
controller is a non-linear unit applying a ‘Softsign’ activation function (Turian, Bergstra, &






On the contrary to the Leaky ReLU function used for ProtoEmo (defined in Sub-Section A.1.1),
the output of the softsign function falls inside the range [−1,1]. The fact that all neurons in
PrimEmo use a softsign activation function is an error in the implementation. Originally,
the design intended for neural units to apply a ReLU function to the weighted sum of their
inputs for reasons similar to those expressed in Sub-Section A.1.1. The softsign activation
function should have been reserved for the neurons of the VTA layer, since they are in charge of
computing the discrepancy between predicted and actual reward, as well as between predicted
and actual punishment. In this context, an output value of −1 would represent a punishment,
whereas a value of 1 would be a reward. Therefore, 0 would be considered as neutral. Although
it was a mistake, softsign has an advantage over the more standard hyperbolic tangent (tanh)
activation function. Compared to tanh, softsign approaches its boundaries more smoothly
which means that the activation values are not pushed as much towards the limits. As a result,
the neural activities are better spread across the [−1,1] range.
Neural units representing the same brain area are organized in layers. Inside a layer neurons
are able to influence each other’s activity via lateral inhibition for reasons similar to those
expressed in Sub-Section A.1.1. On the contrary to the ProtoEmo architecture, however,
lateral inhibition is not implemented as a normalization layer, but takes the shape of laterally
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(a) The Critic portion of the PrimEmo architecture.
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(b) The Actor part of the PrimEmo architecture.
Figure B.1 A visual representation of the layers implemented for the PrimEmo controller. It
should be noted that the order of appearance is the same as the sequence followed to propagate
the activities of the input units through the architecture.
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projecting synapses connecting a neuron with all other units in the layer. The synaptic strength





Where layer_size is the number of units in the layer. It should be noted that in a neuron the
lateral inhibition is taken into account before applying the activation function. Additionally,
wherever a link is depicted between layers in Sub-Figure B.1a the sending layer fully connects
to the receiving one.
The brain areas part of the actor portion of the PrimEmo architecture (illustrated in
Sub-Figure B.1b) are each implemented as a separate group. Inside each group layers are
independent from each other. However, where group sends projections to another one, each
layer in the sending group fully connects to the corresponding layer in the receiving group. Each
of the five layers within a group represents one of the actions available to the hero in Viking
Doom (see Sub-Section 6.3.4 for more details on what those actions are). This concept of
groups of independent layers has been included in PrimEmo’s design to replicate the strip-like
organization of both the pre-frontal cortex (PFC) and basal ganglia (BG) as explained in more
details in Sub-Sub-Section 3.3.2. Moreover, according to Frank et al. (2001), O’Reilly and
Munakata (2013), and Gurney et al. (2001a, 2001b) this is also a feature necessary for the
action-selection mechanism implemented by the basal ganglia to perform its duty. Wherever
a group of layers is depicted as projecting to a single layer in Figure B.1, the group is first
flattened (the layers are merged into a single one) before fully connecting to the receiving layer.
Finally, as depicted in Figure B.1 some of the brain areas are the target of either excitatory
or inhibitory modulation. Modulation within the PrimEmo architecture comes from the ventral
tegmental area (VTA) layer, which contains a single neuron. As explained above, this neuron
applies a softsign activation function to the weighted sum of the activities on its input. Since
the values produced by the softsign function all fall within the [−1,1] range, 1 is considered as
the best reward possible, whereas −1 is the worst punishment. Inside the layers targeted by the
VTA, modulation of the output activity of each neural unit is achieved by simply multiplying
the weighted sum of its inputs by the activation value sent by the VTA. In retrospect, this was
not the best way to apply modulation to the different neurons. Indeed, in this context a neutral
stimulus (one associated with an output activity for the VTA layer of 0) would completely
extinguish all the neurons targeted by the VTA instead of leaving their activities unchanged as
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would be expected. A more interesting approach would have been to employ a scheme similar
to the one discussed by Litt et al. (2006) in which rewards and punishments are either added
to or subtracted from the activity of neurons, respectively (this type of scheme has also been
considered by others beside, such as Frank (2005) and Gurney et al. (2001a, 2001b)).
B.1.2 Re-implementing the ProtoEmo architecture
When the ProtoEmo architecture was included into PrimEmo’s design small changes in the
connection pattern between the layers making up ProtoEmo were implemented. The projec-
tion from the lateral nucleus of the amygdala (LA) to the intercalated neurons (Itc) has been
removed, while a bidirectional connection between the hypothalamus and the basal nucleus
of the amygdala (BA) has been added. These changes however small they may seem are not
without consequences.
The Itc has been suggested to implement a habituation mechanism providing feedfoward
inhibition to the central nucleus of the amygdala (CA; see Section 5.1, Sub-Section A.1.4,
as well as Whalen and Phelps (2009)). By having the hypothalamus send its activity to the
BA, it shifts the responsibility of integrating sensory data describing the external environment
with information about the individual from the CA to the BA. Furthermore, now that only the
BA projects to the Itc, it means that the exact same information reaches both the Itc and CA.
Consequently, the Itc can more precisely predict by what amount to inhibit the CA to silence
its neurons.
In Section 6.1 it was suggested that the output activity of the BA could be interpreted as a
novelty signal. Therefore, an unpredicted stimulus triggering a spike in BA’s activity will be
transmitted to both the Itc and CA. At first, and due to the Itc having a slower learning rate
than the CA, neurons from the CA are potentiated, essentially raising the alarm for the rest of
the brain. However, if the same stimulus is repeated for long enough, the Itc will slowly adapt
its inhibitory activity to silence the CA preventing it from interfering with ongoing cognitive
processes. In this context, the projection from the BA targeting the hypothalamus can be
construed as the BA warning the control center of the autonomic nervous system about the
presence of something potentially harmful. It is then the responsibility of the hypothalamus to
prepare the individual for a fight-or-flight response.
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B.1.3 Connecting the models together
Since PrimEmo is the architecture that results from the aggregation of ProtoEmo, the PVLV
and the basal ganglia, some decisions had to be made when connecting those models to-
gether. Although Section 6.1 already describes the overlapping areas and their meaning within
PrimEmo, this section goes over the connections between the models in more details again.
For the PVLV, in both its original (O’Reilly et al., 2007) and updated (Hazy et al., 2010)
forms (see Sub-Sub-Section 3.3.2 for a detailed description), the ProtoEmo architecture can be
construed as an extension. Indeed, while in the PVLV only the central nucleus of the amygdala
is included as the excitatory component of the ‘Learned Value’ (LV) system, ProtoEmo is
modeled after a survival circuit, comprised of the amygdala, thalamus, and the hypothalamus,
found in the brain of rats and non-human primates. Consequently, extending the PVLV with
ProtoEmo increases the explanatory power of the PVLV. To connect the two models together
the following projections are required:
• From the lateral hypothalamic area (LHA) and the central nucleus of the amygdala (CA)
to the pedunculopontine tegmental nucleus (PPT): the function fulfilled by those two
indirect connections from both the LHA and CA to the VTA via the PPT is not clearly
understood yet (Hazy et al., 2010; O’Reilly et al., 2007). According to both O’Reilly et al.
(2007) and Hazy et al. (2010), activation of the PPT nucleus results in the dopaminergic
system firing bursts of activities, but only for dopamine neurons that are already tonically
activated. Additionally, because the PPT nucleus sends both cholinergic (inhibitory) and
glutamatergic (excitatory) efferents to the dopamine system, it could also be involved in
suppressing the phasic activity of the dopaminergic system when the triggering stimulus
is sustained (Hazy et al., 2010).
• Directly from the CA to the ventral tegmental area (VTA): In the PrimEmo architecture
the VTA stands in for the aggregation of the dopaminergic (DA) and serotonergic (5-
HT) systems. The DA system is usually considered as being made of the VTA and the
substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc). The 5-HT system mostly consist in the dorsal
raphe nucleus. Within the PVLV model, the CA is hypothesized to be the excitatory
component of the LV system. As such, the output activity of the CA is interpreted as a
value attached to any stimulus that is reliably paired with a reward (Hazy et al., 2010;
O’Reilly et al., 2007). In the ProtoEmo architecture, the CA has been hypothesized
(see Chapter 5) to detect stimuli relevant to the individual’s survival. Thus, the CA’s
output can be construed as an alarm signal, and the responsibility of determining the
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rewarding or punishing nature of a stimulus falls with the VTA. Even though it might
seem otherwise, considering that what is relevant to an animal’s survival is usually
perceived as being either rewarding or punishing as well, the points of view expressed so
far are compatible with each other (Rolls, 2007, 2013). Furthermore, Hazy et al. (2010,
p.709) remarks that the CA is also active for innately rewarding stimuli (US), and learns
to fire for an associated CS via conditioning (see Chapter 4 and Armony et al. (1995) for
a computational model describing this mechanism). This observation lends support to
both hypotheses at the same time.
• Between the basal nucleus of the amygdala (BA) and the ventral striatum (VS): In the
PrimEmo architecture via its connections to both parts of the ventral striatum (Whalen
& Phelps, 2009), as well as the other two components of the PVLV system, the BA
sends a consolidated view of both the environment and the individual. Consequently, this
allows the ‘critic’ portion of the PrimEmo architecture (see Section 3.3 for a detailed
description of the Actor-Critic as a mathematical model and its mappings to the animal’s
brain) to learn and predict the rewarding value associated with a global state. This is
further supported by the fact that, even though, both BA and CA receive projections
from different cortical areas, afferents to the BA are more numerous and of a finer
granularity (Aggleton, 1992; Hazy et al., 2010; Whalen & Phelps, 2009).
• And connections from the VTA modulating the activities of the LHA and the CA:
Assuming that the aggregation of the PVLV model with the ProtoEmo architecture is the
‘critic’ portion of PrimEmo, then the output of the VTA would be equivalent to the TD
error defined in Sub-Section 3.3.1. This discrepancy between predicted and actual reward
is used by both the critic itself and the actor to adjust the strength of their synapses.
Consequently, the output activity of the VTA is a learning signal sent to all components
of the PVLV architecture.
In PrimEmo, consistent with the Actor-Critic model described in Section 3.3 the interac-
tions between the ‘critic’ and ‘actor’ portions of the architecture are kept to a minimum. Only
the two following projections connect the PVLV model with the basal ganglia:
• The DA system modulates both sub-populations of the dorsal striatum (DS): As described
in Sub-Sub-Section 3.3.2 this modulatory connection between the VTA and the dorsal
striatum is necessary to ensure that the basal ganglia (BG) can perform its role as an
action selection mechanism. Moreover, in the context of the mathematical description of
the Actor-Critic model in Sub-Section 3.3.1, the signal between the VTA and DS can also
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be interpreted as the discrepancy between the predicted and the actual reward received
(the TD error) in a given state after performing the previously selected action.
• The motor cortex (MC) targets both sub-populations of the ventral striatum (VS): This
second connection sends back the action the individual has just performed to the ventral
striatum, and as will be detailed later to the BA as well. Since both targets of this
projection are within the critic portion of the PrimEmo architecture it means that the TD
errors are computed using (state,action) pairs.
Similar to the PVLV, the basal ganglia and the ProtoEmo architecture do not overlap and
very few connections link them together. However, the projections that do exist between those
two structures greatly enhance the capabilities of ProtoEmo. The links implemented in the
PrimEmo controller and their suggested function are as follow:
• The basal nucleus of the amygdala (BA) is target by both the pre-frontal (PFC) and motor
(MC) cortices: In the PBWM model introduced by Frank et al. (2001), the PFC is shown
to be the ideal candidate for fulfilling the role of working memory. Indeed, assuming
that information is stored within the activation pattern of the PFC’s neurons, the many
recurrent loops that make up the PFC allow it to actively sustain any firing pattern over
delays. Rapid update of the data stored inside working memory relies on the gating
mechanism implemented by the basal ganglia. Whenever the gate is open, information
is allowed to flow into the PFC and, therefore, modify the content of working memory.
On the contrary, when the gate is closed new inputs are prevented from modifying the
content of working memory, which is actively maintained by the PFC. Consequently, by
connecting the BA with both the MC and PFC, the BA has access to the action being
carried out, as well as high-level information concerning the current situation. Thus, the
BA can integrate any incoming stimulus into a broader context, and, therefore, build a
broader picture encompassing the state of both the environment and the individual, along
with predictions about the future.
• The central nucleus of the amygdala (CA) receives a projection from the somato-sensory
cortex (SSC): This connection is part of the model of the dual pathways to the amygdala
suggested by LeDoux (1986) and Romanski and LeDoux (1992). As described at length
in Chapter 4 and by Armony et al. (1995), this indirect pathway from the thalamus to
the amygdala provides the CA with fine-grained data related to incoming stimuli, hence,
allowing animals to discern between two adjacent frequencies for example.
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Although, in animals the motor cortex (MC) is the brain area responsible for executing
any planned action, in the PrimEmo architecture an output layer has been added on top of the
MC. As introduced in Sub-Section B.1.1 areas belonging to the actor portion of PrimEmo
are implemented as groups of layers, where each layer represents the program and salience
associated with one of the actions available to the hero (see Sub-Sub-Section 3.3.2, as well
as Redgrave et al. (1999) for a description of the ‘dual population coding’ model). The motor
cortex is no exception to this rule. Each unit in the output layer is fully-connected with a single
layer from the motor cortex. The activity of a unit is computed as the average activity of its
input layer. A softmax activation function (defined in Equation A.4) is then applied to the
whole output layer to implemented a graded version of the winner-takes-all mechanism. Then,
to decide which action to perform next the PrimEmo controller uses a greedy policy, which
dictates that the action associated with the most activated unit is always selected. It should
be noted that, due to the softmax activation function the values of the output units could have
been interpreted as probabilities for their respective action to be selected as is the case for the
asynchronous actor-critic controller described in Section 3.3.
Last but not least, for any of the recurrent connections present in the PrimEmo controller,
such as between PFC and BA, or between CA and LHA, an exponential decay mechanism
has been implemented. As a result, only 90% of an input unit’s activity is transmitted to its
targeted area via a recurrent projection. In animals, such a decay mechanism has been found
in the PFC which has been suggested to be maintaining and updating the content of working
memory (Frank et al. (2001); Shanahan (2010); Sloman (1999) to name but a few examples).
Moreover, since the PrimEmo controller lets the network settle before observing the output,
having a decay mechanism for any recurrent connection prevents any pattern of activity from
being maintained forever causing the network’s output to never stabilize.
In an effort to keep this appendix concise yet accurate, and due to the number of brain areas
involved, the sizes of the layers making up the PrimEmo controller (shown in Figure B.1) have
been defined in Table B.1.
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Table B.1 This table details the size of the different layers defined for the implementation of the
PrimEmo controller. It should be noted that, wherever brain areas have been implemented as
groups of layers, each group contains 5 layers (one layer for each action available to the hero).
As a result, PrimEmo’s neural network shown in Figure B.1 includes 60 layers in total.
Brain Area Layer \ Group Size
External Input Layer 1 22
Internal Input Layer 1 2
Reward Input Layer 1 1
LHA Layer 1 8
Hypot Layer 1 10
Thal_1 Layer 1 40
LA Layer 1 20
Layer 2 10
BA Layer 1 50
Layer 2 25
Itc Layer 1 12
Layer 2 7
SSC Layer 1 20
CA Layer 1 30
Layer 2 15
PPT Layer 1 10
VS_1 Layer 1 20
VS_2 Layer 1 20
VTA Layer 1 30
Layer 2 1
DS_1 Group 1 20
DS_2 Group 1 20
GPe Group 1 15
STN Group 1 15
SNr Group 1 20
Thal_2 Group 1 20
PFC Group 1 20
MC Group 1 20
Output Layer 1 5
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B.2 Evolving PrimEmo for optimal survival and decision-
making
The training process for the PrimEmo controller is very similar to the one described in Sec-
tion A.2 for the ProtoEmo controller. A simple genetic algorithm (GA) is employed to update
the synaptic weights and optimize PrimEmo’s strategy for gathering as much gold as possible
while surviving in Viking Doom (a game introduced in Section 6.3 and detailed at length in
Section C.2). The reasons for employing a GA once again are similar to those expressed at
the beginning of Section A.2. Not only does using a GA draw nice parallel between animals
evolving emotions and now virtual agents evolving emotions of their own, but it is also highly
parallelizable, and, therefore, more computationally efficient (even more so when compared
to alternatives such as backpropagation through time (Lillicrap et al., 2016; Werbos, 1990)
which would require extensive amounts of memory and compute power). Due to its ease of
use and the possibility it affords for splitting computation across different compute node, the
Distributed Evolutionary Algorithms in Python (DEAP; written by Fortin et al. (2012)) library
was also used again for implementing the training process.
The remainder of this section is organized in three parts. The first Sub-Section introduces
the population and individuals used for the genetic algorithm. The next part describes step by
step the protocol followed for evaluating and evolving the individuals as part of the training
process. Finally, the last Sub-Section presents the evolutionary operators implemented for
selecting the parents, as well as mating them to produce the next generation.
B.2.1 A population of synaptic strengths and biases
As with any other artificial neural network the means by which the PrimEmo controller
learns to perform a task is through the update of the strengths of the synapses connecting
units together. Consequently, the individuals defined for the GA are based on the weight
matrices associated with the different connections between layers. On the contrary to the
training process implemented for the ProtoEmo controller, only a single population was used
instead of multiple co-evolving ones (see Sub-Section A.2.1 a definition of the concept of
cooperative coevolution in the context of the DEAP library). Consequently, each individual is a
list containing the matrices for all the projections defined in PrimEmo. The biases for all neural
units are initialized to b = 0.1 and left unchanged for the whole duration of the experiment.
Since the implementation of the PrimEmo network relies on the Keras framework (Chollet,
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w0,0 w0,1 · · · w0, j
w1,0 w1,1 · · · w1, j
...
... . . .
...
wi,0 wi,1 · · · wi, j
 (B.3)
The width of the matrix j is set to the size of the layer and the height i to the number of units in
the sending layer(s). As a result, an individual takes the following shape:
ind = [W1,W2, . . . ,Wn] (B.4)
Where n = 57 corresponds to the number of layers implemented for the PrimEmo controller.
Finally, at the beginning of the training phase the matrices inside each individual are initialized
with random values sampled from a Gaussian distribution with a mean of µ = 0 and a standard
deviation of σ = 1. The population used for training the PrimEmo controller to play Viking
Doom contained 50 individuals.
B.2.2 Evaluating individuals
By definition genetic algorithms search the space of available solutions for the optimal set of
parameters for a given problem, be it a task or a mathematical function. To aid in this endeavor
each individual is first evaluated and assigned a value representing how fit it is for a specific
problem. This ‘fitness’ value is then utilized by the different evolutionary operators to select
parents and mate them to build the next generation. Although, it is possible in the DEAP
framework to define multiple fitness corresponding to different objectives, and assign weights
to each fitness to denote the relative importance of each objective, the PrimEmo controller is
only alloted a single goal, that is to collect as much gold as possible before the end of a game.
Furthermore, due to the randomness inherent in the design of Viking Doom (see Section 6.3
and Section C.2 for more details) the fitness of each individual is set to the total amount of gold
gathered on average over 10 games. The fact that only one objective related to the average total
amount of gold was defined has been done for two reasons. Firstly, it provides a fair context
in which to compare PrimEmo with the other two reinforcement learning based algorithm.
More importantly, however, is that the intention behind this experiment was to have emotions
naturally emerge from the evolutionary process rather than be the consequence of some external
constraints.
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For the genetic algorithm implemented to train the PrimEmo controller, the evaluation
phase can be split into the following steps:
1. An empty template embodying the design of the PrimEmo architecture (described in
Section 6.1 and further detailed in Section B.1) is pre-loaded.
2. The matrices contained within the individual are utilized to set the synaptic strengths and
biases of all connections between layers.
3. The completed neural structure is then evaluated by having the PrimEmo controller play
10 games of Viking Doom. Each game of Viking Doom lasts at most 1000 cycles or until
the hero dies.
4. At the end of each game, the total amount of gold gathered by the hero is recorded. When
all 10 games are completed the average amount of gold gathered is then assigned as the
individual’s fitness.
5. Finally, the next individual is retrieved and the process repeated from step 1 until the
whole population has been evaluated. From within the evaluated population the parents
are selected and mated to produce the next generation.
The results analyzed in details in Section 6.4 were obtained by training the PrimEmo controller
for 89 generations only. Given that the population size was set to 50 individuals, it means that
a meager 4450 sets of weight matrices were evaluated.
B.2.3 Making the next generation
After the evaluation phase is complete, the second step of a standard genetic algorithm is to
evolve a select number of parents to produce the next generation. This step can be split into
three main operations. Starting with selecting suitable parents. Although, selection mecha-
nisms usually determines an individual’s probability of being chosen based on its fitness, and
ultimately decide whether to pick it as a parent or not, in the GA implemented to train the
PrimEmo controller the fitness does not intervene and is only used to rank individuals within
the population. The ‘rank selection’ algorithm, which is the standard name for the selection
mechanism employed in this experiment, applies constant pressure by favoring higher ranked
individuals. This is a desired characteristic especially at the beginning of the learning process
when all individuals have similar fitnesses. It ensures that the next generation stems from the
best parents, while still maintaining a diverse genetic pool.
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Once appropriate parents have been selected, the offspring population is created via a
crossover operation which combines parts from two parents to produce two children. Given
that individuals have been defined as lists of weight matrices, the GA implemented for the
training process applies a modified version of the standard ‘two-points’ crossover. In this
modified version, and because each matrix represents a different synaptic connection, the
standard two-point crossover is applied row-wise between corresponding matrices from both
parents. The probability for two individuals to be combined is set to 0.8.
The third, and final, evolutionary operation applied to the resulting population of children
is mutation. Since individuals are lists of real valued weight matrices, mutation within the
implemented GA takes the form of random replacement with values sampled from a Gaussian
distribution of mean µ = 0 and standard deviation σ = 1. The probability for an individual
to be mutated is set to 0.05. Furthermore, if an individual is selected for mutation, then the
probability for an element of a weight matrix to be replace is set to 0.8.
In the end, after evaluating the whole population, then ranking and selecting the parents for
the next generation, the selected individuals are evolved through combination and mutation
to produce offspring. The old population is then replaced with the children, and the genetic
process starts all over again for many generations.

APPENDIX C
Specifics of the Viking Doom project and the second version of
the game engine
Viking Doom is a benchmark in the shape of a roguelike game. It is used in Chapter 6 to inves-
tigate the role of emotions in the decision-making process through the PrimEmo architecture
described in Section 6.1 and Appendix B. Furthermore, the use of a game as a benchmark
is all the more convenient, since reinforcement learning agents (more specifically a deep Q-
learning (DQN) and an Advantage Actor-Critic (A2C) controllers) have been implemented
for comparison. Indeed, games by their very nature have a dense reward function (usually
this is the current score), which can be used to efficiently direct the learning process. There-
fore, even if the nature of the task is quite complex both the DQN and the A2C agents should
be able to relatively quickly learn an optimal strategy, while avoiding divergence or local optima.
As explained at length in Section 6.2 and Section 6.3, Viking Doom was first intended to
be used in a competition. As such, an accompanying website and a JavaScript backed display
have been implemented. However, because the competition did not yield any useful results
and the environment’s design was flawed a second, standalone, version of Viking Doom was
created. This appendix describes in more details the interface developed for building agents
capable of playing the version of Viking Doom. It then provides all the specifics required for
implementing the second version of Viking Doom’s game engine.
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C.1 Defining a protocol for players to communicate with
Viking Doom’s game engine
When organizing an on-line machine learning competition it seems there are two popular
approaches. The first one is to provide the game engine in advance, so that players can develop
their virtual agents. For the competition, participants then upload the final version of their
agents to a central repository. It is then the responsibility of the server hosting the competition to
automatically execute the different agents, and have them compete in a round-robin tournament.
This kind of scheme puts all the cost and complexities on the competition’s host. Furthermore,
it also limits the programming languages in which players can implement their virtual agents.
Another possibility, and the one adopted for the first version of Viking Doom, is to design
the game around a client/server model. This not only spreads the cost between the host and the
participants, but also alleviates some of the problems faced by the previous approach. Firstly, it
does not force participants to use a single programming language to implement their virtual
agents. Since HTTP is a standard protocol, clients can be written in virtually any language.
Furthermore, since participants do not have to submit their virtual agents to be run on a central
host computer, it removes any need for automation scripts, and allows players to more quickly
deploy new versions of their programs. However, the flexibility afforded by a client/server
architecture comes at a cost. The most important, in the point of view of the participants, is
that it requires players to have a ‘good’ (in terms of speed and stability) Internet connection
and to leave their computers running for the whole duration of the competition. Furthermore,
since different programming languages can be used to implement virtual agents, it means that
the server has to send data in a format understandable by all. This section, therefore, details the
design of the game engine and explains how it mitigates some of the problems expressed so far
to provide an even playing field for all participants.
C.1.1 Registering a player
Before any adventuring business can begin, users first have to register as new players. To do that
they need to provide a ‘username’ and some personal information. Once the subscription form
has been submitted to the server each user receives a unique code made of 15 alphanumeric
characters. This code is the only way the server can identify heroes and link them to a specific
username. Consequently, if a user ever loses their code they will have to register a new player
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and restart their journey through the ranks.
Now that a new players has been created and associated with unique codes, users can finally
start programming their agents. Indeed, Viking Doom is not a game to be enjoyed by mere
humans. It pitches AIs (artificially intelligent agents) against AIs and display the resulting
battle on the associated website’s home page for humans to enjoy (see Figure C.1 for some
examples of this display; a live version is also available as a video 1). To help in the process
of creating an agent, users can have a look at the random agent available in the VikingDoom
project on Github 2. There they should also find the game engine and its accompanying website.
This will allow them to test their agents before entering the real battle. By cloning or forking
the whole project, users are free to further improve the game and use it for their own end.
As shown in Figure C.2, an agent at its core acts like a simple HTTP Client sending ‘PUT’
and ‘POST’ requests to the Viking Doom server and receiving a JSON formatted response.
It is then up to the user to include some logic in the agent and have it devise some brilliant
strategies to always gather more gold, while avoiding danger. Even though, the game engine
(acting as the server) and the website are written in Python, agents can be implemented in
any programming language, be it JAVA, C or C++. JSON has been chosen, because it is
a language-independent human-readable data format commonly used to store and transmit
objects consisting of attribute-value pairs. Even though, it is derived from JavaScript, many
programming languages are able to generate and parse JSON formatted data. Furthermore,
although textual data is not the most efficient way (in terms of bandwidth requirements) to
transmit information over the Internet, JSON formatted information is easy to handle for clients
and does not incur as much overhead as data compression/decompression would. Finally, the
different objects (detailed in Sub-Sub-Sections C.1.3 — C.1.3) have been designed to contain
the strict minimum required to describe the state of the environment and of all the heroes.
Further optimizing bandwidth usage and communication speed.
C.1.2 Joining a game of Viking Doom
To begin a new game, well players simply ask for it by sending a ‘PUT’ request to the
url: http://www.vikingdoom.com/game/new/your_code_here/, where ‘your_code_here’
has to be replaced by the code given to each user upon the creation of their associated player.
As an answer the server sends a JSON formatted game object (an example of which is shown in
Listing 1) back. The game object (described in more details in Sub-Sub-Section C.1.3) contains
1https://youtu.be/yndgfQ2HobM
2https://github.com/casparluc/VikingDoom
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Figure C.1 Examples of the display used on the home page of the website associated with the
first version of Viking Doom.
262 Specifics of the Viking Doom project and the second version of the game engine
Figure C.2 A graphical representation of the communication protocol between the player (the
client) and the game engine (the server).
all manner of information, but the most important one in this case is the ‘URL’ attribute. This
contains the url at which players send ‘POST’ requests to move their hero around.
Before going further into playing the actual game, users have to be aware that upon sending the
initial ‘PUT’ request, the server can send back one of the three following HTTP status code:
• ‘201_CREATED’: the corresponding player has been found and added to a game.
• ‘409_CONFLICT’: a player associated with the current user is already part of this game.
Since, users can only have one player per game, it means they will have to ask to be
added to another game.
• ‘404_NOT_FOUND’: the server was unable to find a player linked to the unique code
the user sent.
C.1.3 Playing a game of Viking Doom
Playing the actual game follows a pattern similar to that of asking for a new game. Users simply
send the action, they want their heroes to perform next, through a ‘POST’ request and wait for
the server to send the JSON formatted game state back. The same two steps are repeated until
all players are ‘Terminated’ or the game is ‘Finished’.
When asking for a new game users receive and should parse the JSON formatted response.
As mentioned earlier, the game object contains the ‘url’ to which users should address all of
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their consequent ‘POST’ requests for the up coming game. The body of the request should
contain:
• code (required): the 15 alphanumeric characters corresponding the player.
• action (required): the action the hero should to perform next. See Sub-Sub-Section C.1.3
for the different values this parameter can take.
Shortly after the server sends back a game object, that users can parse to take decisions
about their next move. Users only have one second to send the next action and it has to be a
valid move. Failure to do so more than three times leads to the linked player being ‘Terminated’.
A terminated player can still still send actions, but none will be considered by the game engine.
If everything goes well and all agents manage to play for 1000 turns, the game enters its
‘Finished’ state. Scores for the game are recorded in a database and combined with previous
scores to form the global rank of each user. Once a game is ‘Finished’ actions can no longer be
sent to the server. Similar the previous phase, sending an action in a ‘POST’ request can result
in four different HTTP status codes:
• ‘504_GATEWAY_TIMEOUT’: the game is still waiting for more players to join. Or the
previous game is not finished yet and this one is still in the queue.
• ‘503_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE’: the game the user trying to access is ‘Finished’. No
one is playing anymore and the scores have been recorded. Users should ask for another
game.
• ‘404_NOT_FOUND’: the server could not find the game or player associated with the
code sent by the user. The user should make sure that he is sending the correct code in
the body of the ‘POST’ request and that the ‘url’ is correctly formatted.
• ‘200_OK’: the associated player has been found and the game is still playing. The user’s
request for the next action has been sent to the game engine and will be considered
shortly.
The game object
The game object is the top level container. It includes information about the map, all heroes,
the hero attributed to the current player in particular and the aforementioned ‘url’. Here is an
example of a game object:
The different fields are:







"heroes": [ ... ],
"map": { ... },
"your_hero": { ... }
}
Listing 1 An example of a JSON formatted game object returned by the Viking Doom server.
• ‘map’: a map object, containing information about the state of the environment. See
Listing 2 for more details on its content.
• ‘players’: in each game four players are participating. This list of player objects contains
the heroes’ state (health, gold, position and more). Refer to Listing 3, as well as Sub-
Sub-Section C.1.3 below for an in-depth description of its content.
• ‘turn’: this is a simple integer indicating the game turn to which this object corresponds
to. The turn meter begins at 0 and goes to a maximum of 1000.
• ‘url’: the ‘url’ to which users have to send all their actions in the shape of ‘POST’
requests.
• ‘code’: similar to the code attributed to each player, this string of 15 alphanumeric
characters is an identifier for this game.






• ‘your_hero’: A hero object that repeats the state corresponding to the hero the current
player owns. It is a shortcut for accessing what really matters to the agent.
C.1 Defining a protocol for players to communicate with Viking Doom’s game engine 265
The Map object
The map object includes information relevant to the environment that players are currently





$_ ~P !S ##
@2 ##
###### ##
## ########## $_ @3##
## ########## ##
## ########## ##










Listing 2 An example of a JSON formatted map object returned by the Viking Doom server.
this object are:
• str_map: a string representation of the current state of the map.
• width: an integer representing the width of the map in columns. Equivalent to the size of
the map along the X axis.
• height: an integer representing the height of the map in rows. Equivalent to the size of
the map along the Y axis.
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The map object contains an encoded representation of the current environment’s state. For
each turn agents have to decode this string and extract any relevant information. Each object is
represented by two characters as follow:
• ‘##’: a simple wall. Heroes cannot step on such tiles,
• ‘$_’: a mine that does not belong to anyone,
• ‘$1’: a mine that belongs to the first player,
• ‘@1’: the hero controlled by the first player,
• ‘!S’: an enemy unit:
– ‘!S’: references skeleton units,
– ‘!D’: represents The Dragon,
• ‘?P’: an item:
– ‘?P’: for potion,
– ‘?G’: for a purse full of gold,
– ‘?B’: for a chest of gold,
• ‘ P’: indicate the location and type of a market. With:
– ‘ P’: for potion selling markets,
– ‘ U’: for strength upgrade caravans.
It should be noted that Orc units are not represented in the encoded map since each mine has an
orc guarding it. Therefore, players can assume that: “Where there is a mine, there is an orc”.
The Hero object
Inside the global game container, there are five hero objects. One for each player and a shortcut
to the hero associated with the player originating the request (aptly named ‘your_hero’). These
objects describe the state of each hero as seen in the following example: Where:
• ‘hero_id’: an integer in the range [1,4] uniquely identifying the hero in the current game,
• ‘pos_x’: is the current position of the hero along the X axis,














Listing 3 An example of a JSON formatted hero object returned by the Viking Doom server.
• ‘pos_y’: is the current position of the hero along the Y axis,
• ‘spawn_x’: is the initial position of the hero along the X axis,
• ‘spawn_y’: is the initial position of the hero along the Y axis,
• ‘health’: an integer representing the hero’s level of health,
• ‘gold’: the amount of gold amassed since the beginning of the game,
• ‘strength’: indicates the level of strength the hero currently has,




• ‘action’: a single character representing the action performed by the hero during the last
turn. In addition to the available actions described below, this fields can take the values:
– ‘F’: Fight
– ‘B’: Buy
268 Specifics of the Viking Doom project and the second version of the game engine
Figure C.3 A graphical representation of the different actions a player can request its hero to
perform.
Even though, they are called actions the request players send for their hero is more of a
direction for the hero’s next move. Thus, as the picture above shows in the ‘POST’ request the
‘action’ variable can contain only one of the following characters:
• ‘N’: going upward along the Y axis,
• ‘W’: going left along the X axis,
• ‘S’: going down the Y axis,
• ‘E’: going right along the X axis,
• and finally ‘I’: stands for idle, if the player wishes for his hero to remain standing on the
same tile.
C.2 Viking Doom 2.0: specifics regarding the game engine
At the end of Section 6.2 a peculiar strategy adopted by all the agents was brought up. This
strategy is characterized by the hero either not moving at all for the whole game, or moving in
one direction until the hero bumps into a wall and then stays in place. Throughout Section 6.3
possible causes for learning algorithms to fall into this local optimum were briefly discussed:
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• Since heroes could not step on an already occupied tile, they could only gather items or
fight enemies on neighboring tiles. A hero’s neighborhood was defined as the set of tiles
above, below, left and right of its current location. Consequently, on a single game cycle
a hero could gather up to four items and/or fight up to four enemies. Combined with the
fact that items were randomly scattered around the map, it means that heroes had a high
probability of picking up gold while staying idle.
• Once a hero had gained ownership of a mine, its level of gold would rise by a constant
amount on each game cycle. Since the reward’s value heavily depends on the hero’s level
of gold, it means that any action taken would be positively reinforced, hence, confusing
the learning algorithm.
Additionally, the first version of the game engine was meant to work as a Web server accepting
and answering requests from remote players on the Internet. This client/server architecture
was dictated by the on-line nature of the competition. However, moving away from the on-line
competition and toward a standalone experiment meant that the game engine now had to run on
a High Performance Computer. Consequently, the Web server had to be abandoned. To solve
all those issues it was,therefore, necessary to redesign the environment from the ground up and
establish new rules for the game. Enters Viking Doom 2.0.
This section is a complement to Section 6.3, and provides all the details required for
implementing Viking Doom. Alternatively, it is also possible to clone or fork the Viking Doom
project on GitLab 3, and run the experiment presented in this thesis on your computer.
C.2.1 Configuring a complex and dynamic environment
As already mentioned in Sub-Section 6.2.2, the background and obstacles of every maps in
the first version of Viking Doom were hand drawn. This was a tedious process, which limited
the number and variety of environments available. To streamline the map creation process, in
Viking Doom 2.0, configuration files have been introduced. As is shown in Listing 4, this file
not only contains the width and height of the map, it also defines the position of all the obstacles,
as well as areas and their associated quotas. Finally, at the end are specified the maximum
number of items and enemies, on a per type basis, that can appear at once in the environment.
Using configuration files, rather than static images, not only allows for quickly designing new
and interesting environments, a great asset for the experimentation and exploration process, it
3https://gitlab.com/davinellulinvega/vikingdoomv2.git
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means that the creation process could also be entirely automated. Regardless of how the files
are produced, for running an experiment it is required to provide a list of configuration. To
train the different controllers, it is then possible to either go through the list of environment
sequentially or randomly. Both are valid choices, but have different advantages and drawbacks.
Considering the environments randomly is more suitable for training a controller, but means
that reproducing the results might be more difficult. The reverse being true for going through
the different configurations in sequence.
At the beginning of each game, a configuration file is read and the environment is initialized
with the corresponding set of obstacles, enemies and items. As mentioned in Sub-Section 6.3.2,
those objects and the heroes are contained and managed by the environment. This means that
whenever an item or enemy disappears from the map, it is the environment’s responsibility to
replace it on the next turn. Similarly, the attributes from all enemies and heroes currently on




"obstacles": [[2, 2], [2, 7], [7, 2], [7, 6]],
"areas": [
{"id": "0", "position_min": [0, 0], "position_max": [4, 4]},
{"id": "1", "position_min": [4, 4], "position_max": [9, 9]},
{"id": "2", "position_min": [0, 4], "position_max": [4, 9]},
{"id": "3", "position_min": [4, 0], "position_max": [9, 4]}
],
"quotas": {
"0": {"hero": 1, "enemy": 25, "item": 18},
"1": {"hero": 1, "enemy": 25, "item": 18},
"2": {"hero": 1, "enemy": 25, "item": 18},
"3": {"hero": 1, "enemy": 25, "item": 18}
},
"max_enemy_counts": {"skeleton": 0, "troll": 0, "dragon": 2},
"max_item_counts": {"purse": 0, "chest": 12, "potion": 12}}
Listing 4 An example of a JSON formatted configuration file, from which a complete environment
can be created.
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C.2.2 Assigning values to the incentives and dangers
In Sub-Section 6.3.3 six objects are described as populating the environment, aside from
obstacles and heroes. Those objects can be sorted into two main categories: collectible ‘items’
and ‘enemies’ to fight. In this version of Viking Doom heroes can collect the following items:
• Purse and chest: purses only grant 5 units of gold, while chests are worth 25 units of
gold. This discrepancy in reward has been included in the design, so that controllers
could adapt their strategy depending on the expected reward. For example, if a hero finds
itself in the following scenario: the closest gold item is a chest, but it is right next to a
dragon, while the second closest item is a purse. It is expected of any controller, whose
completed its learning phase, to chose to collect the isolated purse. The logic behind
this choice is quite simple. On the one hand, going toward the chest (the highest reward)
comes with the risk of having to fight an enemy (a dragon, the strongest unit) and maybe
dying in the process. Picking the purse as the next target, on the other hand, is certain to
yield a reward, albeit a smaller one.
• Health potion: Whereas purse and chest can be considered virtual incentives, since they
are only relevant in the context of this game, health potion is a real motivator necessary
to the hero’s survival. Indeed, the only option for a hero that has taken some damage and
is not at full health anymore, is to collect potions which increase its health level by 25
units each. It is expected for a controller, whose learning phase has been completed, to
show a preference for health potions rather than chests or purses, whenever a hero is in
need of healing.
To allow the investigation of both positive and negative emotions, Viking Doom also provides
dangers in the form of enemy units. During a typical game heroes can come across three types
of opponents. From the weakest to the strongest they are:
• Skeletons: Every instances of this type are initialized with 10 units of health and a single
unit of strength. Given the low-level of health skeletons are granted, heroes are expected
to discover that they can easily defeat them and therefore increase their strength. Indeed,
killing a skeleton is rewarded with one unit of gold and one of strength. Similar to the
first version of Viking Doom, skeletons can move on every game turn. Compared to
the previous implementation, though, their movements are not random. Instead, upon
initialization a skeleton is assigned an initial position and has an area of effect. This area
is a circle around the unit’s initial position and with a radius of one tile. Once initialized
a skeleton unit, therefore, executes a very simple strategy. By default a skeleton waits for
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a hero to enter its area of effect. The enemy unit then uses an A* algorithm to determine
the quickest path to the hero, and move in that direction. If the skeleton manages to catch
up with the hero, they automatically fight. A skeleton will pursue a hero until the hero
either exits the area of effect or dies. At this point the skeleton simply moves back to its
initial position, and waits for another hero to come by. If two heroes are within the area
at the same time, only the closest hero from the skeleton’s current location becomes the
target. Even though, skeletons are weak and should not be a threat to any healthy hero, a
swarm can quickly become quite deadly.
• Trolls: They are characterized by a level of strength of 12.5 units, 25 units of health and
the fact that they are static. A fully trained controller will rarely, if ever, meet a troll,
since it should have learned to avoid enemies through its encounters with the skeleton
units. Unless a hero is seeking a fight with a specific troll, it is expected that the hero will
rather learn to optimize its way around the static troll. Trolls are only virtual obstacles,
since they can be fought and defeated. Doing so grants the victor 10 units of gold and
three units of strength.
• Dragons: With 75 units of health and 25 of strength, this enemy is the most fearsome.
Similar to skeletons, dragons are mobile and are assigned an initial location. From this
location a circular area of effect with a radius of two tiles is defined. Any hero setting foot
in this area will fall prey to the dragon’s wrath. Dragons’ movements are also planned
based on the A* algorithm and they retreat to their initial position when the hero dies
or leaves the area. Unlike skeletons, dragons can only move on odd turns of the game.
Their fighting ability is not impeded, only movement is.
No matter its type when an enemy unit is on the same tile as a hero, it automatically fights said
hero dealing damage at every turn of the game. Furthermore, it should be noted that within the
Viking Doom project, whenever distance is mentioned it is taken to be the Manhattan distance
or L1 norm.
To address the issue of heroes being able to ‘win’ the game without moving, any randomness
in the initialization process of objects has been removed, and two rules common to all objects
(heroes included) have been enforced. Firstly, heroes can only interact with objects on the same
tile as them. That is, to collect items or fight enemies (or other heroes) a hero’s position has
to overlap with that of the object in question. This was introduced to decrease the probability
of heroes collecting items without having to move. To actually force heroes to work before
obtaining a reward, the second rule that has been implemented is: an object cannot be initialized
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on an already occupied tile. So, for example, items cannot appear on the same tile as heroes or
enemy units.
To allow a more flexible design process of the map and a precise placement of the different
items, enemies, and heroes, compliant with the rules above, the concepts of ‘area’ and ‘quota’
have been introduced. This is also a measure to prevent another phenomenon observed in
the previous version of the project. Given that previous maps were bigger in size it was less
apparent, but narrow areas (i.e.: bottlenecks) usually ended up being overcrowded, since not a
lot of heroes were going through to collect items or battle enemies.
Areas and their associated quotas are a flexible solution to all those problems. As shown
in Listing 4, both areas and quotas are defined in the configuration file. An area is simply a
square shape zone characterized by a minimum and maximum position along the X and Y axis.
It is not actually drawn on the map, but virtually constrains objects (such as heroes, items and
enemies) to appear in certain parts. Due to the restriction on the shape, areas can overlap or be
independent from each other.
Each area has three associated quotas: one regulating the number of heroes that can be
initialized in this area, another for the number of enemies, whose initial position is within the
area and a last one for the number of items present in the area at the same time. Note that the
quotas are not specific to each sub-type of items or enemies. This is so that if an area already
contains a dragon, for example, only a few trolls or skeletons can be added, but no dragon. As
such it creates a system that is simple to configure, balances itself out and avoids having any
overcrowded area on the map.
In addition to all the other attributes defined above, each item and enemy unit is also assigned
a ‘fulfillment rate’. When adding an object to a specific area, the environment decreases the
quota by the corresponding fulfillment rate. Deleting an object, therefore, increases the area’s
quota again, allowing other items or enemies to be created. Consequently, whenever the
environment creates a new item or enemy unit, it first ensures that the maximum number of this
type of object has not been reached yet (this number is part of the environment’s configuration
as seen in Listing 4). Then it goes through all the areas and checks which one has a quota
higher that the object’s fulfillment rate. If more than one area meets this condition, an area is
chosen at random, using the quotas of each area as weights for the sampling process. Finally,
a random valid position is picked within the selected area. Here a valid position is defined
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as a tile, which is not currently occupied by an enemy, a hero, an obstacle or an item. The
fulfillment rate of a hero, a potion, a purse and a skeleton is set to one. Trolls and chests both
have fulfillment rates of five and dragons are the highest with a rate of 25.
C.2.3 Implementing controllers for the heroes
This final part is an extension to Sub-Section 6.3.4 as it provides the specifics required for
implementing the Deep Q-learning (DQN) and Advantage Actor-Critic (A2C) controllers. The
source code for both controllers is also available on GitLab 4 as part of the Viking Doom project.
The main difference between Deep Q-learning (Mnih et al., 2013) and the Q-learning
algorithm, detailed in Sub-Section 3.2.4, is that Deep Q-learning makes use of a neural network
in place of an array to approximate the value function. Based on the features provided by the
generic controller, the Deep Q-learning network outputs the Q-values corresponding to all
actions at once. The vector of Q-values thus computed is then passed to the ε-greedy policy,
which decides on the next action to perform. The specific implementation written for this
experiment contains ten hidden layers, made of ReLU neural units, and a simple linear output.
A linear output is used, since the neural activity of each unit represents the expected value of
one of the available actions. The networks parameters (i.e.: the different weights and biases)
are updated using the Adam optimizer (Kingma & Ba, 2015). At its core, this optimizer relies
on the backpropagation algorithm to propagate the loss from the output layer to the input. For
the output layer, the Mean Squared Error (MSE) is used as the loss function. In its standard











Where n is the number of predictions (or the size of the output layer), Y is the vector of observed
values for the variable being predicted and Ŷ the vector of predicted values. However, the
ground truth for the different Q-values (Y in Equation C.1) required by this standard definition
of MSE is unknown. In fact, it the agent’s goal to learn an approximation of these Q-values,
while only being told how better or worse the new state is, compared to the previous one. What
the reinforcement learning process provides though, via the TD error described in Equation 3.5,
is an estimate of the true Q-values: Y = rt+1 + γ × ν(St+1,a;ωt). It should be noted, that
in Equation 3.5 the Q-value function was only dependent of the state, since in a classical
4https://gitlab.com/davinellulinvega/vikingdoomv2.git
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conditioning experiment the subject is passive and receives a reward/punishment regardless of
any action performed. For the Viking Doom task (which can be seen as an operant conditioning
experiment), on the other hand, the agent is rewarded or punished for performing an action
from a given state. Hence, the Q-value function depends on both the state St and the action a.
Putting it all together results in a loss function resembling the TD error of Equation 3.5, for the
Deep Q-learning network:
lossDQN =
1n ×∑ni=1 (rt+1 −ν(St ,ai;ωt))




i=1 (rt+1 + γ ×ν(St+1,ai;ωt)−ν(St ,ai;ωt))
2 otherwise
(C.2)
Furthermore, to avoid catastrophic forgetting and improve the neural network’s stability, the
Deep Q-learning controller makes use of both a target network, updated every 300 cycles, and
experience replay.
The Advantage Actor-Critic (A2C) implemented follows the architecture suggested in Mnih
et al. (2016). However, rather than having many asynchronous learners the current imple-
mentation only has a single agent. Hence, the lack of ‘Asynchronous’ in the name. In its
simplest version, the A2C architecture simply expands on the basic Actor-Critic model detailed
in Section 3.3. The Critic, whose task it is to estimate the value of a given state, uses the same
loss function as the Deep-Q learning network described above (see Equation C.2). The only
difference being, that the Critic only learns to expect a reward irrespective of the last action
performed. Therefore, the value function, the Critic seeks to optimize, only depends on the
environment’s state, and only a single linear neural unit is necessary to represent the Critic’s
output. Consequently, the equation corresponding to the Critic’s loss can be rewritten as:
losscrit =
(rt+1 −ν(St ;ωt))
2 if the episode ended
(rt+1 + γ ×ν(St+1;ωt)−ν(St ;ωt))2 otherwise
(C.3)
As determined in Section 3.3, the role of the Actor is not only to choose the next action to
perform, following the softmax policy defined in Equation 3.10, but also to optimize said
policy. To accomplish that the Actor updates its weights, at each time step, following the rules
described by Equation 3.9.
This is where the A2C architecture really differentiate itself from the standard Actor-Critic
model imagined by Sutton (1984). In the original version, the update rule for the Actor’s
weights did not include the TD error (δt), instead relying on the Q-value associated with a
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given state to compute the change. Getting back to Equation 3.9b, the rule would be closer to:
θt+1 = θt + ε ×ν(St ;ωt)× zθt (C.4)
However, this expression presents a serious problem. For example, if the estimated values,
for three states: A, B and C, are close to one another, such as 102, 103 and 101, respectively.
Going from the current state to any of those three would result in a considerable update to the
network’s weights, but most of the information important to the learner is lost. Indeed, the only
relevant fact for the Actor (that state B is the best one) is hidden away in the small relative
differences between the states’ values. Williams (1992) introduced the concept of the ‘baseline’
to solve this problem. The idea behind this approach is quite simple. By subtracting the same
amount from all states’ values, the important information is emphasized. Therefore, in the
example above, a baseline of 100 could be used, to tell the learner how advantageous state B is
compared to A and C. The only constraint is that the baseline be independent from the action






i × rt+i + γk ×ν(St+k;ωt)−ν(St ;ωt) (C.5)
Where k can vary between episodes, but is upper bounded by the number of steps between
two learning phases. For each time step t, this quantity represents the discrepancy between
the expected value of a given state and an estimation of its actual value, also known as the TD
error. Consequently, introducing the Advantage within the learning rule means, that rather than
simply telling the agent how good an action was, it now knows just how better than expected
said action actually is. The resulting expression for updating the network’s weights is:
θt+1 = θt + ε × [Rt −ν(St ;ωt)]×
[
λ
θ zθt−1 +∇ log(π(at |St ;θt))
]
(C.6)
Where Rt = ∑∞k=0 γ
krt+k, is defined as the accumulation of the discounted rewards expected by
the agent at time t and in state St . Finally, to improve exploration an entropy term H is added
to the learning rule. In this case, the entropy can be seen as a measure of how certain the Actor
is when choosing a given action. Intuitively, if the Actor outputs similar probabilities for all
possible actions, the entropy will be high and so will the corresponding weights update. On the
contrary, if one action has a much higher probability of being chosen compared to the others,
then the entropy will be low. Thus, resulting in a smaller change in weights. Including the
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entropy, the rule for updating the Actor’s policy can be reformulated as:
θt+1 = θt + ε × [β∇H (π(at |St ;θt))+(Rt −ν(St ;ωt))×∇ log(π(at |St ;θt))] (C.7)
